EXPLORING AND TEACHING THE KOREAN WAR
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Korean War Legacy Foundation (KWLF) Veterans Interview Archive

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As we approach the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War this year, the history of the
United Kingdom’s involvement in the Korean Peninsula can be understood in relation to its traditional
role as balancer. In the early twentieth century, the United Kingdom’s policy in Korea involved allying
with the United States and Japan to deter Russian expansion southward, while also establishing inroads
into the power of the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910) by securing harbours between China and Japan.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance from 1902 to 1903 aimed to secure the UK and Japan’s interests in China
and Korea, respectively; however, the UK’s strategic interest in this alliance was to deter Russian
expansionism, culminating in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Great Britain was keenly aware
of the geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, mainly in the context of the rivalries among
China, Japan and Russia in their tug-of-war over the declining Joseon dynasty.

Although first contact between Britain and Korea left few clear records, it is chronicled that Captain
William Broughton of the HMS Providence was ordered to disembark at Busan in 1797. Eighty-six years
later, the countries signed a treaty for the two-year British naval occupation of Geomundo, a small island
south of the Peninsula. Before the Korean War in 1950, Britain’s interests in Korea were ‘distant but
nonetheless an obligation’ in the words of then prime minister Clement Atlee.

Despite Korea’s relatively low priority for the UK, Great Britain committed the second largest military
to the Korean War, second only to the United States’ 1.79 million. From 1950 to 1957, Great Britain
committed over 100,000 soldiers. During the actual war period from 30 June 1950 to 27 July 1953,
about 60,000 British served, 746 were killed, 2,533 were wounded and 1,157 were missing in action,
with 977 prisoners of war. British Commonwealth Forces Korea (BCFK), which included the first deployment
of Australian military as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan after World War II,
numbered over 100,000. With such commitment of Great Britain as a UN Security Council member and an
ally to the United States, its bilateral relationship with Korea turned a corner, ushering in a new era, mainly
due to changing views of Korea among British soldiers, with increasing admiration for Korea’s simultaneous
achievement of economic rebirth and democratic development.

In the Korean War veterans digital archive of the Korean War Legacy Foundation
(www.koreanwarlegacy.org), constructed with the unwavering support of Korea’s Ministry of Patriots
and Veterans Affairs (MPVA), about 50 Korean War veterans from the United Kingdom witness their
first impressions of modern Korea: most knew little about Korea and found it very foreign, primitive
and extremely poor. Even in the mid-twentieth century, Korea’s place in the minds of British soldiers
was unclear. When they left Korea in the middle of war, they had no idea that Korea would ever rise from
the ashes. British veterans, when asked if they could ever have imagined that Korea would become the
11th largest economy in the world and most substantive democracy in Asia, almost unanimously shook
their heads. There was no way to foresee a Korean nation when nothing had been left standing. When
they returned to the Republic of Korea through the MPVA’s ‘Revisit Korea’ programme, veterans often
spoke of finding a sense of closure for unresolved memories they had long hoped to put behind them.

Korea has not just become a power of industry and technology; it has also attracted global attention
among young generations through cultural phenomena like K-pop and English Premier star players like
Ji-sung Park and Heung-min Son. In 2030, Korea is projected to become the seventh largest economic
power in the world, directly behind the United Kingdom and ahead of France, as mutual interdependence
and Korea–UK exchanges have deepened to an unprecedented level since their first encounter in the
eighteenth century. Korea now has a place in the history of Great Britain, as well as in the minds of those
who honourably served and sacrificed: a source of pride for 100,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers
and gratitude from Koreans for their contribution to the success that Korea has become.
Having gathered oral histories from Korean War veterans from the 22 countries that participated in the war, as well as about 1,600 in-depth interviews, with thousands of artefacts, the Korean War Legacy and World History Digital Education Foundations published in 2019 the first K-12 curriculum book, containing analyses of more than 1,000 interviews of American Korean War veterans by America’s largest social studies organisation, the National Council for Social Studies. We are now giving birth to the second curriculum book, reflecting the last 70 years of British involvement in Korean history. These valuable educational resources breathe life into the honour and sacrifices of our heroes, continuing their legacy onward.

It was in the summer of 2017 that I first met Melanie Jones, Educational Director of the Historical Association (HA), to discuss collaborating on a series of interviews with Korean War veterans in the UK. In 2018, Executive Director Joseph Karb and I drafted specific plans to produce this book while participating in the HA’s annual conference in Stratford-upon-Avon. Ben Walsh has led eight history teachers from the UK to reflect on the changed place of the Korean War in British history curricula, bringing us a step closer to publishing curricular resources for the 22 countries that participated in the Korean War. Thank you, Ben and Mel.

I want to thank the Historical Association and the entire staff, including Maheema Chanrai, for making such a strong professional effort and commitment. Foremost, Joseph Karb’s action plans have played a vital role in transforming our veterans’ oral histories into resources that educators can easily use in classes on the changing place of Korea in the world history curriculums.

I also want to acknowledge the support of veterans from all 22 countries in helping teachers to change attitudes towards and understanding of Korea. Ultimately this work can only be done ‘by the teachers for the teachers’ – my foundation’s most important catchphrase. My sincere appreciation goes to our UK teachers, who have done such superb jobs in writing this publication.

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In honour of our heroes’ precious sacrifice,

Dr Jongwoo Han
President,
Korean War Legacy Foundation (www.koreanwarlegacy.org)
World History Digital Education Foundation (www.worldhistoryde.org)
Throughout world history, as nations have risen and fallen, wars have been among the most important events. Wars serve as indispensable means for new powers and states but unavoidable realities for the defeated. For powers both new and old, however, wars have immense costs in human lives. Thus, we must find the positive outcomes and rationales, or new challenges, however ironic that may seem.

Long ago, the Peloponnesian War (B.C. 431–404) demonstrated the power of not only democratic governance in the Greek city states but also their alliance against the authoritarian and totalitarian system of Sparta. World Wars I and II saw the end of Western colonial imperialism, establishing what Immanuel Kant would have recognised as a ‘Pacific Union’ among Western democracies. The Vietnam War defeated American-backed French colonialism and triggered political and civic activism in the United States in the 1960s and ‘70s. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ushered the globe into a new type of fanatic religious warfare, challenging us to consider the thousand-year-old issue of who is right within the current context of counter-terrorism.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KOREAN WAR FOR KOREA

But what were the by-products of the Korean War? Many epithets have been used, including ‘A sour little war’ by W. Averell Harriman and ‘police action’ by Harry S. Truman. The Republicans called it ‘the foreign policy blunder of the century’. General Omar Bradley called it ‘Frankly, a great military disaster’ (Goulden, 1982, p. xiii). More broadly, it has been described as a template of Cold War conflict, a starting point for bipolar Cold War international politics between the US and the Soviet Union and, most famously, ‘the forgotten war’. Critically, though, it is the longest of wars in the twentieth century, as the 1953 Armistice was never officially replaced by a peace treaty, leading to dire situations of international importance such as North Korea’s nuclear provocations and the Sino-US collision course.

This ongoing war has also dramatically impacted the destinies of the two Koreas: North Korea, isolated, totalitarian and hunger-stricken, versus South Korea, dramatically transformed from aid-receiving to aid-offering, with the most dynamic democracy. What could have caused such a stark contrast between these regimes, despite having shared the same history, culture and political system for millennia before separation in 1948, three years before the Korean War?

How can we explain such disparities between these two groups of people, separated from each other only by international powers and ideological competition? The past 70 years have marked a watershed, completely shifting the courses of these separated but related nations. Korea has continuously maintained national identity through the Three Kingdoms, Goguryeo (B.C. 37–668), Baekjae (B.C. 18–660), Silla (B.C. 57–935), Goryeo (918–1392) and the Joseon periods (1392–1910), with a recorded history of five millennia.
Since the early seventh century, the Korean nation had maintained a homogeneous identity, culture and political community. The Joseon dynasty, in particular, was tightly controlled and centralised, with rule of law, a constitution and a standing army. It was one of the longest dynasties, running 518 years, just slightly shorter than the 844-year Holy Roman Empire (962–1806), the 790-year Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC) in China, and the 724-year Ottoman Empire (1299–1923). Considering that this political community thrived as one nation for thousands of years, contemporary division, confrontations and discrepancies between the two Koreas stand out in two ways: the division of a Korean nation into two may be temporary, yet the current impasse between the two Koreas with superpowers like China and the United States is also unprecedented in Korean history. In fact, South Korea’s post-Korean War rebirth is unprecedented in the whole history of Korea.

THE KOREAN WAR AS PART OF A GLOBAL POWER STRUGGLE

In fact, the Korean War was the first major war to occur in the context of the bipolar Cold War system, with North Korea as the first state after World War II to invade and seek the annexation of another (Clemens Jr., 2016, p. 7). It was not only a Korean civil war between North and South but also the first major collision between the US-led alliance of UN forces and the alliance of newly communist China and the Soviet Union. Many Korean War veterans interviewed by the Korean War Legacy Foundation (www.kwvdm.org; www.koreanwarlegacy.org) clearly recall encountering no North Korean soldiers after the Korean War entered stalemate trench warfare in 1951. To these UN veterans, their Korean War enemies were Chinese, in the absence of Russia, in most cases.

Another important historical fact that we need to be aware of is that the legacy of the Korean War is that it was not Japan, the Axis Power, that divided Korea. This was carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union, tacitly backed by other powers at the end of World War II. The principle of dividing Germany was not applied to Japan. Instead, it was the Korean Peninsula, which was the victim of Japanese colonial occupancy, that was divided. Korean interests and voices were completely ignored and disregarded, if not disdained. According to Fry (2013), future US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, then a colonel on General George Marshall’s staff, and fellow Army staffer Colonel Charles ‘Tic’ Bonesteel were assigned with identifying a line of control that both the USA and the Soviets could agree to. Time was of the essence: the Soviets had just entered the war against Japan, and American officials were worried that they would rush in to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula before the USA, whose nearest troops were still 600 miles (966 kilometres) away on Okinawa, could establish its own presence on the mainland. Rusk knew that the 38th parallel ‘made no sense economically or geographically’ – Korea, in fact, had enjoyed unity and a high degree of geographic continuity for the better part of a millennium – but this was now the Cold War. Military expediency had to rule the day. Korea, it was thought, would be divided only temporarily. Rusk later recalled the experience in his 1991 memoir, *As I Saw It*:

‘During a meeting on August 14, 1945, the same day as the Japanese surrender, [Bonesteel] and I retired to an adjacent room late at night and studied intently a map of the Korean peninsula. Working in haste and under great pressure, we had a formidable task: to pick a zone for the American occupation. Neither Tic nor I was a Korea expert, but it seemed to us that Seoul, the capital, should be in the American sector. We also knew that the U.S. Army opposed an extensive area of occupation. Using a National Geographic map, we looked just north of Seoul for a convenient dividing line but could not find a natural geographical line. We saw instead the thirty-eighth parallel and decided to recommend that… [Our commanders] accepted it without too much haggling, and surprisingly, so did the Soviets.’

It is almost ridiculous to learn that this was how a nation’s destiny was determined. Two US colonels were ordered to find the most convenient line of permanent division of a nation in a hurry completely ignoring its opinion and that line still exists halving the whole Korean nation.
contemporary international politics centres on North Korea’s nuclear provocations and China’s expansionist policies. These exemplify the power struggles that have stemmed from the unfinished war in the Korean Peninsula. They fought not just for their proxies but for themselves.

When MacArthur ordered UN forces to march north of the 38th parallel and Yalu River, which marks China’s north-east border with North Korea, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) feared pressure from US and UN forces. The US and the UK did not want to spark another world-scale war by colliding with the second-largest communist country backed by the Soviet Union so soon after World War II. The UK government, in particular, vehemently opposed General MacArthur’s idea of nuclear bombing Manchuria. The stalemate since 1951 in the Korean War ended with an armistice in 1953, signed by China, North Korea and the United Nations. The division of Korea cannot be overcome unless these two poles reach an accord and put war behind them. This unbearable legacy of the Korean War may be the most convincing reason why the Western world has not wanted to break the status quo in the Korean Peninsula – it would necessarily involve North Korea being backed by China and rectify the conventional policy of regime denial.

KOREA AND THE KOREAN WAR’S PLACE IN THE ONGOING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USA AND CHINA

Can there be an end to history? This is a legitimate question as we commemorate the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War in 2020 and the 70th anniversary of the Armistice in 2023, ending the Korean War with a ceasefire that has never been replaced with a peace treaty. Francis Fukuyama, in his book *The End of History and the Last Man*, argues that the fall of the Soviet Union and the consequential end of the Cold War indicates that political and economic systems cannot evolve further, concluding that our era is ‘not just... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (1989). Does this argument hold, though, when Korea is still technically at war and China challenges US hegemony in the South China Sea with its One Belt and One Road Initiative to spread Chinese economic and cultural influence?

Will the current encounter between Washington and Pyeongyang mark the end of the evolutionary process of the Korean War? The current state of the US–North Korea conflict, centring around Pyeongyang’s provocative nuclear missile test, poses a threat not only to countries near the Peninsula but also to global peace and stability.

Unfortunately, the 70-year-old rivalry between China and the USA has never been resolved. In fact, China is determined to replace US hegemony and rise beyond Western influence. *South China Morning Post* sees the current bilateral trade war with the USA as not just ‘a mighty tussle over imports and exports’ but ‘pitting China against a coterie of Western nations that see it as the gravest threat to their dominance of the existing world order... On the one side, there is the clear goal of slowing down China’s seemingly inexorable rise as a superpower. And on the other side is China’s determination not to bow to the collective might of the West and forfeit the right to decide its own destiny.’ (Fong, 2018) However politically and parochially oriented this remark may seem, the current trade war between the United States and China is no surprise in this historical context. Since the Korean War and up to the moment at which China became the world’s second-largest economy, this collision course was expected, and even recognised during the Obama administration in his ‘pivot to Asia’ policy. Chinese government and pro-communist intellectuals blame the USA for this trade dispute and hegemonic competition in the South China Sea and Taiwan. Wei (2019) claims
that ‘Washington started to regard Beijing as its strategic rival. Before 2010, the US did not believe China’s national strength could pose a threat to it, nor did it think China was a challenge to the US-led international order.’

Such attitudes and words become a trend. The recently created mouthpiece of the Chinese government, *The Global Times*, wrote an article in which China Central TV (CCTV) reshuffled the broadcasting schedule to suddenly insert movies on the Korean War.¹ From Thursday 16 May 16 to Saturday 18 May 2019, China’s state television aired three classic Chinese films featuring the heroic roles of the Chinese army in the Korean War, replacing the previously scheduled programmes and prompting wide discussions online amid the simmering China–US trade war. CCTV’s movie channel CCTV-6 said on its Weibo on Thursday night that the war classic *Heroic Sons and Daughters* would be aired at 8:25 pm, and the previously scheduled programme of the Asian Film and TV Week would be shown at 10:20 pm. Later, the channel said that it would screen another military film, *Battle on Shangganling Mountain*, depicting a major battle in North Korea, on Friday night. A third classic film, *A Surprise Attack*, was aired on Saturday, replacing the scheduled comedy. All three films featured the war against US aggression and to aid (North) Korea, as it is known in China. (*Global Times*, 2019) The second film in particular was commissioned by Chairman Mao in 1956. The Chinese see the Korean War, in which they fought for the first time against Americans, as the start of their long battle with the United States, and it is still ongoing. Renping (2019) wrote that the current intensifying trade war with the United States recalls the Korean War, saying: ‘The war lasted over three years, and in the later two years of fighting and talking, our persistence on the battlefield and the continuing gains eventually forced the Americans to bow their heads at the negotiating table. Looking at the current arrogance of the American elites toward a strategic crackdown on China, it’s clear that we face a long and almost determined and protracted war regardless of the progress of the trade talks. Regardless of whether a trade deal is signed or not, this game is inevitable. We must carry forward the spirit of the battle on Shangganling Mountain. A trade war is a great game in which we need to create and unleash our vitality while maintaining our position and crush the will of the other side with China’s growing economic strength.’

Sheng (2019) explains why these unscheduled Korean War movies were aired so abruptly. Sheng said that ‘it would broadcast a documentary about the 1950 Battle of Chosin [Jangjin in Korean] Reservoir, an important battle in the war that marks the complete withdrawal of US-led UN troops from North Korea’. He adds that ‘because of the demand from the audiences’, the channel decided to broadcast China-produced movies on the Korean War. ‘We are using movies to echo the current era,’ CCTV-6 said on its Weibo. ‘We are not afraid of the US, not in the past, not today.’

All the current coverage on the trade war between the USA and China corroborates research on how the Korean War has shaped the negative narratives of China’s policy and attitudes with the United States. Gries, Prewitt-Freilino, Cox-Fuenzalida and Zhang (2009, p. 437) conducted an experimental case study on how ‘the valence, source, and nation of historical accounts of the Korean War affect Chinese and US students’ beliefs about this shared past, emotions, national self-esteem, and threat perception in the present’. This article seemingly validates a journalist’s view on the current trade war and its similarity to the Korean War.

**THE POTENT LEGACY OF THE WAR FOR CHINA**

Gries et al. (2009) argue that the unfortunate past between the USA and China still haunts contemporary bilateral affairs, best exemplified by the Korean War. They find that ‘while most Americans have largely forgotten the war, many Chinese not only remember it but also draw pride and strength from that memory. This fortuitous asymmetry of historical relevance mitigates the impact that contending Korean War histories have on US–China relations today… When both parties to a shared contentious past link that past to their self-understandings in the present, there is little room for compromise.’ (Gries et al., 2009, p. 455) As we find from abundant evidence

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¹ *The Medium Global Times*, where these articles appeared, was created by the Chinese government. With more than 600 million Internet users, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for proactive and effective Communist Party-led responses to a changing media environment. Speelman (2015) writes ‘Enter the Paper, or Pangai in Chinese, a web-based media outlet headquartered in Shanghai promising to provide news on “politics and thought” and one of the most successful answers to Xi’s call thus far.’
on how Chinese digital media depicts the current trade friction with the USA, the Korean War represents a deep wound and, simultaneously, a lesson in Chinese relations with the United States; Gries et al. (2009) argue that contemporary affairs are shaped by conflicts about the past. They claim further that ‘Chinese nationalism today is closely tied up with narratives of China’s past victimization at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism, and that nationalism has an impact on China’s foreign policies in general and US policy in particular.’ (Gries et al., 2009, p. 434)

Even before the current trade conflicts, metaphors and direct references to the Korean War have apparently been used in different contexts. Gries et al. (2009) highlight The People’s Daily’s reference to the ‘Korean battleground’ as noteworthy. The CCP (Communist Party of China) has long claimed nationalist legitimacy, partly based on a nationalist narrative in which the CCP led a righteous effort to aid the Korean people and expel the invading US forces from Chinese and Korean soil. Indeed, it has been argued (Gries, 2004, pp. 56–61) that, in Chinese nationalist narratives, “victory” over the US in Korea marks the end of the “Century of Humiliation” and thus remains central to both the collective self-esteem of many Chinese nationalists as well as the legitimacy of the CCP today’ (Gries et al., 2009, p. 434). China sees the Korean War as a way to recover from the humiliation of bowing to Western and Japanese imperialism. This is why the Korean War has resurfaced whenever China faces problems with countries that insult its self-respect.

Gries et al.’s (2009) comparative analyses of high school history textbooks in both countries indicates that the ill-fated past has shaped current frictions between the USA and China.

‘Current textbooks continue to refer to the United States as the “enemy” (in Chinese, diren), suggesting that the United States intervened in the “domestic affairs” of Korea without provocation. No mention is made of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. When MacArthur’s armies headed toward the Yalu River, the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) drove the “invaders” (qinluezhe) back to the thirty-eighth parallel, where they were forced to sign the armistice. The CPV had “won” (shengli), and the United States had “lost” (shibai). By contrast, US history textbooks tend to treat Korea as the “Forgotten War.” Compared to their much more extensive treatment of the “good war” against German and Japanese fascism during World War II, US textbook treatment of the Korean War is brief. For instance, the 1991 eighth edition of the popular McGraw-Hill textbook American History: A Survey devotes thirty pages to World War II but just three to the Korean War. The account begins with the North Korean “invasion” of the South, followed by US intervention to “assist” the overwhelmed South Korean army against “communist forces.” It concludes rather ambiguously with a “protracted stalemate” back at the thirty-eighth parallel where it had all started (see Brinkley et al. 1991, 844–846). There is no discussion of either victory or defeat.’ (Gries et al., 2009, pp. 435–6)

Based on this study, the Korean War has clearly not ended, at least in the context of contemporary Sino-US collisions in East Asia. The Korean War appears to be a living organ, constantly reminding us of the similar problems that caused the US-led UN forces and the Russian-led communist forces to collide. Thus, in this context, neither the Cold War nor history has really ended, but the unresolved scar has frequently resurfaced and produced new problems. In fact, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation drove the parties involved to a dead end in 2018 and 2019, to North Korea’s seventh nuclear and ICBM tests, and to the USA’s consideration of a ‘bloody nose’ attack, a limited...
strike on a missile launch site or other target. South Koreans had to worry about another Korean War before the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.

China’s ambition to rise above the only hegemon, the United States, has been clear in its bold One Belt and One Road Initiative (BRI), declared in the APEC Summit in 2014. Essentially, China wants to revive its heyday of economic power by tying the whole world together on both land and sea. Ironically, the Maritime Silk Road exactly overlaps with the Acheson Line, whose declaration on 12 January 1950 inadvertently compelled Stalin to allow Kim Il-Sung to attack South Korea.

**QUO VADIS?**

History never ends, but the Korean War has constantly reproduced further and unresolved confrontations among the parties of the war and threatened regional peace and prosperity. This is why the British government’s policy of ‘Global Britain’ puts enormous emphasis on the freedom of navigation and oversight in the South China Sea in order to maintain the rule-based international order and contain China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative. It is noteworthy that one of Britain’s amphibious transport vessels, the HMS Albion, which deployed to Asian waters in 2018–19, conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) en route to Vietnam, contesting China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracels in 1974. The main mission of these five Royal Navy vessels was to deter Chinese provocations to high-seas freedoms in the South China Sea by conducting naval drills with the USA, Japan and the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA) allies – Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. Both Britain’s foreign and defence ministers made it clear that the UK would deploy two aircraft carriers to the South China Sea in the near future, into one of the busiest commercial sea routes, carrying $5 trillion worth of trade a year. Britain’s defence minister Gavin Williamson in 2018 made it clear that the presence of its Royal Navy in Asia was no ‘flash in the pan’ but ‘a permanent presence’ to enforce the triangle alliance among the USA, Japan and Great Britain. History does not end but repeats this triangle that defeated Russian expansionism on the Korean Peninsula in the early twentieth century. This time, however, their potential threat is China.

The Korean War continues to exemplify the most important values in the history of human society: individual freedom and open transparency in our economy and democracy. As the second-largest presence in the Korean War, Great Britain has played an integral role in what the Korean War has accomplished. The outcomes of the Korean War are threefold: 1) South Korea survived and became a world economic power with a substantive democracy; 2) North Korea remained isolationist and has not changed its antagonistic policy towards the free world; and 3) the status quo among the superpowers on the Korean question has not changed significantly. The ultimate questions are whether the war has finished its due course and whether the USA and North Korea will reach resolution or wage war. The key to this issue is China, which was the main enemy against the UN forces and one of the three signatories of the ceasefire in 1953, which has remained unchanged for the last 68 years. Will the twenty-first century see the end of the Korean War, replacing this ceasefire with a peace treaty and a resolution to the current stalemate and confrontations between the free world and North Korea, as well as China?
The Korean War was a crucible that irrevocably changed Korea and the world. Its brutal fighting, massive destruction and indeterminate conclusion left a complex legacy for all the nations that fought in it. Americans and Europeans have often called it the ‘forgotten war’ because it never seemed to offer a clear lesson. In Korea, however, the war can never be forgotten because so many aspects of contemporary politics, economy and society bear its imprint.

FORGETTING A WAR THAT MUST BE REMEMBERED

Perhaps the main reason why many NATO countries have termed the Korean War the ‘forgotten war’ is because they are not really sure how it should be remembered. It did not end with a resounding victory over adversaries who were intent on world conquest, as World War II did. Nor did it lead to a humiliating defeat in a struggle whose very morality many questioned, as did the Vietnam War. In fact, the Korean War never really ended. Fighting stopped on 27 July 1953, when representatives of the UN Command, the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the North Korean People’s Army signed an armistice, but to this date, there has been no official peace treaty between the combatants.

While many have found little to celebrate or mourn about the war, the fact is that it reshaped the Cold War. The war strengthened the Free World’s determination to contain communism in Asia. In 1952, the Allied Powers signed the Treaty of San Francisco with Japan, formally ending World War II and ending the US occupation of Japan. The treaty left Japan in the hands of politicians who were considered reliable conservatives, while keeping 200,000 American troops stationed at 2,000 base facilities on the Japanese main islands (Immerwahr, 2019). Within one year of the Armistice, the United States had signed mutual security treaties with both South Korea and Taiwan, indefinitely committing itself to the defence of these anti-communist allies. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan became outposts of American influence in the Pacific and took on a new value to the United States and its allies.

The Korean War also contributed significantly to the militarisation of the Cold War in Europe. In April 1950, the US National Security Council had produced a policy paper known as NSC-68, which called for the build-up of sufficient military power to prevent communist domination of the Eurasian land mass. By 1951, the Truman administration had moved significantly towards implementing the document’s recommendations, and American military power was almost double what it had been in 1949. European military power also grew dramatically. When the Korean War began, NATO countries had only 14 army divisions and spent approximately 5.5% of their GDP on the military. By the time the war ended, NATO had 15 divisions stationed in West Germany alone, and NATO countries spent more than 12% of their GDP on defence (Stueck, 1995).

Finally, the connection between the Korean War and the domestic politics in Great Britain and the United States must not be overlooked. A wave of domestic political repression swept both the United States and Europe over the course of the war. America’s second Red Scare had already begun before June 1950, but it unquestionably reached new heights during the Korean War. Its rise was fuelled in part by growing hostility towards communist China. Moreover, the war strengthened the hand of the notorious Republican senator from Wisconsin Joseph McCarthy and his allies in the United States. During the war, Congress passed the McCarran Act over President Truman’s veto. The act required all members of the Communist Party in the United States to register with the Attorney General. The government would no longer employ anyone with records of affiliation with the party. And of course, McCarthyism went far beyond the federal government. It sought to root communists and suspected communists out of nearly all sectors of American life – schools, universities, the entertainment industry and...
numerous others (Stueck, 2002). In Great Britain, the new paranoia about communism manifested itself in strong new efforts to curb Labour activism. When the Transport Workers’ Union went on strike in the autumn of 1950, it was fiercely criticised as a communist tool, and workers saw little choice but to go back to work (Masuda, 2015). The Korean War did not in and of itself create this wave of anti-leftist repression. The responsibility for that lies in the hands of manipulative and self-interested politicians and the thousands of paranoid people who believed them. Yet the war created a context in which these ideas could flourish.

Outside of Korea itself, the Korean War has never occupied a space in historical memory that is proportionate to its political and social influence. Koreans, however, do not have the luxury of forgetting the war. It has left their country permanently divided and has kept families separated from each other for decades. Seventy-five year later, out of the wreckage of the war have emerged two very different Korean states. The first, in the north, became a failed socialist utopia. But South Korea stands out as one of the few post-colonial states to emerge as a prosperous democracy, and the war has influenced this process. The war’s legacy in South Korea has fascinated historians because it is as remarkable as it is contradictory. It has left the country impoverished yet in some ways it paved the way for an economic ‘miracle on the Han’. It has left an anti-communist dictatorship in place but also induced some of the changes that would undergird South Korea’s long struggle for democracy.

**THE KOREAN WAR AND SOUTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE**

By the signing of the Armistice in 1953, South Korea had been reduced to smouldering rubble, but its people stood resilient. There were shortages of everything and infectious diseases such as tuberculosis were widespread. Its industries were wiped out, along with a substantial portion of its infrastructure. There were few school or universities still standing and more than 600,000 homes had been destroyed by bombs and artillery. More than five million people – roughly a quarter of the population – were without suitable homes by the time the fighting stopped. Americans estimated that the total damage to South Korea’s infrastructure was around $3 billion, a staggering sum for a country that had struggled economically even before the war began. Yet within a generation, South Korea would emerge as one of the ‘Asian tiger’ economies and amaze the world with its technological prowess. Some of the cornerstones for this rapid growth were laid during the war.

Even as the war wrought massive destruction, it also led to the construction of some new infrastructure that would later play an important role in South Korea’s development. UN forces in South Korea needed supplies and they needed a way to transport them within the Korean Peninsula. The activities of US Army engineers in the south-eastern port city of Busan had a transformative effect. They expanded the city’s piers and wharfs, constructed new storage facilities and laid oil pipelines (Chung, 2019). Once weapons and supplies arrived in Busan, the UN Command needed to move them rapidly to troops on the front-lines, but they found that South Korea’s transport capacity was inadequate. Army engineers expanded and standardised the South Korean rail network, which became the most important part of the supply chain, and they paved roads so that more trucks could be used (Chung, 2019). In total, the United States spent more than $117 million on improving South Korea’s transportation infrastructure during the war (Chung, 2019).
These investments had two enduring effects. First, they enabled Busan to emerge as a leading container port by the 1960s and a major centre of South Korea’s economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s. Second, during the war, a number of important South Korean companies seized the opportunity presented by working with the Eighth Army. Hyundai was perhaps the most famous example of this. Jeong Ju-yeong, the founder of the company, later explained that learning American construction processes and gaining access to American equipment was critical to Hyundai’s future emergence as a global conglomerate (Chung, 2019). Paradoxically, the war left South Korea devastated but also bequeathed it with some of the infrastructure and technical knowledge that would help to propel the economy forward in future decades.

Despite this new infrastructure, South Korea needed a great deal of assistance during the period immediately after the war. Without a massive infusion of aid from the United States, it is highly questionable whether Syngman Rhee’s government would have survived. These aid programmes were underway even before the war ended. American assistance to South Korea ranged between $200 million and $300 million per year during the 1950s – more on average than any other country in the world at the time. It included food aid, the construction of new power and fertiliser plants, the paving of thousands of roads, and assistance in further improving railroads and other parts of the transportation infrastructure (Brazinsky, 2007). Yet these ambitious aid programmes produced only modest economic growth rates. The problem was that South Korea’s leadership needed to play a constructive and active role, and Syngman Rhee never really did that. His government was corrupt and wasteful and tended to divert American aid funds to projects that would strengthen its grip on power rather than promote rapid development. The real driving force behind South Korea’s rapid development was another important legacy of the war: the rise of the military.

In May 1961, a military junta led by Major General Park Chung-hee and his allies launched a coup d’état. The junta’s experience in the military had bequeathed its leadership with both the vision and the capabilities to promote rapid economic development in South Korea. At the same time, the economic model that Park created was not solely a product of foreign tutelage. Park heeded American demands that South Korea increase exports but he did not achieve this through the
kind of free market system that prevailed in the United States. He created a model of growth in which the government maintained tight links to a select group of preferred companies. These companies received low-interest loans and preferential treatment from the state and, in return, helped to fund Park’s political party. This kind of state-led development was influenced by Germany, Japan and Taiwan, but the South Korean model had its own distinctive characteristics. Ultimately, the model was highly effective at spurring rapid economic change. GDP growth had been modest at best during the 1950s, but during the 1960s and 1970s it averaged over 10% annually.

Park remained in power until his assassination in 1979, and though he allowed several elections (in which he won the presidency and his party dominated the National Assembly) during the 1960s, his government always maintained strict limits on civil liberties. But even if South Korea under Park was an autocracy, it was a developmental autocracy. It built institutions, fostered the rise of a new middle class, invested in education and implemented other policies that laid the basis for the vibrant democratic society that would emerge by the end of the twentieth century. Despite the myriad of hardships brought on by the war, South Koreans could never completely ignore the kind of country that they hoped to build.

The Korean War and South Korean Democracy

When the Armistice was signed, South Korea was scarcely the embodiment of the Free World ideals that UN forces had purportedly fought for. In fact, Syngman Rhee had used the emergency of wartime to tighten his grip on power – at least temporarily. In 1952, he forced the National Assembly to alter the constitution so that he could seek another term as president through direct election. Rhee was also able to build up indigenous security forces during the war and gained a powerful tool for suppressing dissent.

Even while the government became more repressive, some important seeds of democracy were planted in South Korea during the war. It would take decades for these to fully blossom and they needed to be nourished by the blood and suffering of many South Koreans, but in their absence, the ROK’s political development might have taken a very different route. Despite the hardships brought on by the war, South Koreans could never completely ignore the kind of country that they hoped to build.

It was during the Korean War that international relief agencies began working together with South Koreans to rebuild the country’s education system. Education had long been greatly valued in Korea as a means of gaining status and power (Seth, 2002). Neo-Confucian ideals that were prevalent during the Joseon dynasty had also stressed education as a means of self-cultivation. Under Japanese colonialism, much of the curriculum had focused on turning Koreans into loyal subjects of the empire. The imperial government forced Korean schoolchildren to learn Japanese and adopt Japanese names. The US occupation had reformed the curriculum and expanded the education system to some degree, but the outbreak of the war had forced a suspension of schooling as many school buildings were destroyed or used to house UN forces. In the midst of this chaos, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), whose main task was to help South Korea recover from the ravages of war, launched an expansive programme...
to rebuild the Korean education system. It spent millions of dollars on new schools and dispatched a team of curriculum experts, who it charged with the task of revising the curriculum. During the years after the war, American assistance agencies supplemented these programmes with new ones that brought leading South Korean teachers and educators to the United States, where they could learn about the American school system first-hand (Brazinsky, 2007). With this assistance, the South Korean school system expanded dramatically during the 1950s. The number of students attending high school grew from 59,000 to 275,000, while those attending colleges and universities quadrupled to 140,000 (Brazinsky, 2007). These students would in turn become a critically important political force.

Student and intellectual dissent had a long history in Korea. During the Joseon era, scholars saw it as their moral duty to criticise the king when wrongdoing was perceived. This tradition persisted in a slightly different form during the colonial period, when many anti-Japanese protests were student-led. By the late 1950s, students and intellectuals were once again taking up the mantle of righteous dissent. It was a student-led revolution that finally toppled Syngman Rhee’s government in 1960. Although the democratic government that took its place barely lasted a year, students would remain an important source of protest throughout the Park Chung-hee era. Finally, student protests were at the heart of the South Korean democratic movement during the 1980s. At that time, a new and highly unpopular military clique, led by Chun Doo-hwan, had seized power. More than any other group, it was students who took to the streets to protest military rule and it was often student dissidents who bore the brunt of the regime’s violent efforts to suppress dissent. Student activists also moved into factories to mobilise protests by workers during the 1970s and 1980s. The intent of building up South Korea’s school system had never been specifically to foment student protests. It had nonetheless created an important social group that was deeply committed to democratic change and willing to fight for it.

The Korean War was an important incubator for South Korean arts and culture, and these too would be important to the emergence of a democratic society. The war’s influence on the film industry was particularly important. According to Christina Klein, ‘The Korean War cleared a space, literally and figuratively for the production of a distinctive postwar film culture.’ (2019, p. 14) It destroyed what was left of the colonial-era film production system and brought South Korean filmmakers into greater contact with Western techniques and materials. A number of filmmakers who would become important during the 1950s and 1960s gained significant experience working with the United States Information Agency producing propaganda films. The South Korean motion picture industry produced only 18 films in 1954 but the number had already grown to 111 by 1959 (Klein, 2019). Other cultural and intellectual endeavours achieved similar growth, in part due to American assistance. During the war, the US Embassy in Seoul first began supporting South Korean publication by providing newsprint – a scarce commodity in war-torn Korea – or other supplies. This continued during the 1950s, when American funds supported journals such as Sasanggye (‘World of Thought’) that challenged the authoritarianism of the South Korean government. The State Department supplemented these efforts through the so-called ‘Leader Program’, which brought important intellectuals, opinion-shapers and democratic-minded political leaders to the United States (Brazinsky, 2007).

South Korea’s burgeoning popular culture would become another important force behind its eventual democratisation. Although the state could censor some publications and control some cultural production, it could never completely prevent dissenting ideas from being expressed when such heterogeneous cultural media existed. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, artists and intellectuals such as the poet Kim Chi-ha would become powerful voices against authoritarianism, and their writing would inspire many to join pro-democracy protests. Many political figures who participated in the Leader Program during the 1950s would become important leaders in South Korea’s democratisation movement during the 1980s. Two participants in particular, Kim Young-
Section 1 | 1B The Legacy of the Korean War

Today South Korea is a prosperous democracy. Since 1987, when Chun Doo-hwan agreed to allow an open presidential election, South Korea has generally moved towards greater accountability for elected officials, more freedom and greater transparency. Of course, South Korea’s institutions are not perfect and it still needs to achieve greater social equality, reduce corruption and eliminate some longstanding constraints on freedom of information and expression. But 75 years after the Korean War began, South Korea has become a prosperous democracy with tremendous soft power and a cutting-edge technology industry. Few could have envisioned such a success story at the time at which the Korean War began, and yet the legacy of the war is deeply infused into almost every part of this story.

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Section 1 | 1C Situating the Korean War in the context of the Cold War and British Cold War policies

1C SITUATING THE KOREAN WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR AND BRITISH COLD WAR POLICIES
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Korea in 1950 was when the Cold War turned hot. It was a dangerous period, during which one of the superpowers seriously considered the first use of nuclear weapons against the forces of a communist power and might have precipitated a third world war. The Korean War also drew in the United Kingdom against its strategic national interests at the time; but it also gave the British the opportunity to influence Washington’s policy, usually advocating restraint to localise the conflict.

THE CONTEXT FOR THE USA – THE END OF KENNANITE CONTAINMENT

The war also witnessed the manifest abandonment of the original strategy of ‘containment’ towards the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, transforming the policy from a limited one into a wider geopolitical pushback against communism. Up to the outbreak of the war, the central figure in defining American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was a career diplomat, and historian of Russia, George Kennan. Based in the American embassy in Moscow, Kennan found himself in a unique position to shape the State Department’s thinking when, during the ambassador’s absence through illness, he seized the opportunity to dispatch his assessment of Soviet policy. This was the Long Telegram, which arrived in Washington on 22 February 1946. (Gaddis, 1982, 2005; Kennan, 1967; Greenwood, 1990).

Kennanite containment of the Soviet Union evolved in the author’s mind from 1946 to 1948. It encapsulated a series of fundamental principles that Kennan believed must guide American policy towards Moscow. The first proposition was that co-operation with the USSR was both unattainable and undesirable. The Soviets were expansionist, for sure, but this was through their sense of insecurity (particularly given their experience of the sudden Nazi attack in 1941) and not through an ideological commitment to communist conquest. Kennan emphasised that, to contain the Soviets, it was essential to realise that the United States had finite resources and means to resist any communist expansion by Moscow. The ‘ends’ (containment) must fit the ‘means’ (resources) to attain Washington’s strategic aim. The United States could not be a ‘world policeman’.

When Kennan looked around the globe, he saw a hierarchy of US interests that must be protected before anything else. He boiled this hierarchy of interest down to five vital power centres. These were the United States, Great Britain, Germany and western central Europe, the USSR and Japan. Significantly, from the point of view of this publication, Kennan did not include Korea in this defensive perimeter. It was Kennan’s firm belief that the Soviet Union would use all means short of war to expand – political, diplomatic and economic methods. The American response – if containment was to work – had to be to match like with like, i.e. the full use of American political, diplomatic and economic responses. And the joker that Washington could play, if the Soviets were considering military expansion, was the American atomic monopoly, which Kennan believed would be sufficient as a deterrent to Moscow (Gaddis, 1982, 2005; Kennan, 1967).
Soviet interventions in Iran, the Berlin airlift, the Greek civil war and threats to Turkey created a shift in American thinking, given coherence by Kennan’s timely telegram. Its arrival in the State Department meant, as Daniel Yergin argues, that the official American view of Russia was no longer ambiguous. Washington’s assessment ‘no longer entertained any notion that the Russians were confused or crudely reactive; instead, interpretations and assessments from this point on derived from the axiomatic construct that the Soviets were not a great power operating within the international system but rather a world revolution estate bent on overturning that system.’ (Yergin, 1977, p. 235)

When President Truman ordered a root and branch study of the international issues facing the United States, he did so in the shadow of Churchill’s Fulton speech, and his declaration of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ responding to the aforementioned events in Europe and the Middle East. It culminated in NSC 68, whose authors, including the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, identified the hostile intent of the Soviet Union and advocated a massive build-up of American military might. As Walter Lafeber argued, with the American people by no means prepared to pay such costs, NSC 68 was ‘a policy in search of an opportunity. That opportunity arrived on June 25, 1950.’ (Lafeber, 2002, p. 103) Coming in the aftermath of the ‘loss of China’ to communism, American intervention in Korea was a radical departure from Kennan’s original definition of non-military intervention and from focusing on the five key power centres that he identified as vital to American security.

**THE DILEMMA FOR BRITAIN – CONFLICTING STRATEGIC PRIORITIES**

To understand how Britain became embroiled in the Korean War, it is first necessary to appreciate the country’s strategic priorities in 1950. In June of that year, the British Chiefs of Staff set out the United Kingdom’s position in their ‘Allied Defence Policy and Global Strategy’. Here, the Chiefs defined as the ‘first essential’ of Britain’s political and military aims the struggle against Russian Communism. They concluded that the ‘enemy’s aim is quite clear – it is a communist world dominated by Moscow’. Echoing Kennan, the Chiefs concluded that Russian policy was ‘fundamentally opportunist and the Soviet will always exploit any weaknesses – especially the weakness inherent in a lack of unified policy on the part of the Western democracies’. But they recognised how, historically, the Russians, while always aggressively expansionist in policy, ‘do draw back when faced with determined opposition, a characteristic which communist Russia appears to share with imperial Russian policy – the tactical withdrawal when conditions are unfavourable’. The Chiefs, therefore, cautioned that the West should not be unduly impressed by the ‘war of nerves’ that would undoubtedly continue with varying intensity over the coming years.

The defence of Western Europe was absolutely vital. Militarily, this meant that the defence of Europe – including the United Kingdom – ‘must have top priority. The primary offensive weapon in hot war must remain the atomic bomb.’ The second most important theatre was the defence of the Middle East, which had ‘always been one of the three pillars of British defence policy and it is of equally critical importance in Allied strategy’. It was the land bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa and a most important link in the Commonwealth system of sea and air communications. Its oil supplies could not be allowed to fall under Soviet control. Third, the Chiefs considered the key to the Cold War problem in the Far East to be China. Allied policy in that direction, ‘while inflexibly anti-communist, should not be anti-Chinese’. It was important that ‘we should not drive China irrevocably into the arms of Russia’. The Chiefs accepted that there was room for doubt over whether the inherent xenophobia of the Chinese would allow them to submit to Russia any more than to any other foreign intervention.

The front line of the Cold War in Asia lay not in Korea but in Indo-China, where the French were fighting communists; the British, meanwhile, were engaged in another anti-communist counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya. The most important object of British foreign policy in the Far East was to achieve a firm unity of policy between
the British Commonwealth, the United States and France. ‘Nothing could suit our enemies better than for the Western Powers to pursue divergent objectives in the Far East and South-East Asia’, considered the Chiefs (see ‘Documents on British Policy Overseas’ (DBPO), 1991, for report by Chiefs of Staff). The very idea that Korea would be the principal theatre in which East and West turned the Cold War into a Hot War seemed absurd. But that is precisely what happened with the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. What would have surprised the Chiefs of Staff even more was that British ground forces were soon committed to the fight.

**BRITAIN’S DECISION TO COMMIT TROOPS – A POLITICAL NOT A MILITARY DECISION**

What led to British forces being committed was a series of discussions, held between 20 and 24 July, between US and UK representatives in Washington on the ‘Present World Situation’. The Americans were represented by General Omar Bradley and the British by Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, and Lord Tedder, the senior British military figure in Washington. The meetings were to alter fundamentally the British reaction to the Korean War. At the first meeting, on 20 July, the question of UN land forces in Korea was raised by Bradley. He emphasised that, with American forces pushed back by the advancing North Koreans, such reinforcements were of utmost importance from a military as well as a political aspect (TNA DEFE 11/196 BJSM).

Franks despatched a telegram to London, putting the case for the offer of British ground forces in Korea. The Ambassador’s telegram changed British policy. Foreseeing a long and difficult ground campaign, the Americans knew that ‘many nations will follow the British decision on this matter. They see us as the key to the situation and hence await our decision as more important to them and their purposes than any other.’ The Americans looked to the British because underneath the thoughts and emotions engendered at times by ‘difficulties and disagreements between us and them there is a steady and unquestioned assumption that we are the only dependable ally and partner. This derives from our position in the world over past decades, our partnership with them in two world wars and their judgement of the British character. The Americans in Korea will be in a tough spot for a long time. They look round for their partner’. (TNA DEFE 11/197)

The Chiefs in London were sceptical of deploying British ground troops – there were strategic military reasons for not committing them – so it was the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, who took the decision to contribute forces on political grounds. On 24 July, the Prime Minister informed the Chiefs of his decision: although he fully understood that there were now strong military reasons for not sending land forces to Korea, ‘there were now strong psychological reasons for reviewing the situation’. Franks’s telegram was the key, in that Attlee thought the ‘moral’ effect of providing this force would be considerable and that it was in fact now essential for a British token force to be provided (TNA DEFE 11/197).

**THE LIMITS OF BRITISH INFLUENCE – CONSULTED OR INFORMED?**

The commitment of British land, air and naval forces meant that London was now intimately concerned with the conduct of the war. It was particularly concerned with the actions of the UN Supreme Commander, General MacArthur, who the British feared wanted a wider war with communist China. London was concerned over whether it was President Truman and the State Department, with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, deciding policy, or was it MacArthur in Tokyo? Chinese military intervention heightened these concerns of a wider war that would draw in the Soviet Union – fears that did not lessen following MacArthur’s removal in 1951.

British fears about American intentions were crystallised when Truman, at a press conference in December 1950, appeared to suggest that the atom bomb might be used in Korea (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950). Although it was clarified, quite quickly, that the President had not been advocating the use of the bomb in Korea...
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What the British hoped for was an undertaking from the Americans to be ‘consulted’ on the use of the atomic bomb. They were disappointed. In a private meeting, the President promised Attlee that the UK would be consulted if Washington considered the use of atomic weapons; but, with no formal minute-takers present, the State Department later disputed that any formal commitment was given and only recognised the need to ‘inform’ the British. (Attlee later told the Cabinet that ‘Truman didn’t realise he’d dropped such a brick’ (TNA CAB 195/8 C.M. 85 (50)), it did furnish an excuse for the British to persuade the White House that this was an opportune moment for an Anglo-American summit. When Attlee met with Truman in Washington, differences of emphasis emerged. The Prime Minister urged the Americans to take account of public opinion both in the United Nations and in America, Europe and Asia; he argued that the United Kingdom, through its Commonwealth associations, was perhaps particularly able to gauge opinion in Asia: ‘If we became involved in war with China we should be playing the Russian game.’ The Americans took a different view, with Acheson arguing that the central moving factor in this situation was not China but Russia. The former was a ‘satellite’ of Moscow (TNA PREM 8/1200).

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THE NUCLEAR OPTION – WAS THERE A REAL DANGER?

The limits of British influence did not mean that the Americans could ignore the former, who remained, after all, their principal allies. The relationship meant that the British maintained a privileged insight into American policy, allowing them to do what they could to influence Washington’s thinking. The necessity for this was never more relevant than when the Korean Armistice, in 1953, saw President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill discuss Korean options at the Bermuda Conference, in December 1953. The British were in for a shock.

Eisenhower revealed, at the opening meeting, that the United States government would ‘hit back with full power’ in the event of a communist breach of the Korean Peninsular (TNA FO 371/105540 PM/53/337). He found the world in a ‘rather hysterical condition about the atomic bomb’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954). The President privately informed Churchill that if there was a deliberate breach of the Armistice by the communists, ‘we would expect to strike back with atomic weapons at military targets. We would not expect to bomb cities but would attack areas that were directly supporting the aggression.’ The Prime Minister, according to the American record, replied that he ‘quite accepted’ this and that the President’s statement put him in a position to say to Parliament that he had been consulted in advance and had agreed (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954b). The elderly Churchill was on his own here: his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was staggered by the news, warning the Prime Minister: ‘This goes far beyond anything we have hitherto agreed… we have never given, or been asked to give, approval… to the use of atom bombs.’ Eden feared that the Chinese would not attack again in Korea without Soviet approval: the use of atomic weapons by the Americans would invite nuclear retaliation from Moscow (TNA FO 371/105540 PM/53/337). With American nuclear bomber bases in the UK, this meant unleashing a third world war and the possible nuclear devastation of Britain (TNA FO 371/105540 PM/53/339).
In the end, there was no breach of the Armistice. But the Korean stand-off illustrated the hair trigger by which the world was now away from a possible global nuclear confrontation in the region - and possibly beyond. Not long after Bermuda, the Americans exploded their first hydrogen bomb. The Soviets would follow suit. The nature of a future global war had been transformed by thermo-nuclear weapons, and the possibility of the United Kingdom surviving in such a conflict was diminished considerably when compared to the aftermath of an atomic attack on it. And for Eden, it was the Americans, with their commitment to the first use of nuclear weapons in a renewed Korean conflict, who appeared to be the greatest danger to world peace.

For Eden it was the Americans, with their commitment to the first use of nuclear weapons in a renewed Korean conflict, who appeared to be the greatest danger to world peace.

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1D SITUATING THE KOREAN WAR IN BRITISH HISTORY

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Until recently, the Korean War has lived up to its most famous soubriquet – the ‘Forgotten War’. When war broke out in the summer of 1950, just five years after the end of the Second World War, it seemed to many British people a far more distant, more ambiguous war. Britain had few historic links with the Peninsula, and the war’s uncertain progress, protracted peace negotiations and eventual conclusion in 1953 did little to cement its position in the national consciousness. Few British novels and films explored the Korean War after 1953 and even historians largely overlooked it as a violent anomaly in Britain’s post-war history, a period much more associated with the establishment of the welfare state than the continuance of warfare.

But publications like this highlight just how important the Korean War is in understanding post-1945 British history. Militarily, the British Army faced some of its harshest battles in Korea – most famously the Battle of the Imjin in April 1951, but also the Battles of the Hook (1952 and 1953) – and 1,060 British servicemen withstood months of captivity as prisoners of war (Farrar-Hockley, 1995).

British service personnel were a mixture of the old and the new: young National Service conscripts served alongside veterans of the last war, called up from the reserve or remaining as regulars. Of the Army, Royal Navy and a small Royal Air Force contingent sent to Korea, 1,078 service personnel were killed (Farrar-Hockley, 1995 – estimates of the total number of British service personnel vary due to the lack of official statistics; official historian Anthony Farrar-Hockley indicates a standing commitment of 27,000 but an overall commitment of 81,084, but it is unclear whether this includes Commonwealth forces). Politically, the war posed awkward questions for Clement Attlee’s Labour government and exposed the weaknesses in Britain’s international standing and relationship with the United States. In wider society, it prompted short-lived panics about the potential use of nuclear weaponry in the early stages of the war, the dangers of communist ‘brainwashing’ techniques in prisoner of war camps and the threat of the ‘enemy from within’ in Britain itself (Daily Mail, 1950). Many of these worries persisted after the war and came to define British culture in the Cold War. The Korean War also demonstrated just how much the long years of war between 1939 and 1945 had changed how ordinary people understood war itself and how they memorialised conflict in the post-war world, something that would shape how the Korean War was remembered – or forgotten.

Britain’s Korean War is therefore not only an important episode in military history, but it also had profound political, social, economic and foreign policy implications for Britain itself. This publication shows the many ways in which we can encourage learners to engage with the complex histories of the Korean War and the British role within it. This short introduction provides a brief overview of some key concepts and new approaches that historians have used when analysing Britain’s involvement in ‘the Forgotten War’.

WELFARE, WARFARE AND DIPLOMACY IN THE COLD WAR WORLD

Britain’s Korean War must first be set against the domestic backdrop of post-war politics. Even before the Second World War had ended, people across Britain had begun to think about what they wanted Britain to be like after the war. Clement Attlee’s Labour Party’s manifesto Let Us Face the Future Together (1945) had promised an ambitious set of policies to promote economic reconstruction and social change after the Second World War. Labour’s victory in the 1945 general election led to a new programme of reforms, most notably social reforms, which many today see as the foundation of the modern ‘welfare state’. These included acts regarding housing, national insurance and – most famously – the foundation of a National Health Service (NHS) in 1948.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 potentially challenged this welfare agenda. Minister for Health Aneurin ‘Nye’ Bevan famously resigned from the Cabinet in April 1951 over the increase in defence spending due to the Korean War, which had led to the introduction of charges for false teeth and glasses. For Bevan, these charges challenged the foundational idea that the NHS should be free at the point of use. Yet historian David Kynaston points out that one 1950 Gallup poll estimated that 78% of people supported increased defence expenditure. For all their emphasis on domestic reform, the Attlee government had taken a strong line on foreign policy, in particular the foreign secretary Ernest Bevin and Attlee himself. In a radio broadcast in July 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the war, Attlee told listeners that ‘The fire that has been started in distant Korea may burn down your house’ and told them that Britain needed to stop aggression, as it had done in the last war (Daily Mail, 1950). For Attlee and others, the Korean War was not therefore a challenge to their vision of post-war Britain, but a necessary undertaking to protect it. As historian David Edgerton has argued, warfare as well as welfare thus characterised post-war Britain (Edgerton, 2006). John Newsinger goes even further, arguing that the praise given to the Attlee administration for its domestic programme obscures the Labour government’s hard-nosed ‘imperial strategy’, such as its continued involvement in colonial wars and even its reluctance to grant independence to India in 1947 (Newsinger, 2018). In this way, histories of Britain’s Cold War – and its experiences in the Korean War – overlap with its complicated position at the end of empire, as well as the fluctuating demands of welfare and warfare.

Yet there are some who ask whether Britain should even be included in histories of the Cold War at all. Anders Stephanson argued that the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was always at the core of the ‘Cold War’ and that to extend it beyond those two superpowers dilutes the meaning and usability of the term (Stephanson, 2012). As Lawrence Freedman puts it, the Cold War is not ‘everything that happened everywhere’ between 1945 and 1991’ (2010, emphasis added). Yet others argue that the conflict had a global reach that affected Britain profoundly: its fixation with the ‘special relationship’ with the United States during the Cold War, for instance, is important in explaining Britain’s turbulent relationship with Europe after 1945. On a cultural level too, the Cold War shaped a generation of British fiction, television and film (see Hammond, 2013, and Shaw, 2001). Britain influenced the course of the Cold War: its proximity to mainland Europe made it strategically significant, as did its imperial and military spheres of influence and its possession of nuclear weaponry. Britain also had some influence at the United Nations and NATO, albeit less than the US, but significant nonetheless (Stueck, 2002). We might usually ask our students then to consider whether Britain was the ‘junior partner’ in the Korean War or whether it had influence over its strategy, operations or tactics, either on its own or in collaboration with the other Commonwealth countries who came to form the 1st Commonwealth Division on 28 July 1951 (see Grey, 1998, and Barnes, 2010).

The relationship with the United States was doubtless another important factor in Britain’s Korean War. In December 1950, Attlee stated that ‘where the stars and stripes fly in Korea, the British
flag will be beside them’ (British Pathé, 1950). But historians differ on the significance of such statements, particularly as Attlee made this statement during ‘crisis’ talks in Washington. Peter Hennessy has interpreted Korea as the height of Britain’s influence over decision-making in the Cold War, whereas Callum MacDonald highlighted just how uneasy the US response to Chinese intervention in November 1950 made Attlee and his cabinet (MacDonald, 1990). There were other more subtle differences between the two nations too. In April 1951 at the Imjin River, as two divisions of Chinese troops bore down on 29th Brigade, British Brigadier Tom Brodie reported to the American Corps headquarters that their situation was ‘a bit sticky’. Presuming that no situation described as ‘sticky’ could be that grievous, the Americans did not send sufficient support: the subsequent capture of many men from the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment highlighted just how much of an understatement it had been. For some, this anecdote represents the cultural, as well as political, differences between Britain and the United States, and it has entered the popular folklore that surrounds the war (Hastings, 1987; Reynolds, 1987).

**THE BRITISH MILITARY EXPERIENCE**

British soldiers recall the difficult conditions of the Korean War, particularly in the intensely cold winter of 1950–1951, equipment shortages and the seemingly harsh landscape. But they also later remembered the hardship they saw the Koreans enduring too, the many thousands of refugees they passed on the roads. Yet, though it was unique in many ways, the Korean War was still overshadowed by the Second World War, even at the time. Soldiers wrote about ‘the last war’ frequently and some younger service personnel saw it as their chance to do something as great as their fathers (Montgomery, 1954).

But source material like this requires careful analysis. Service personnel from all wars stress the difficulty of speaking and writing about their experiences: the boredom, fear, discomfort and violence of warfare is hard to express, even if people are willing to listen (Harari, 2008). But historians of Britain’s Korean War do have access to ‘primary source’ material in the form of letters written home, diaries and oral history interviews conducted many years after the war. All these sources offer a different perspective and require different analytical tools, but all are attempts by service personnel to make sense of the war and the world around them. Historians of war and conflict increasingly use such ‘life-writing’ material to tell the histories not simply of what happened on the battlefield, but also the outlook of individuals and their sense of themselves as part of the military and even as citizens in the post-1945 world (Gill, 2010; McLoughlin, 2010).

Service personnel also wrote histories of the war. Anthony Farrar-Hockley published two official histories of the British role in the early 1990s. Farrar-Hockley was a senior figure in the British military in the late twentieth century and had been the Adjutant of the 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment, during its infamous ‘stand’ at the Imjin River. His detailed narrative history provides a meticulous account of British military actions during the war (Farrar-Hockley, 1990, 1995). Taken captive in Korea in April 1951, Farrar-Hockley also wrote an autobiographical account of his experiences much earlier too, and many other service personnel wrote published (and unpublished) memoirs of their experiences (1954). Memoirs such as naval officer Dennis Lankford’s *I Defy!* (1954) and chaplain Sam Davies’s *In Spite of Dungeons* (1954) remain some of the most compelling British narratives of the war, as do newer publications such as Ethel McNair’s *A British Army Nurse in the Korean War* (2007) and Fred Hayhurst’s *Green Berets in Korea* (2001).
Shortly after the war there was also a small burst of fiction-writing about the war: Simon Kent’s novel, *A Hill in Korea* (1954), follows the unfortunate exploits of one patrol largely composed of National Service conscripts, and John Holland’s searing novel *The Dead, the Dying and the Damned* (1956) was a best-seller. These accounts deeply enrich our understanding of what it felt like to live through the Korean War, but they also tell us something about the way in which the war was remembered after it happened: how the memories of the conflict changed over time, even after the war had ended. These publications are therefore ‘primary’ sources as well for students and teachers of Britain’s Korean War.

**PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE INVENTION OF BRAINWASHING**

Another distinctive element of Britain’s Korean War was the experiences of its prisoners of war. Twenty-five Royal Marines were captured in November 1950 at Jangin (Chosin) and 80 officers and other ranks (most Royal Ulster Rifles) were taken in the first Chinese Offensive in January 1951. The capture of the largest number of British troops took place at Imjin River (527, including Colonel James Power Carne, who was awarded the Victoria Cross), and small numbers of others were taken in minor engagements in November 1951. Prisoner of war historians point out that their captivity does not fit with our vision of barbed wire, watch towers and daring escapes, images so prevalent in Second World War films. In fact, many Korean War prisoner of war camps were located in a network of abandoned villages and camps along the Yalu River in the north, and the distances involved made the possibility of escape very limited. Initially overseen by DPRK forces, China assumed responsibility for POWs in 1951 and ran distinctive ‘re-education’ classes for POWs, calling on them to reconsider their role in this ‘senseless’ American war (Huxford, 2015). Only one British serviceman defected to China after his imprisonment, Royal Marine Andrew Condron. He later claimed that he wanted to see a Marxist society in action, though he returned to the UK in 1962 (Mackenzie, 2011).

These re-education classes had more far-reaching consequences in Britain and America. In 1950, journalist Edward Hunter first used the term ‘brainwashing’ (originally a Chinese term, *hsi-nao*) to describe Chinese re-education methods and, though the term was quickly dismissed within the scientific community, it became culturally very popular. Brainwashing became a key element of Cold War films such as *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962) and *The Ipcress File* (1965), starring Michael Caine. In 1961, the ability of ‘turning’ someone in captivity was exemplified still further by the imprisonment of former intelligence officer George Blake, who had acted as a Soviet double agent since he had been imprisoned in Korea during the war. Blake later staged a dramatic escape from Wormwood Scrubs prison, fleeing to the Soviet Union. Fascinating as these examples are, cultural historians would point out that they tell us much more about how British and American societies responded generally to Cold War threats, rather than whether brainwashing actually existed or not. We only have to look at its subsequent history to realise that the term brainwashing had a long afterlife, regardless of whether it existed or not (and the scientific community was largely sceptical). Historian Kathleen Taylor notes how ‘useful’ the term has been for politicians and how it has been used since 1950 to describe varying disagreeable or inexplicable views (Taylor, 2004). Brainwashing as an idea, then, is one of the most powerful cultural legacies of the Korean War.

**RESPONSES TO THE KOREAN WAR IN BRITAIN**

As ‘brainwashing’ shows, people back in Britain responded to the war in a variety of ways. First came anxiety, even panic. In Mass Observation surveys conducted in the first months of the war (these social surveys ran from 1937 to the early 1950s, observing and recording personal writing, conversation and behaviour in Britain – see www.massobs.org.uk), people describe being ‘frightened’ and worrying about what would happen to their families. Some of this concern came from memories of Second World War bombing of urban areas, and some people considered rebuilding their air-raid shelters. But after the initial worries and the dramatic events of the first year of the war, Korea became less visible in the press and in
people’s memories of the early 1950s. By the end of the war, one news report argued that England’s cricket victory in the Ashes was more celebrated than returning troops (Bury Free Press, 1953). As British troops became more static in the second half of the war, attention lessened, not helped by the inconclusive end of the war and continued division of Korea.

But not everyone was apathetic about the war. Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) expressed their opposition to the war fiercely in their publications and through various peace and ‘friendship’ organisations. Politicians from within the Labour Party too called for an end to hostilities: Monica Felton, Chairman of the Stevenage Development Corporation, was sacked from her position for visiting North Korea on a sponsored visit. Elsewhere, the ‘Red Dean of Canterbury’ Hewlett Johnson (1874–1966) and the scientist Joseph Needham (1900–95) alleged that the United States Air Force had conducted a ‘germ’ warfare campaign in northern China. Some of these figures were dismissed as eccentric, but some newspapers called them traitors and lobbied for them to be tried in court as such.

For historians of anti-war protest, the Korean War marks an important early episode in anti-nuclear protest, which hit the headlines later in the decade with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)’s first Aldermaston march in spring 1958 (Hudson, 2005).

**REMEMBERING THE FORGOTTEN WAR**

But if the Korean War was so controversial, why was it forgotten? Some of the reasons lie in its unclear aims, the nature of the fighting and the outcome of the war itself. The shadow cast by the Second World War also meant that Korea failed to attain a distinct place within British and memorial popular culture. Charles S. Young suggests that the story of the Korean War also fails to fit within a ‘usable past’, unlike the Second World War or the much-criticised Vietnam War (Young, 2014). However, we can also ask whether the Korean War is still forgotten in the same way in Britain: it features in major museums of war and conflict, its new memorial on the Victoria Embankment in London opened in 2014, and the war is even mentioned in television programmes such as *Call the Midwife*. As this publication demonstrates, it can also be usefully taught throughout the secondary curriculum. The history of the Korean War in Britain must therefore address the changing significance and remembrance of the war in the twenty-first century, even as the generation who served in the war pass away. The war might, in short, be forgotten no longer.
REFERENCES


Section 1 | 1E Why did the UNO join the USA in the Korean War?

THE UN FORUMS WERE EVOLVING IN THE COLD WAR CLIMATE

In the shadow of the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was established by the victorious Allies – the United States, United Kingdom, China, Soviet Union and France – during the San Francisco Conference on 25 April 1945.

Bringing together independent countries from across the globe, the construction of the UN represented the advent of a new international order: an inter-governmental organisation that sought to define, lobby and petition for peace rather than wage war. Decisions made under the aegis of the organisation, such as the adoption of the UN Human Rights Declaration in December 1948, established new norms in states’ fundamental duties towards their citizens and, in tandem, encouraged movements for self-determination within colonising nations. In the post-war context, diplomatic discussions within the UN about human rights, humanitarian relief and international law indicated that the world’s leaders intended to participate in the UN as a means not only to repair the damage of the past decade, but also to ensure that such violations never happened again.

However, only a few years following the conclusion of the Second World War, diplomatic conflict between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, was rapidly accelerating. As the two nations fought for ideological supremacy, the primary forums of the UN – the Security Council and the General Assembly – became the preferred spaces for debate. The organisation provided a unique forum whereby representatives from all UN member states were given a platform to present a resolution or to debate those presented by others. Thus, it was the perfect environment for diplomats to assert the ideological convictions and political weight of their nation on the world’s stage.

The UN forums also provided an environment where the superpowers could vie for allegiance from other member states, encouraging a combative environment. This geopolitical dynamic served to stymie any diplomatic progress anticipated in the cosmopolitan UN Charter: how could the organisation’s member states work in unity towards peace in the context of the Cold War?

THE POWER OF VETO ALLOWED PERMANENT MEMBERS TO BLOCK ACTIONS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS

The procedures that facilitated the operations of the UN were also at odds with the conflict between the two superpowers. At the centre of the organisation’s functionality was the UN Charter, a document that outlined the specific activities that the organisation was permitted to perform and the requirements of nations for membership. The UN Charter did not explicitly authorise the organisation to construct or lead peacekeeping missions, but it did give permission for the Security Council to respond to breaches of international peace and security. Member states within the Council could call upon other nations to take measures to restore stability, and this resolution would then be taken to a vote. Although this process appeared democratic, the five founders of the UN were provided the special privilege of veto-power over any resolution with which they disagreed. In the evolving conflict of the Cold War, this power was a significant means for the superpowers to interfere in the international interventions of the others.

As all permanent members were legally required to support a resolution for it to be authorised by the Security Council, the activities of the forum were frequently immobilised by the use of veto by the US or Soviet Union. It was the guaranteed frustration
of this procedural tactic, with relative ease of use, that contributed to its frequent deployment: the diplomatic costs of a veto were low while the benefits of frustrating an ideological enemy were high.

**THE USSR BOYCOTT OPENED THE DOOR FOR THE UN TO SUPPORT US ACTION IN KOREA**

As the Cold War diplomatic battles within the UN Security Council continued to rage, the conflict was beginning to have real impact on the ground in North and South Korea. Despite the constraints of the UN Charter, the organisation, hypothetically, could potentially deploy armed forces as a reaction to a breach of the peace. Using the vague wording of the UN Charter, the US representatives alerted the UN Security Council to the North Korean belligerents’ invasion of the southern territory and called for an international response to the armed attack.

During most of 1950, the Soviet Union had chosen to boycott the UN forum because the organisation had accepted a representative of Taiwan to take China’s chair rather than a representative from the People’s Republic of China. This absence meant that the normal five permanent members of the UN were reduced to four – an absence that had never been legally accounted for in the UN Charter. Could a resolution ever be authorised through the Security Council if all permanent members were not present and voting? However, this legal quandary was overlooked, and the United Nations Command (UNC) was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 83 in June 1950.

A truly unique armed force, the UNC positioned the UN as a belligerent actor within the conflict, despite its lack of military authority over the force. The 16 countries who unified against the communist invasion from the North were militarily and strategically led by the existing US personnel on the ground. Thus, although transnational in design, the UNC was directed towards the protection and supremacy of pro-capitalist (and US) interests. Although fighting under the UN flag, the military character and strategy employed by the transnational battalions was far from a UN-staff-led mission.

**THE DECISION WAS A PRECEDENT THAT HELPED CHANGE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES AT THE UN**

The influence of the UNC on the evolution of peacekeeping is significant. The context of the UNC and its presence on the ground in South Korea provided a legal and operational precedent for future UN missions. As a diplomatic collaboration, it was a military experiment held together under the principles of the UN. The existence of this multinational force forged in the name of ‘peace’ – or anti-communism – led to the creation of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ General Assembly resolution, which permitted member states to circumvent the permanent members’ right to veto in cases of a breach to the peace to introduce the resolution to the General Assembly. Thus, due to the procedural and diplomatic dynamics of the UNC, the functions of the General Assembly were expanded from being exclusively a deliberative forum to being an operational forum capable of authorising ‘appropriate measures’ for the resolution of international peace.
1F HOW DID BRITAIN RESPOND TO THE KOREAN WAR?

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STRATEGIC BRITISH INTERESTS DICTATED GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE KOREAN WAR

When the Korean War began in June 1950, the British Labour government of Clement Attlee had been in power for five years, having been re-elected earlier that year.

The Labour government fulsomely supported the denunciation of North Korea as the aggressor in the conflict, through the UN Security Council. Moreover, when the US engineered an intervention on the Peninsula, to counter North Korean advances into the South, under the guise of the UN, the British establishment agreed that the British Far East fleet, already stationed in Asia, could be mobilised in support. This was unsurprising given that the British elites, the government, foreign office and army had been keen to forge closer ties with the US throughout the post-World War II period, which had culminated in the establishment of NATO in 1949.

However, the senior commanders of the armed forces, in particular, expressed concerns that British military power in Asia, where imperial possessions such as Hong Kong and Malaya were still prized, would be unnecessarily stretched by the deployment of ground troops in Korea. These concerns encouraged the Attlee government to initially decide against sending such a combat force to engage with the army of Kim Il Sung. This was deemed only partial support by Washington, who were unflinching in their desire to have their closest ally support their intervention in Korea with combat troops.

Under this pressure, dominant figures within the military and Foreign Office altered their stance and came around to the view that any rupture in US–UK relations as a result of British non-deployment of ground forces would be potentially more damaging to British interests than not doing so. Influenced by changed attitudes from other key players, the Labour government shifted its own position, and by the end of July 1950, Britain was committed to sending ground forces to Korea, with the first battalion arriving within a month.

THERE WAS MORE CONTINUITY THAN CHANGE UNDER SUCCESSIVE LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS

Developments regarding Korea in the summer of 1950 demonstrated how decision-making regarding British foreign policy at this juncture was not just the preserve of the government but, rather, it evolved within a polycratic state.

In its dealings with the joint Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office, voices within the Attlee government did not present perspectives regarding Britain’s place in the world, which were at odds with those of the supposed bastions of conservatism – the military and Foreign Office. The public-school-educated doyennes of the Foreign Office and the military were speaking the same language, regarding Korea, as the Minister of Defence, Manny Shinwell, who first emerged on the public scene as a socialist agitator during the ‘Red Clydeside’ movement that came out of World War I.

Eventually a split did occur within the Labour cabinet over Korea, which saw three leftist ministers resign, including, most famously, the architect of the NHS, Bevan. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that concerns about the Korean War as an imperialistic venture had some influence upon those who resigned, yet publicly they claimed that their opposition was the cost of the intervention, which precipitated the introduction of some charges for NHS patients, which they were unwilling to swallow.

When Churchill’s Conservative administration replaced Labour, following the October 1951
general election, the conflict in Korea was still ongoing, although by that point it had settled into the stalemate that would continue right up to the end of the conflict in 1953. However, there was basically no alteration to the British position in Korea. Indeed, Cabinet discussions pertaining to the conflict did not entertain the idea that the new government might adopt a policy altered from its predecessor. The Korean War is therefore a good indicator of the immense continuities between the foreign policy of the two British parties of government in the post-World War II, Cold War era.

GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA UNITED TO DISMISS DISSENTERS

Much of the domestic population responded to British intervention in Korea with a combination of puzzlement and fear. Britain was fighting in a faraway theatre, of which most knew little, and this so soon after World War II and its associated horrors, including the Blitz and evacuation. Attlee made a very public case to engender support for British intervention, by highlighting its centrality to the domestic front and arguably fomenting the aforementioned fears, claiming that ‘a fire in Korea may burn down your house’.

With both major party frontbenches supporting British intervention, including the deployment of ground forces, and with most of the media unquestioning of the conflict as well, it is not surprising that dissent in Britain was limited. The miniscule British Communist Party, not unexpectedly, was critical, and a few Labour backbenchers were doubtful, but the most famous dissenters were individuals.

In 1951, town planner Monica Felton conducted a ‘fact finding’ mission in Korea, thanks to an invite from the women’s section of the International Democratic Foundation. Felton critiqued British and American operations on the Peninsular by suggesting that their treatment of North Koreans entailed ‘ruthless barbarity that was beyond imagination’. Felton was subsequently sacked from her job and vilified in the media.

Another dismissed by his employers for espousing similar concerns was journalist James Cameron. Cameron, later the founder member of CND, was fired from the Picture Post for attempting to publish horrific images of violence exacted against the North Korean population.

Other dissenters, including the ‘Red Dean of Canterbury’ Hewlett Johnson and the scientist Joseph Needham, particularly the former, were criticised in the media and condemned by various politicians for questioning whether the US had used biological weapons during the conflict.

The scathing response to dissenters, from all but the most fringe leftist publications, i.e. the communist newspaper The Daily Worker, highlights a unanimity between political decision-makers in Cold War Britain and the media, the supposed proponents of heterodox critical discourse on all matters of public interest, including foreign policy. Moreover, it poses questions regarding media ownership and continuities of personnel and world view across the British political, military and cultural elites, relating to their shared backgrounds.
The Battle of the Imjin was the bloodiest engagement the British Army experienced during the Korean War. The 29th British Independent Infantry Brigade held back a Chinese Spring Offensive directed at the capital of South Korea, Seoul. During this four-day battle between 22 and 25 April 1951, the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment were surrounded and eventually captured, along with members of the 170 Independent Mortar Battery. These soldiers held out on and around the hill designated ‘Hill 235’, south of the Imjin River. Despite being outnumbered, the Glosters allowed UN forces to retreat and reform. This offensive would see the end to the mobile phase of the Korean War and begin the stalemate that would last until an armistice was signed in July 1953. It would also give rise to debate on its significance.

BACKGROUND

The war before Imjin had four distinct phases:

- The North Koreans invaded in June 1950, pushing American and South Korean forces back to the port of Pusan.
- With UN reinforcements, including British forces, the North Koreans were beaten back all the way to the Yalu River, the natural border between China and North Korea, by November.
- At this point, China declared war, pushing back UN forces and capturing Seoul in January 1951.
- Finally, a counter-offensive by UN forces retook Seoul, creating a buffer-zone at the 38th parallel in March.

China’s main aim by this time was to push all UN forces out of the Peninsula and unite a communist Korea. The Battle of the Imjin would occur as Chinese forces mounted an offensive to retake Seoul and destroy UN brigades, such as the British 29th Brigade, that stood in their way (MacKenzie, 2013). The aim of the UN Command on the other hand, was to maintain a defensive line just north of the 38th parallel, from the Imjin River in the west to Wonsan on the east coast. This would provide General Matthew B. Ridgeway, the commander-in-chief of UN operations in Korea, flexibility in dealing with the build-up of Chinese forces in the vicinity of the 38th parallel (Son, 2018).

THE MAIN EVENTS

The UN forces held a zigzag formation on their front line. Chinese forces identified this as a weakness that would allow them to focus their troops on isolating sections of the UN line from their flanking units (Kim, 2018). The Glosters, under Lieutenant Colonel Carne, the Royal Artillery and the reserves had 773 men holding three points with a three-kilometre gap to the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers’ position on their right and Belgian Volunteers on their left. British forces were better armed than the Chinese, but they were about to meet a force of 27–30,000 soldiers.

On 22 April 1951, a patrol of Glosters met the waiting Chinese forces north of the Imjin at 6:00 am, where they engaged, but they soon returned to an allied position south of the river. With not enough men to hold the entire front, the companies of the battalion occupied hill positions, which were considered by Major P. W. Weller as ‘fairly secure’ (MacKenzie, 2013, pp. 41–42).

First contact began at 9:45 am on 22 April with Chinese forces crossing the Imjin River. The 29th Brigade was able to hold them off until 11:30 pm. ‘They kept coming in waves, large numbers of them, however intense the fire they just seemed to keep coming’, a Corporal of the Glosters remembered (MacKenzie, 2013, p. 40).

On the morning of 23 April at 7:00 am, the Glosters ‘beg[an] to run out of ammunition...’, as one of the Glosters remembered (MacKenzie, 2013, p. 64). D Company withdrew from its position at 8:30 am, after covering A and B Companies, before repositioning around Hill 235. Then, during the night, C Company and battalion
HQ moved to Hill 235, and during the day on 24 April, B Company joined them. The Northumberland and Belgians on the flanks were in trouble, with all companies being engaged, and by night the Chinese soldiers managed to infiltrate between the brigades and reach artillery a mile behind the Northumberland (MacKenzie, 2013). On 25 April at 8:30 am, the USAF finally got through to supply support for the Glosters, strafing napalm on the Chinese forces, which revolted some of the Glosters, but soon after, the Glosters’ position became untenable. Lieutenant Colonel Carne ordered Company A, followed by the rest, to make their way off the hill at 10:00 am on the final day (MacKenzie, 2013). The Glosters had lost 623 men: 597 non-officers missing/killed/wounded, along with 26 officers, meaning that only 43 men made it back to friendly territory.

**POST-MORTEM**

The events as reported to commanders outside the battlefield differed from the situation as recorded by the Glosters. For example: on the final day’s report, the 29th were holding position; it was also noted that an infantry and tank taskforce had reached the Glosters and that ‘all is well with the battalion’ (The National Archives, ‘Made by the Ministry of Defence’, no. 262). It was not until the day after that the report stated that the Glosters were completely isolated, with no news on relief, while the rest of the 29th Brigade had withdrawn (The National Archives, ‘Made by the Ministry of Defence’, no. 263). This failure to achieve a clear picture of the circumstances surrounding the Glosters would result in much of the post-battle debate.

The immediate reaction to the battle was to search for those responsible for the fate of the Glosters. Tom Brodie, a brigade commander, would take some of the blame, while blame would go higher to General Ridgway, who wrote on 9 May: ‘I cannot but feel a certain disquiet that down through the channel of command, the full responsibility for realizing the danger to which this unit exposed them for extricating it when that danger became grave, was not recognized nor implemented.’ (MacKenzie, 2013, p. 190)

Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet suggested that Colonel J. P. Carne was at fault, stating that he ‘did not indicate the seriousness of his position and the need for either additional help or withdrawal’ (MacKenzie, 2013, p. 191). This understatement came while a Filipino-led armoured relief column attempted to reach the Glosters. When asked for an update on their situation, the Glosters replied: ‘A bit sticky; things are pretty sticky down there’ (MacKenzie, 2013, pp. 81–82) – a statement that might demonstrate the seriousness to British high command but not to American-led UN command.

Eventually, the debate was put aside for the promotion of UN co-operation. The actions of the Glosters were promoted as an example of proper strategy. On 8 May 1951, the 1st Battalion Gloucester and 170th Independent Mortar Battery survivors received the Presidential Citation, the highest US award to military units, which appeared in The Times the next day (Fisher and Lohan, 2006).

This came at an opportune moment, as The Sunday Times had published an article quoting the President of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, ‘The British had outlived their welcome in my country.’ This could not be proven and was disavowed by President Rhee, but the backlash, especially from front-line soldiers, was seen as a threat to morale (The National Archives, ‘Made by the Foreign Office’). Since the decision to promote the actions of the Glosters, there has not been further debate surrounding who was responsible for the Glosters’ fate.

**CONCLUSION**

The Battle of the Imjin was a hard-fought battle, during which the Chinese had the advantage in strategy and manpower. Despite the odds, the British 29th Brigade was able to hold them back, alongside their fellow UN forces, while the Glosters held longer, allowing their allies to withdraw. The Glosters have been honoured and became a symbol of resistance to support morale during the war. However, the battle, like the war itself, is a largely ignored subject in Britain. This despite the fact that veterans who survived the battle are still alive, the actions taken by national servicemen at Imjin River to help secure the continued existence of the South Korean state, and the achievement of the highest US award to a unit.

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When war broke out in 1950, Korea was seen as a distant nation of little immediate interest to the British public. Some British cabinet officials were allegedly unsure where Korea actually was (Norton-Taylor, 2010). The war in Korea was not seen as a direct threat to Britain, and the Labour government was not as invested in the global struggle against communism as America was. Furthermore, World War II had left British people predictably nervous about another war. Its public were reluctant to send their sons and fathers into battle. In 1945, the British electorate had voted for a government promising an unprecedented level of domestic investment in social policies for housing and health. Yet the nation was still financially unstable, and the electorate were understandably concerned at the effect it might have if vital government funding and tax payer money was diverted to a war in Asia. Thus, it is easy to see the reasons why Britain was reluctant to engage in the Korean War. It is therefore equally important to understand why they did.

Regardless of these legitimate concerns, Atlee advised his government that backing the US in Korea was ‘distant, yes, but nonetheless an obligation’ (Norton-Taylor, 2010). He meant that they were obliged to do so by their commitment to the UN and their relationship with the US. However, Britain had other strategic concerns. The government was anxious that the invasion of South Korea might encourage the Soviets to threaten Europe, and was aware that supporting American forces in Korea might increase their chances of having American support in the event of any conflict on European soil.

There were limits to the British support. Some government officials were worried about the role of General Douglas MacArthur in the war, seeing his actions as excessively aggressive. They were also keen to look after Britain’s ongoing interests in the East, which included keeping Hong Kong stable and protecting the government in Malaya. Thus, when asked to impose sanctions on China to aid the war effort, Britain refused.

This same ambivalence towards the conflict is evidenced in the way in which the war has been remembered.

HOW THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE KOREAN WAR HAS BEEN MEMORIALISED

Britain originally pledged only naval support to the war in Korea, but subsequently sent troops that formed a major part of the First Commonwealth Division. British troops came face to face with the Chinese insurgence in 1951, played a key role in the Battle of the Imjin, then patrolled the 38th parallel as peace negotiations between North and South Korea dragged on for two years.

Despite this contribution and the 1,078 dead, the Korean War was largely understudied, un-commemorated, and uninteresting to members of the British public in the decades that followed.

As noted by Huxford (2018), the narrative began to change from the 1980s. The British Korean Veterans Association was finally formed in 1981, allowing British veterans to talk to each other about their Korean experiences. Following the 60th anniversary of the war, Britain unveiled its first official Korean War Memorial in 2014, although, significantly, this memorial was a gift from the Republic of Korea rather than a British commission.

There can be no doubt that Britain has been slow or disinterested in commemorating the Korean War. Most dedications to soldiers that lost their lives in the conflict are plaques attached to existing memorials to the dead of the Great War and World War II. These memorials were initiated by Korean veterans, and often specific to local areas and regiments. Many veterans found the lack of government involvement in remembrance either frustrating or downright offensive.
HOW THE WAR HAS BEEN MEMORIALISED IN KOREA AND THE USA

North Korea is equally uneasy with commemorating the war. In Panmunjom, within the building where the Korean ceasefire was signed in 1953, sits the North Korean Peace Museum. It hosts a traditionally designed memorial statue as well as an information area about the Korea War.

By contrast, South Korea is home to many monuments and cemeteries, as well as the War Memorial of Korea, which was created in 1994 to teach the military history of South Korea in an effort to avoid future atrocities.

The United States has an even greater number of memorials dedicated to the Korean War. There are memorials dedicated to those who served as well as to those that lost their lives in the conflict. The remarkable Korean War Veterans Memorial consists of 19 large statues of soldiers marching/proceeding towards the pool of tranquility, alongside a wall of images from the conflict and the names of United Nation member states that served alongside the United States in Korea.

UNCOVERING THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON KOREAN CIVILIANS

Military deaths were dwarfed by civilian casualties in both North and South, yet these are little memorialised, and uncovering the true extent of civilian suffering has been complex and controversial. This is particularly true of the accusations of atrocities that have been uncovered in the South.

Through the war, there were a huge number of civilian deaths. Victims were killed by bombing and crossfire, but also deliberately by their own government, as South Korean troops sought to destroy any communist sympathisers and collaborators. The South Korean leadership feared that many people would be swayed in favour of the communist cause if a North Korean army invaded their village, and so the South Korean army sought to destroy these potential traitors.

In 2005, the South Korean government formed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea. Its purpose was, in the words of its president, to ‘settle the past’ and ‘provide a more comprehensive resolution’. A government body set up to last four years, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had a mandate to ‘investigate illegal massacres before and after the Korean War, human rights violations due to constitutional and legal violations or unlawful exercise of authority, incidents involving suspicious manipulation of the truth, and other historical incidents deserving the Commission’s attention’. This included investigating atrocities committed against its own people by the former South Korean government.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission interviewed survivors of the Korean War and investigated burials at sites where mass killings were believed to have happened. The Commission found ditches filled with hundreds of bodies, some still tied together by barbed wire, in positions that clearly corroborated the survivors’ stories.

The Commission found that civilians had been regularly targeted by troops scouring the country to eliminate potential communists. In one incident in Naju, in 1950, South Korean officers disguised themselves as a North Korean unit of soldiers and then shot every civilian that welcomed the communists to their home.

The Commission gave a voice to many whose stories had not been told for years under authoritarian leadership. Despite this, the Commission was seen as slow, unproductive and costly. Two-hundred-and-forty researchers worked on just 300 cases over a four-year period, yet the Commission estimated that 100,000 South Koreans died at the government’s hands – systematically slaughtered by the army. Allegedly, there were also over 200 instances of mass killings instigated by American warplanes and ground troops.

Some civilians were also disappointed by the Commission’s inability to prosecute their oppressors. The Commission was not a court. It was set up to discover the truth of what happened in the years 1950 to 1953, but it was not empowered to prosecute offenders, although it could offer reconciliation through compensation to victims’ families.

REFERENCES


For many years, one of the fundamental principles of the Historical Association’s work on professional development for history teachers has been the value and importance of up-to-date subject knowledge. This commitment has not always been in the mainstream of professional development provision. However, the importance of subject expertise is being increasingly recognised as a key driver in effective teaching and learning (Coe et al., 2014, Cordingley et al., 2015). This commitment is increasingly being supported by research into teaching and learning and is central to the new Ofsted Education Inspection Framework (Ofsted, 2019).

This commitment to making up-to-date, cutting-edge scholarship available to teachers can be seen in the structure of the Historical Association’s Teacher Fellowship Programme. So far, there have been Fellowships on the later Middle Ages; the Cold War; Britain and Transatlantic Slavery; Conflict, Art and Remembrance; and the Age of Revolutions. Each programme involves a rigorous selection process for practising teachers. They then work with academic experts in the relevant field of historical scholarship and with experienced educators.

The current Fellowship was run in collaboration with the World History Digital Education. The programme had five stages:

• **Applications** from current teachers and selection.

• **A residential event** held in Athens in August 2019, in which representatives of many of the nations that took part in the Korean War exchanged scholarship and perspectives on the Korean War and its legacy.

• **An intensive online programme** in which teachers engaged with cutting-edge academic scholarship and discussed their learning from this intensive input.

• **The creation of teaching resources** inspired by this scholarly input but mediated into accessible and ready-to-use classroom resources. This book you are reading is the result.

• **A programme of dissemination** starting with the Historical Association Annual Conference in 2020 but also involving many more local networks of teachers.

The impact of this scholarship can be seen in the quality of discussion that was generated week after week among the Teacher Fellows. Here are just a few examples of the insightful comments generated in discussions:

Bruce Cumming’s argument, that the Korean War was strongly rooted in localised disagreement, which the USA, with the ‘larger quest of hegemony’, then exploited, contrasts sharply with the views expressed by some at the residential conference back in August. I agree that revisionism certainly appears to hit a nerve with Stueck, particularly when he addresses the blame for the length of the war (which Revisionists attribute in part to the ‘inflexible, intolerant and self-righteous’ approach of the UN negotiators).

Week 2 discussion on the origins of the Korean War

Hoare notes the fledgling regime in Beijing was worried about US intentions in East Asia in general and extremely watchful about developments in Korea due to its border with China. However, it is only when the UN forces go beyond the 38th parallel and head towards the Chinese border that the Chinese build up troops on the border and
Jian’s argument seems focused on stating that Chinese involvement in Korea was very much to do with ideology and the need to spread communism in the Cold War world.

**Week 4 discussion on China’s intervention in the war**

Huxford’s article makes a compelling case as to why the Korean War is largely forgotten in Britain by arguing that it has not proved serviceable for the purposes of national identity formation/entrenchment. Framings linked to World War II such as the ‘underdog’ triumphing over ‘evil’ don’t work in relation to a conflict, where Britain was a junior partner and whose aims, methods and outcomes had been at best unclear, at worst criticised.

**Week 7 discussion on how far the Korean War was a forgotten conflict**

These insights can be seen to have informed the contents of this publication, along with the scholarly subject updates that grace Section 1 of the publication. We are grateful to Dr Grace Huxford of the University of Bristol and Professor Thomas Hennessey of Canterbury Christ Church University in particular for their support and written contributions. We are also grateful for the support given by other colleagues in the history community, notably Dr Michael Shin of Cambridge University and Dr Deokhyo Choi of the University of Sheffield.

Inspired by the work of these and other academic colleagues, our Fellows have produced a range of classroom resources that we hope are both rigorous and engaging for students. They are arranged in order of the age group at which they are aimed. However, most experienced teachers should have no great difficulty in adapting these resources to their teaching at other levels.

More information about Historical Association Fellowships can be found on the Historical Association website. We urge teachers to consider applying for these tremendous opportunities!

**REFERENCES**


When the Korean War broke out in 1950, it was something of a shock and a mystery to many – in fact probably most – people in the West. It is quite telling that US and British newspapers and newsreels carried articles and features on where Korea was and why conflict had broken out.

To some extent this lack of awareness persists today, so much so that few Americans are aware that casualty rates in Korea were higher than in Vietnam. Similarly, the tens of thousands of British Korean War veterans regarded the conflict as a forgotten war (which is explored in several of our resources) and few British people are aware of significant engagements such as the Battle of the Imjin River.

THE ROOTS OF THE KOREAN WAR

To locate the roots of the Korean War, we need to look in several different regions and explore several different contexts.

CONTEXT 1: THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE

From 1941 to 1945, the USA and USSR had been allies in the Second World War against Germany and its allies Italy and Japan. But it was not a natural alliance. The USA (capitalist and democratic) and USSR (communist) had completely different political and economic systems. As the war ended, the contrasts and rivalries emerged.

The first clear signs of the rivalry that was to become known as the Cold War were seen in Europe. Between 1945 and 1948, Europe became a divided continent. In general terms, Western Europe allied with the USA while Eastern Europe became part of what Soviet leader Josef Stalin called the Soviet sphere of influence. Western Cold War propaganda portrayed this as Soviet imperialism in the East while, not surprisingly, Soviet propaganda told a story of the USSR protecting Eastern Europe from American imperialism. The arguments about responsibility for the tensions continue to this day, but the relevance of this to Korea was that a mentality of aggressive suspicion was now the currency of US–Soviet relations. Soviet leader Stalin felt threatened. He wanted to rebuild Eastern Europe as a buffer zone to protect the western border of the USSR. The Americans saw this as expansion of communism, and they determined to stop any further expansion. This policy became known as containment.

CONTEXT 2: COMMUNISM AND containment in Asia

The Americans applied containment in Asia as well as Europe. Soon after the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, China became communist in 1949, under Mao Zedong. The Americans had always regarded China as their ally in the Far East.

Between 1946 and 1949, they pumped $2 billion in aid into China, largely to support the nationalists. Now, suddenly, a massive new communist state had appeared on the map. The US was stung by this turn of events. It was one of the factors that precipitated a Red Scare in the USA, in which many innocent people were accused of being communist sympathisers. For example, the East Asia scholar Owen Lattimore was accused and forced to answer questions in Congress. He had been President Truman’s adviser on China, and when China fell to Mao, suspicion fell on Lattimore for somehow helping him. Lattimore was cleared but his story revealed the fear and suspicion in the USA about communism.

Some of this fear was based on evidence, however. American spies reported to President Truman that Stalin was providing support and resources to help communists win power in Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines and Korea. Truman and other Americans watched with increasing anxiety. They saw a conspiracy. They thought that communist countries were acting together to spread communism. They had visions of the communists overrunning all of Asia, with country after country being toppled like a row of dominoes.
CONTEXT 3: THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Korea had been ruled by Japan until 1945. At the end of the Second World War, the northern half was liberated by Soviet troops and the southern half by Americans. When the war ended, the North remained communist-controlled, with a communist leader who had been trained in the USSR, and with a Soviet-style one-party system. The South was anti-communist. It was a not a well-established Western-style democracy at this point, having recently been liberated from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule. However, the fact that it was anti-communist was enough to win it the support of the USA.

There was bitter hostility between the North’s communist leader, Kim Il Sung, and Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea. Kim was eager to strengthen his position. North Korea quickly established strong links with the new communist regime in China. In fact, many North Koreans had fought on the communist side in the war that brought Mao to power. Kim lobbied Mao to support a plan to try to take control of the whole Korean Peninsula. Kim also lobbied Stalin, Mao and Stalin were eventually persuaded. Mao was keen to assert himself on the world stage. Stalin saw the advantages of getting the USA involved in a war in Asia while it would not involve troops from the USSR.

WAR, INTERVENTION AND STELMADE

In June 1950, the hostility spilled over into open warfare. North Korean troops overwhelmed the South’s forces. By September 1950, all except a small corner of south-east Korea was under communist control.

UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION

President Truman immediately sent advisers, supplies and warships to the waters around Korea. At the same time, he put enormous pressure on the UN Security Council to condemn the actions of the North Koreans and to call on them to withdraw their troops. In the Cold War atmosphere of 1950, each superpower always denounced and opposed any action by the other. So normally, in a dispute such as this, the Soviet Union would have used its right of veto to block the call for action by the UN. However, the USSR was boycotting the UN at this time. When China became communist in 1949, the USA had blocked its entry to the United Nations, since it regarded the nationalists (Chiang Kai-shek and his followers) as the rightful government of China. The USSR had walked out of the UN in protest. So when the resolution was passed, the USSR was not even at the meeting to use its veto.

The UN contingent included troops from the USA and Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Colombia, Turkey, the Philippines, France and many others. The USA made the largest contribution of troops and equipment, Britain the second. By spring 1951, Britain’s contribution to the UN forces was 12,000 strong. In 1950, South Korean forces numbered between 80,000 and 100,000, increasing, according to some estimates, to 240,000 by spring 1951. Facing the UN forces were, at first, 150,000 North Korean troops. They were reinforced in the autumn of 1950 by 200,000 Chinese troops. China’s involvement eventually rose to around one million.

The first UN action was to reinforce the remaining South Korean territory around Pusan.
United Nations forces stormed ashore at Inchon in September 1950. At the same time, other UN forces and South Korean troops advanced from Pusan. The North Koreans were driven back beyond their original border (the 38th parallel) within weeks. MacArthur had quickly achieved the original UN objective of removing North Korean troops from South Korea. But the Americans did not stop. Despite warnings from China’s leader, Mao Zedong, that pressing on would mean China’s joining the war, the UN approved a plan to advance into North Korea. By October, US forces had taken the North Korean capital Pyongyang and reached the Yalu river and the border with China.

**CHINESE INTERVENTION**

Chinese leader Mao saw this as a threat to his own country, and in November 1950 China officially entered the war. Huge forces launched a devastating counter-attack, driving the UN and South Korean forces back again. As the freezing cold winter weather drew in, the Chinese advance continued and they recaptured South Korea’s capital Seoul in January 1951. In the next few months, the UN and South Korea forces were able to regroup. They retook Seoul in March 1951 and established defensive positions to the north of Seoul and in the valley of the Imjin River.

At the same time, Truman and Macarthur had fallen out. Macarthur wanted to escalate the war, attacking China and even using nuclear weapons if necessary. In April, Truman removed MacArthur from his position as commander and brought him back home. He rejected MacArthur’s aggressive policy towards communism. Containment was underlined as the American policy. One of the American army leaders, General Omar Bradley, said that MacArthur’s approach would have ‘involved America in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy’.

Back on the ground, the Chinese and North Koreans launched another offensive in April 1951 along the Imjin River. Ferocious fighting followed, including a famous action by British troops from the Gloucestershire Regiment (‘The Glosters’). There were heavy casualties on all sides but the defences held.

**STALEMATE**

The Battle of Imjin marked the end of the mobile phase of the war. What followed was a stalemate, similar to the trench warfare that had been seen on the Western Front in the First World War. Casualties mounted, from fighting, weather and disease.

Away from the front line, peace talks between North and South Korea began in June 1951. There is much debate about why this stalemate continued until July 1953 when it was achieving so little. Some historians have blamed the American negotiators, who tried to force China and North Korea to accept humiliating terms. Other theories include the view that Stalin actually wanted the war to continue because it tied up American resources. There is some evidence that Mao was keen to continue fighting because he enjoyed the prestige of matching the Americans and also because Korea was an opportunity to give his troops experience.

The fighting continued until July 1953, when an armistice was agreed. By then, the US had a new president, Dwight Eisenhower, who favoured peace. In March 1953, Stalin died and the new Soviet leaders were also inclined towards ending the war. This in turn made the Chinese and North Koreans less confident. An armistice was finally signed in July 1953, but the war never officially ended and North Korea remains divided today, with the border zone between the two Koreas remaining a tense and heavily fortified area.
2C WHY TEACH ABOUT THE KOREAN WAR?

Across the United Kingdom, indeed across the world, history teachers can usually be relied upon to bemoan the fact that they never have enough time to teach all the historical content they would like to. Many highly significant topics are taught only in outline or are not taught at all.

In many countries, and this certainly includes the UK, the Korean War is one such topic. The articles and resources in this publication will inevitably raise concerns for many teachers, who despairingly ask themselves how they might incorporate such topics into an already crowded curriculum.

As the representative body for history teachers in England, the HA is all too aware of this tension. There is no simple answer. However, what we can do is to showcase what has been done in some classrooms and to try to extract the planning and pedagogical, curricular and methodological issues and lessons that have emerged from these examples or that drove them in the first place. We can also highlight the opportunities that arise from engaging with up-to-date scholarship.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KOREAN WAR

Perhaps the most compelling case for giving more teaching time to the Korean War is the sheer significance of the war in terms of global history. As Matray (2002) argues, most scholars accept that the Korean War effectively militarised the Cold War, turning it from a political contest into an outright conventional conflict. They also agree that the Korean War expanded Soviet-US hostility from Europe into Asia. The Cold War is, of course, taught widely but Korea tends to take a backstage role in the majority of teaching programmes here in the UK. The significance of this militarisation should not be underestimated, because it involved the Soviet Union, North and South Korea and, for once and once only, the United Nations Organisation. Margot Tudor’s scholarly update (page 3) and Jacob Keet’s resource (Enquiry 4, page 87) explores this militarisation of the UNO, and in the process the resource gives students an insight into the workings of the UNO itself.

A CONFLICT WITH CONSEQUENCES

Another reason to consider teaching the Korean War is that it had such far-reaching consequences. One key consequence was the way in which the war transformed the communist bloc. It was particularly significant for China. It is easy to forget that the communist regime established in China was only one year old when the Korean War began. The war massively strengthened the prestige of China and its leader Mao Zedong, as his forces fought the USA and its allies to a standstill. The war also transformed the armed forces of China. The Red Army emerged from the war with a large force of officers and troops who had combat experience and were well-equipped with up-to-date weapons supplied by the USSR.

It would also be impossible to ignore the fact that the Korean War has had serious long-term geopolitical impacts. The very fact that North Korea and its relationship with the rest of the world is a live issue to this day is due to the Korean War and the inability of all of the parties involved to reach a satisfactory settlement. This issue is explored in great depth and with fascinating source material by Guy Birks in his resource on why the Korean War never really ended (Enquiry 7, page 119).

A CONFLICT WITH IMPACT

In the short term, the war had massive and devastating consequences for Korean civilians and also for the soldiers who fought on all sides. For Britain, the casualties alone would make this the most costly British conflict since the Second World War. British deaths in Korea exceed all of the Falklands, Afghanistan and Iraq wars combined.

Rachel Steels’ resource (Enquiry 2, page 63) explores the experiences of the British veterans during the war and includes a selection of extracts from interviews with Korean War veterans that are both powerful and very moving.
Andrew Wrenn’s resource (Enquiry 3, page 72) picks up on the devastating impact of the Korean War on Korean civilians, using testimonies from veterans and also from the Korean War Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Wrenn then investigates how the Korean War has been memorialised and asks students to engage in deep thinking about the very concept of memorial.

**A CONFLICT WITH A HISTORIC LEGACY**

Another reason to study the Korean War is the way in which South Korea recovered from the devastation of war, a phenomenon that is often referred to as South Korea’s ‘miracle’. In history, we all too often study wars and their causes and events, but sometimes powerful stories like South Korea’s development can be missed. Gregg Brazinsky’s article on the legacy of the Korean War (page 13) explores this phenomenon in greater detail, but it is worth considering the facets of South Korea’s recovery that underpinned this rise: democratisation and economic development.

The years following the war saw the emergence of a democracy. But it is important to recognise that this democracy had to be built up, sometimes fought for. South Koreans at times took to the streets over threats to democracy, particularly in the 1960s. South Korea today is a well-established democracy, with a strong civic society and political institutions, but this journey is a worthwhile reminder that a functioning democracy has to be built and cannot be imposed.

There was also a massive and concerted effort to take South Korea from a war-torn and poverty-stricken region to become a modern, economically developed powerhouse. Governments, working with big corporations, have transformed South Korea into a modern economy – one of the world’s top ten economies, in fact. From a country that received economic aid, South Korea has now become a provider of aid.

**HIDDEN HISTORIES**

Students like discovering hidden histories – stories that for one reason or another have been either suppressed or simply not aired. The Fellowship programme exposed the Fellows to many aspects of the Korean War that could be considered as hidden histories.

Kristian Shanks’ resource (Enquiry 6, page 107) uses original source material to examine a massively controversial issue – whether the US used biological weapons in the Korean War. In doing so, Shanks helps students to develop that important disposition (that is so vital to historians), the ability to interrogate sources and then use these sources as evidence in building an argument. He also shows how source material can be bent and shaped to suit narratives that promote particular agendas.

Although not exactly a hidden history, the Battle of the Imjin River is relatively unknown in the UK. Erica Kingswood’s resource (Enquiry 5, page 98) and Henry Palmer’s scholarly update (page 34) focus on this crucial battle, understanding its place in the war. Kingswood uses a range of source material to challenge students to write a narrative of the battle and to consider the ways in which it has been remembered or not.

Jennifer McCullough (Enquiry 1, page 52) and John Marrill (Enquiry 8, page 135) also uncover some hidden histories, as their resources look at what the history of British involvement in the Korean War can reveal about Britain as well as the war. McCullough channels the work of Grace Huxford (summarised in scholarly article 1D on page 24) to investigate British protest against the Korean War. Using Mass Observation, press and newsreel sources and pen portraits of protesters, she asks Key Stage 3 students to consider how serious the opposition was.

Marrill considers protest but in a broader context, which is the decision-making processes that shaped British policy decisions on Korea. He then challenges A-level students to delve into the workings of government by using notes and minutes from Cabinet meetings and extracts from the press at the time.
A PROVING GROUND FOR DEVELOPING STUDENTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF THE DISCIPLINE OF HISTORY

As this publication shows, studying the Korean War can be a proving ground for the kind of rigorous but accessible activity and study that will build the disciplinary understanding that young people need to become accomplished historians but also good citizens. For example:

• These resources provide engaging but challenging opportunities to investigate original source material. McCullough (Enquiry 1) uses sources to help students to understand the motivation of those who protested against the war. Steels (Enquiry 2) uses veteran testimonies to evoke the experiences of veterans during and after the war. Marrill (Enquiry 8) also uses original sources to shine a light into hitherto unexplored areas of the Korean War. In addition to that, he introduces us to the very essence of historiography by looking at how these same sources have been viewed differently by historians of different backgrounds and beliefs.

• In their different ways, Shanks (Enquiry 6), Steels (Enquiry 2) and Wrenn (Enquiry 3) each encourage students to grapple with historical memory. Shanks provides the opportunity to study the ways in which accounts of the past have been manipulated. Steels considers how the war affected veterans in the years after the war and how the collection of the memories in oral histories helped to rekindle interest and pride. Wrenn looks at similar issues of historical memory. Young people often find the concept of memory problematic because many of them tend to think in binary modes of true or false or fact/fiction. Wrenn introduces the idea that the same events can legitimately generate differing narratives.

• On the subject of narrative, Kingswood (Enquiry 5) provides a perfect opportunity to challenge students to create a narrative of their own. In a similar vein, Keet (Enquiry 4) provides differing narratives for students to compare and contrast.

In the Enquiry outlines in Section 3, each of the authors has carefully explained their curricular rationale – how and why this particular set of lessons can enhance a teaching programme.

REFERENCES
FINDING SPACE IN YOUR CURRICULUM FOR TEACHING ABOUT THE KOREAN WAR

 Those of us who have participated in this Teacher Fellowship would have no doubt that all students could benefit from studying these fascinating and too-often-ignored topics. The fact remains, however, that you probably have limited time and a lot to achieve, so you need to assure yourself and your students (if not prove to a deputy head in charge of curriculum!) that these materials are worth the time and energy that they require, and that they will complement your existing schemes of work at Key Stage 3, GCSE or A-level and enhance, extend or deepen them in relevant ways.

KEY STAGE 3

As we go to print with this publication, schools in England are reconfiguring their history programmes in the context of a new Education Inspection Framework from the education inspectorate Ofsted. This new framework puts a much greater emphasis on the quality of the curriculum. In short, they want the history that students tackle to be authentic and meaningful and not driven by the needs of examinations. One of the aims of this publication is to provide opportunities for this kind of authentic history.

Most Year 9 courses cover the twentieth century – and many focus on the theme of conflict, majoring on the two World Wars and the Cold War. Studying Korea in greater depth could freshen up such schemes of work:

- The Korean War contrasts relevantly with the Second World War.
- It focuses on an ignored Cold War flash point – indeed, the closest the superpowers ever came to nuclear war.
- It is arguably more relevant to British history than the Vietnam War.
- It gives helpful insight into how Britain saw itself at home and abroad in the 1950s.

Equally importantly, Key Stage 3 courses are building disciplinary understanding – by using original documents engaging with a range of historical interpretations, grappling with issues such as memorialisation and writing historical narratives.

Three of our enquiries are designed with this Key Stage 3 context in mind.

Enquiry 1: An unpopular war?
How significant was opposition to the Korean War in Britain?

- The first lesson introduces students to the nature and causes of the war. It touches on the historical debate surrounding the war’s origins.
- The second lesson draws on the work of Dr Grace Huxford and investigates reaction to the war back in Britain, including how we might measure the ‘significance’ of opposition to the war.
- Opposition to the Korean War saw the beginning of the anti-nuclear protest movement, which makes this a good bridge into studying the Cold War and nuclear tension.

Enquiry 2: A forgotten war?
Unearthing the voices of British veterans of the Korean War

- These lessons introduce students to veteran testimony and how and why certain events and people’s experiences are remembered in society.
- This could be a moving contrast with any study of the First and Second World War, where veterans’ stories have been so highly prized and much studied. The contrast with the way in which the Korean veteran experiences have been all but ignored will probably anger your students (in a worthwhile and creative way!) and they should enjoy the experience of trying to correct the historical record and give these veterans their due attention.
- They will also see how oral histories change.
Enquiry 3: Impact and memory. How should the Korean War be remembered?

- This goes deeper still into those themes and concepts, building deeper understanding of specific terms such as memorial and memorialisation, and developing students’ ability to handle evidence, describe change and continuity, evaluate historical interpretations and identify similarity and difference (diversity).
- By approaching the war through individual stories and through memorialisation, it also gives you the opportunity for some local history, some online research and some creative work.

### KEY STAGE 4

The Korean War features strongly in AQA GCSE history. It also features in the two international GCSEs from Cambridge and from Pearson Edexcel (see Table 1).

**Table 1: The Korean War in the GCSE history specifications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AQA GCSE history</th>
<th>BC Conflict and tension between East and West, 1945–1972</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part 2: The development of the Cold War</td>
<td>• The significance of events in Asia for superpower relations: USSR’s support for Mao Tse-tung and Communist revolution in China, and the military campaigns waged by North Korea against the UN.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edexcel International GCSE</th>
<th>B5 The changing role of international organisations: the league and the UN, 1919–2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setting up the United Nations Organisation and its work to 1964</td>
<td>• The UN role in the Korean War (1950–53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cambridge IGCSE</th>
<th>Core Content: Option B The twentieth century: international relations since 1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 How effectively did the United States contain the spread of Communism?</td>
<td>• The United States and events in Korea, 1950–53 (Specified content: American reactions to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, involvement of the UN, course of the war to 1953)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BD Conflict and tension in Asia, 1950–1975**

Part 1: Conflict in Korea

- The causes of the Korean War: nationalism in Korea; US relations with China; the division of Korea; Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee; reasons why the North invaded the South in June 1950; US and the UN responses; USSR’s absence from the UN.
- The development of the Korean War: the UN campaign in South and North Korea; Inchon landings and recapture of South Korea; UN forces advance into North Korea; reaction of China and intervention of Chinese troops October 1950; the sacking of MacArthur.
- The end of the Korean War: military stalemate around the 38th Parallel; peace talks and the armistice; impact of the Korean War for Korea, the UN and Sino-American relations.

Depth study 6 A world divided: Superpower relations, 1943–72 The Cold War in the 1950s

- The impact of the Korean War
Many students will be studying the war in those contexts. However, it is notable by its absence from the other specifications. However, if Korea is in your GCSE history course, these resources will help you to add depth and texture.

GCSE courses tend to become utilitarian – the exam grade outcome is what leads and everything else falls into place behind it. Whether that is a trend you have reluctantly learned to live with or one you fight every inch of the way, then we believe that these resources can help you in delivering your Key Stage 4 course in three main ways.

**MOTIVATION**

Students are more motivated by what they study in depth. If the Korean War is reduced to just a few bullet points without real understanding or context it could be very boring. If it is approached as an unfolding story with complex underlying issues, they will be intrigued and motivated to understand the detail. For example, if you use Lesson 4.2 (How significant a role did the members of the UN play in the Korean War?), the UN force will no longer be an amorphous blob but a varied and textured organism – worth getting your head around. Complexity enriches. Simplification dilutes.

**MEMORY**

We all know that GCSE students most worry about remembering stuff for their exam. You probably spend a good deal of your time each year boiling down the content into manageable and organised boxes. And yet one of the surest ways to strengthen memory is emotional engagement and particularly engagement with real people with real stories that illuminate the whole. For example, students will remember more about the events of the Korean War when it is hung on Tommy Clough’s testimony of what happened at the Battle of the Imjin River (which features in Enquiry 5: What happened at the Battle of the Imjin River, April 1951?) than from a depersonalised narrative.

**MEANING**

In our twentieth-century-focused GCSE studies, we investigate big events with strong moral implications. The Korean War is one such event. It was a brutal war that brought massive suffering for civilians. Chemical weapons such as napalm were used; there was blanket bombing of civilians; there were atrocities on both sides; and the use of battlefield nuclear weapons was seriously considered by General MacArthur. These are big issues. The Americans were also accused wrongly of using germ warfare. Enquiry 6 investigates these accusations, the reasons for them and the controversy still surrounding them, thus foregrounding the moral dimension of twentieth-century warfare.

Three of our enquiries are pitched at Key Stage 4 level with GCSE in mind.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enquiry 4: The UNO intervention. Why did the UNO join the USA in the Korean War?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• This enquiry begins with an assessment of the UNO’s role in the Korean War and the processes and events that led it to intervene in the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It then continues with four source-based case studies on the role that Turkey, the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark played in the Korean War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Its aim is to enable students to contextualise and enrich their understanding of the UNO’s involvement in the Korean War.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enquiry 5: The Glorious Glosters. What happened at the Battle of the Imjin River, April 1951?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• We all know the challenge of how to meaningfully engage students with historical evidence. This challenge is particularly evident when looking at GCSE exam questions. How can they evaluate the utility of a source without first using that source as evidence for a specific enquiry?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• This resource attempts to address the issue by providing source investigation that is interesting, motivating, engaging, challenging and proper history. Students work as historians to build a narrative of the Battle of Imjin by using source material from the time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 2 | 2D Finding space in your curriculum for teaching about the Korean War

Enquiry 6: Contested evidence. Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?

• One of the most challenging aspects of the Korean War for students relates to the long stalemate between 1951 and 1953. The allegations of biological warfare come within this part of the topic and could be used by teachers to develop knowledge of this phase of the war.

• In particular, it would provide useful context for those delivering the AQA GCSE unit on Conflict and Tension in Asia 1950–1973, especially the bullet point covering the Development of the Korean War. This paper has a source-based component, and work done through the tasks should enable students to develop their skills in this aspect of historical thinking.

KEY STAGE 5

The Korean War also features in most A-level history specifications (see Table 2).

The two Key Stage 5 resources we have provided can be used to enrich many of these A-level programmes:

• Enquiry 7, with its causation focus

• Enquiry 8, with its evidential and historiographical focus

Enquiry 7: An unfinished war. Why was there no peace in Korea?

• The scheme of work aims to develop students’ ability to evaluate primary sources and historical interpretations. Across the four lessons they use these sources to build a fuller understanding of why the Korean conflict has proven so intractable.

• The developed analysis will help students to construct their own interpretations and judgements.

• It will enhance students’ skills in identifying and elaborating on the tone, utility and overall value of sources: core competencies at GCSE and A-level.

Enquiry 8: How did Britain respond to the Korean War? An evidential and historiographical approach

• This enquiry develops students’ understanding of governance and power in Britain. In the process, students engage with original source material and consider what historians see as the purpose of their discipline and what influences their approach.

• The resource is relevant to many options within A-level history courses that focus on British government and foreign policy. Moreover, some A-level modules have historical-interpretations focused-bullet points, to which this enquiry readily applies.

• This resource aims to access the radical questioning approaches of leftist historians such as Curtis, Herman/Chomsky and Gramsci to enable learners to ask penetrating questions about elite power in Britain during the early years of the Cold War, and so to advance their historical understanding. By bringing such scholarship into the history classroom, the resource aims to foster deeper analysis of what lies behind the construction of historical works, how the types of sources used affect the decisions that historians make, and how historians differ regarding what they see as the purpose of their scholarship. Such interrogation of source context and the historian’s methodology is something that examiners expect learners to engage with (Edexcel A-level coursework module being one example).
Table 2: The Korean War in the A-level history specifications  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Red</th>
<th>Blue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AQA</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1K The making of a Superpower: USA, 1865–1975</td>
<td>General focus</td>
<td>Blue = General focus Red = British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Superpower, 1945–1975 (A-level only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The USA and international relations: the Cold War and relations with the USSR and China; the Vietnam War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2N Revolution and dictatorship: Russia, 1917–1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>The transformation of the Soviet Union’s international position: the emergence of a ‘superpower’, the formation of a soviet bloc; conflict with USA and the capitalist West; death of Stalin and Stalin’s legacy at home and abroad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2P The Transformation of China, 1936–1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC’s international position and dealings with neighbours: Korea, Tibet, Taiwan and the USSR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2Q The American Dream: reality and illusion, 1945–1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>The USA and the Cold War: Superpower rivalry and conflict with the USSR; responses to developments in Western and Eastern Europe; reactions to the rise of Communism in Asia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2R The Cold War, c1945–1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Widening of the Cold War, 1949–1955 • The defensive perimeter strategy; support for South Korea; NSC-68 • The Korean War: causes, position and aims of Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee; attitudes and actions of the UN, USA, USSR and China; military involvement and settlement • Increasing Cold War tensions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Edexcel</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper 1, Option 1F</td>
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<tr>
<td>In search of the American Dream: the USA, c1917–96</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 The changing political environment, 1917–80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941; the impact of involvement in Korea and Vietnam.</td>
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<td>Paper 2, Option 2E.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mao’s China, 1949–76</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Establishing communist rule, 1949–57</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>China and the Korean War: its role in enhancing CCP control, suppressing opposition, and promoting national unity; the human and financial costs of intervention in Korea; China’s enhanced international prestige.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OCR</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Y113 Britain 1930–1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain’s position in the world 1951–1997 • Relations with and policies towards the USA and the USSR; Britain’s influence at the UN; role in Europe; nuclear policy; response to crises: Korean War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Y222 The Cold War in Asia 1945–1993</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Korean War 1950–1953 and its impact to 1977 • Causes and outbreak of the Korean War, the aims of Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee; US and UN involvement in the war; Russian support for Kim, the Inchon landing, the UN crossing of the 38th parallel and advance to the Yalu river, Chinese intervention in Korea and its impact; reasons for Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur; causes of stalemate 1951–1953; US public opinion; the changing nature of the war; difficulties in reaching a settlement; the outcome for the participants, the situation in Asia in 1953; the creation of SEATO in 1954 and its failure to 1977; non alignment: the Bandung Conference 1955 and its development from 1961.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Y317 China and its Rulers 1839–1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>China and the wider world – Relations with the USSR and the USA; the Korean War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Y318 Russia and its Rulers 1855–1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact of war and revolution on the development of the Russian Empire and the USSR - the Cold War.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WJEC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A2 Unit 3 - Option 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>THE AMERICAN CENTURY c.1890–1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>The impact of US involvement in the Second World War and the Cold War 1941–75 - the Cold War and relations with the USSR and China 1945–1972.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTATION

So there are ample hooks on which to hang these enquiries. However, we think the challenge is not to identify where the Korean War figures as things stand, but to imagine how the Korean War might, profitably, be added to your schemes of work in the future. So, we urge you to consider not 'do I study it now?' but 'how might it improve my courses if I did?' This may not be immediately obvious. If it was, you would probably already have been teaching Korea for years!

So, our aim in these resources has been to provide rigorous resources that arouse your curiosity to try something new and see how it goes. We don’t expect many people to use these resources as they stand (however hard we have tried to make them pedagogically watertight). It is much more likely that, and we will be much more excited if, you pick and mix and build your own lessons, and use the stimulus of this project to find your own meaning and excitement in the events of the Korean War.

With this in mind:

• **We have made all lessons relatively self-standing.** You don’t have to do a two- or four-lesson enquiry if all the time you have available is a spare slot on the eve of half-term.

• **We have included masses of source material**, including abundant video material, that looks at the war from many angles.

• **We have built in optionality.** The tasks within an enquiry build on each other, but if you miss one out, the whole edifice will not usually fall down! Likewise, some enquiries (such as Enquiry 4) break into parallel case studies and you decide whether to tackle two, three or four of the case studies.

• **We have revisited content and themes at different levels.** For example, opposition to the Korean War in Britain is tackled in both Enquiries 1 and 8. Memorialisation occurs regularly but is a key aspect of Enquiries 2, 3, 5 and 7.

HOW TO USE THE SCHEMES OF WORK

The rest of this book is given to the eight enquiries. Each enquiry is presented in the same pattern.

**Enquiry outline**

- Summary
- Key areas of focus
- Target age range
- Scholarly rationale
- Curricular rationale
- References to academic works

**Scheme of work**

- Overview
- Lesson breakdown
- Starter
- Activities
- Plenary
- Selected lesson PowerPoints

These resources are also available in editable form in Word on the HA website at [www.history.org.uk/go/KoreanWar](http://www.history.org.uk/go/KoreanWar). They are free to all signed-up HA members.

The online resources also include complete PowerPoint presentations plus lesson resource sheets that are not included in this print publication.
ENQUIRY 1
AN UNPOPULAR WAR? WHY DID BRITAIN GO TO WAR (AGAIN) IN 1950?
A two-lesson enquiry by Jennifer McCullough

ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY
This enquiry has been designed to help teachers of Key Stage 3 integrate the Korean War into a wider scheme of work on the Cold War.

After covering, in outline, the main events of the war and Britain’s involvement, it then explores the war as it was perceived in Britain.

It focuses particularly on opposition to the war from a number of individuals, investigating the reasons for that opposition and how their views were received by the media, politicians and the public at large.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS

• Introductory background knowledge: the causes and the course of the Korean War.
• The British reaction to the outbreak of war in Korea – how it was covered in the news and what this tells us about the British public’s knowledge of the situation in Korea.
• Key groups and individuals who opposed the Korean War, the differing reasons for their opposition and the nature of their opposition.
• The way that these individuals and groups were treated by politicians and the media and the influence (or lack thereof) that they had on wider public opinion.
• Reach a judgement about the ‘significance’ of opposition to the war in Britain.

TARGET AGE RANGE
The lessons are designed for use with Key Stage 3. The opposition theme is also tackled in Enquiry 8 as part of an A-level enquiry.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE

Lesson 1 offers an overview of the Korean War, principally a focus on the causes of the war. This is rooted in the ongoing debate about how far the Korean War was a civil war between North and South and how far it was a manifestation of international tensions and rivalry. The resource in Lesson 1 is based on the work of Dr Michael Shin (2013).

However, the principal focus of the enquiry is in Lesson 2. This focus emerges from the research of Huxford (2018), which charts a social history of the war in Britain and uses a range of source material including Mass Observation surveys, letters and diaries.
It is traditionally argued that when the Korean War broke out, there was relatively little interest in Britain at the time. Kynaston, for example, notes a diary entry that indicates that the birth of Princess Anne received more attention in the media than the outbreak of the Korean War (Kynaston, 2008). By contrast, Huxford’s research shows that there was a significant – if short-lived – anxiety shown by the public on hearing about the outbreak of war, with memories of the Second World War still very much alive. And although this anxiety and interest did subside after the first year, there was nevertheless a certain amount of ongoing controversy surrounding Britain’s involvement in the war.

What is particularly striking is Huxford’s exploration of opposition to the Korean War in Britain. This is therefore chosen as the basis for this enquiry. This aspect has previously been somewhat overshadowed by opposition to the Vietnam War, which is typically viewed as the most ‘controversial’ war. Yet Huxford argues that there were absolutely contentious elements to British involvement in Korea, with some British people growing uneasy about how the war was conducted as it progressed. It was also during this period that many people started to adopt an anti-nuclear stance. Huxford highlights some fascinating stories of various individuals, ranging from fully paid-up communists, to journalists, to scientists who bought into rumours of germ warfare. One particularly absorbing story is the case of Monica Felton, a town planner who was sacked from her government position for taking part in a ‘fact-finding’ trip to North Korea. Therefore, although ‘forgotten’ in this way, as well as in many others, the Korean War can be seen as an important turning point in anti-war opposition in Britain.

CURRICULAR RATIONALE

Most teachers of Key Stage 3 will cover the Cold War at some point in their scheme of work, and yet the Korean War is rarely a main feature in this coverage. The starring role is usually reserved for Vietnam. Yet as Professor Kathryn Weathersby (2019) has argued, there are a number of important reasons for studying the Korean War:

- The Korean War shaped the international post-war system.
- It was the Korean War that militarised the Cold War.
- The war transformed the communist side in the Cold War.
- It had a profound impact on North East Asia.

Add to this that Britain was the second largest force in the UN contingent, with over 100,000 British troops serving through the course of the war, and there are plenty of reasons why Korea should get a look-in with Key Stage 3 students of history. This enquiry therefore seeks to expose students to this ‘forgotten’ war, emphasising its links with Britain, while bearing in mind that most teachers will not have space for more than two lessons in their Cold War scheme of work.

The first lesson in the enquiry covers some essential groundwork, introducing students to the nature and causes of the war. It seeks to expose them to the historical debate surrounding the war’s origins (as set out in Shin, 2013, and referenced above), as well as to help them place into context people’s perceptions of the war back in Britain, ready for their second lesson.

The second lesson draws on the work of Dr Grace Huxford outlined above and investigates reaction to the war back in Britain. It is hoped that students will understand that the outbreak of war did not go unnoticed in Britain, nor was there unquestioning acceptance of Britain’s involvement in the war. They are also required to grapple with how we might measure the ‘significance’ of opposition to the war.

After completing the enquiry, it is anticipated that students will have a better and more well-rounded understanding of the early Cold War period so that their studies of (for example) Cuba or Vietnam will have some broader context.

REFERENCES

**OVERVIEW**

The enquiry provides two relatively self-standing lessons. We envisage that it would be taught in Year 9, building on earlier work covering the end of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War (e.g. lessons on Potsdam and the Berlin Blockade).

Lesson 1 establishes an overview of the Korean War. If you have already covered this ground, you might go straight to Lesson 2.

Students examine the historical debate around why conflict erupted in 1950. They find evidence to support two different arguments and come to a judgement. Following that, students build up a basic understanding of the main stages of the war.

Lesson 2 focuses on the perception of the war in Britain. Students analyse a contemporary newsreel on the war’s outbreak and infer how the British government persuaded people back home that sending troops to Korea was necessary and worthwhile.

The main focus of the enquiry is on opposition from different groups/individuals, and students consider how we might measure how ‘significant’ this opposition was.

If you are not using Lesson 1, then Lesson 2 could easily be taught over two separate lessons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 1:</strong> Why did Britain go to war in 1950?</td>
<td>For obvious reasons we don’t start with the enquiry question. We don’t even mention Korea. Given that this is a forgotten war, we presume that the students have not even heard of it. In this lesson, students use oral history and photographs from the war to figure out which conflict they are about to examine. They examine two different explanations for the origins of the war and find evidence to support each. They use maps and a timeline to get a sense of the nature and course of the war. To summarise their learning in this lesson, they write a caption for the image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 2:</strong> How significant was British opposition to the war in Korea?</td>
<td>In this lesson, students use a contemporary source and case studies based on Huxford’s research to explore how the war was perceived back in Britain. They use case studies of five groups/individuals who opposed the war to measure the ‘significance’ of British opposition. Using simplified role cards, they each research one of the five groups/individuals who opposed the war, recording their findings, and then feed back to the rest of the class. They conclude by answering the overarching enquiry question.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LESSON 1.1 BREAKDOWN: WHY DID BRITAIN GO TO WAR (AGAIN) IN 1950?**

**STARTER (SLIDES 1–7)**

NB For obvious reasons, we don’t mention Korea at the start of this lesson. We don’t even mention it in the enquiry question! Test out whether this is really a ‘forgotten war’ – have students heard of it?

**Slide 3:** Play the clip from 1’00” where Captain John Shipster describes how he took his golf clubs and tennis racquet with him to Korea (although Korea itself is not mentioned in this clip).

Students speculate on the questions listed on the slide, perhaps writing their guesses down on whiteboards.

- Shipster’s excellent accent should hopefully give it away that he is British!
- Students might also pick up on details such as he mentions going to Japan, and also how he was greeted by a tall, black sergeant (they will probably need help with the phrase ‘We’ve got a right load of Charlies here’!).

Allow them to make their guesses but don’t give the game away just yet.

Following this, show/play them Clues 1–5 (on Slides 3–7) one at a time and in that order. After examining each one, they should attempt to answer any of the questions on Resource sheet 1.1A (reproduced from Slide 3). You are primarily leading them towards finding out where the conflict is, although students should also be able to make other inferences about the fighting conditions, the causes of the war and the troops too:

- Clue 1 might lead them to believe that the war is somewhere very cold (so the eventual answer may surprise them if they do not associate Asia with being cold!), and also reveal the difficulty of the winter conditions.
- Hopefully they will recognise the Aussie accent in Clue 2 (some of them might also pick up on ‘napalm’ here and perhaps guess Vietnam).
- Clue 3 should narrow down the possible location of the war as Asia.
- You might allow them to look at an atlas to assist with Clue 4, which also gives them a big hint as to US involvement and why the war is being fought.
- And of course, Clue 5 gives the answer if they haven’t guessed by then.

This has been a lengthy starter, but now that the secret is out that we are studying the Korean War, you can now overview the rest of the lesson and enquiry using Slides 8 and 9.

**ACTIVITY 1: WHY DID WAR BREAK OUT IN KOREA IN 1950? (SLIDES 10–13)**

Use Slide 10 to give some very basic background to the situation in Korea in 1950.

Then explain that historians don’t actually agree as to why the war broke out, and use Slide 11 to introduce them to the two schools of thought:

- that Korea was merely a symptom of Cold War tension between the USSR and the USA
- that its origins lie with internal tension inside Korea

Slide 12 gives them an explanation grid, also on Resource sheet 1.1B. They colour-code each piece of information to show which of the arguments it supports.

(NB This sheet is based on the summary of the historiography presented in a podcast by Dr Michael Shin of the University of Cambridge, The Korean War, which is available on the HA website.)

Slide 13: Recap by going through the answers and asking students to decide which statement on the slide they find more convincing. There is also a third option, which links the previous two together.

**BEFORE YOU START**

You will need:

- Lesson PowerPoint 1.1
- Resource sheet 1.1A (Questions for Starter 2)
- Resource sheet 1.1B (Explanation grid for colour-coding for Activity 1)
- Resource sheet 1.1C (Timeline of the Korean War for Activity 2 plus maps to sequence on pages 2 and 3)
Activity 2: What Happened During the Korean War? (Slides 14–16)

The intention here is that students gain a basic understanding of the nature and course of the war between 1950 and 1953.

Slide 14 gives a link to a BBC documentary 20th Century Battlefields: 1951 Korea, presented by Dan and Peter Snow. At the time of writing, the documentary was accessible on YouTube at www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLV3eonORPc, but if it disappears, a Google search for ‘Dan Snow Peter Snow Korean War’ should work!

You could start at 2’06”. The explanation of the war starts at 4’15” but students might find the preceding two minutes interesting as they describe the border today. Play on until around 9’30”.

This clip should firstly give students a good idea of the strangeness of the current border situation between the North and South, as well as serving as an excellent introduction to the beginning of the war, ending with the arrival of UN troops in South Korea.

Next, students should read through the fuller timeline narrative of the war (Slide 15 and on Resource sheet 1.1C) and, using this, attempt to place the four maps on page 2 of that sheet in the correct order – sticking them in the space on page 3. These illustrate the main stages in the war. You can then use the animation on Slide 16 to go through the correct answer.

Students may well ask why the stalemate continued for so long between 1951 and 1953 when it was achieving so little. There is much debate around this.

- Some historians have blamed the American negotiators, who tried to force China and North Korea to accept humiliating terms.
- Other theories include the view that Stalin actually wanted the war to continue because it tied up American resources.
- There is some evidence that Mao was keen to continue fighting because he enjoyed the prestige of matching the Americans and also because Korea was an opportunity to give his troops experience.

These issues are examined in depth in one of the Key Stage 5 enquiries (Enquiry 7).

Plenary (Slides 17–18)

Slide 17 continues the story to the present day and outlines casualty figures.

Slide 18 shows a photo of the current border crossing between the North and South. It might look neat and ordered but the border (or Joint Security Area) is a symbol of extreme tension between the two countries, who are still technically at war.

Students are invited to reflect on what they have learned about the causes and course of the war, writing a 25- to 50-word caption to go with the photograph.
LESSON 1.2 BREAKDOWN: HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS BRITISH OPPOSITION TO THE WAR IN KOREA?

STARTER (SLIDES 1–5)

Slide 3 displays an image of Monica Felton and invites students to speculate about why she was sacked from her job in 1950. Either give students the eight clue cards relating to her (Resource sheet 1.2A) or drip-feed them in one at a time, starting with the less obvious clues – for example, ‘she missed an important meeting’ may encourage them to guess that she was sacked for not doing her job.

Given some of the clues and the previous lesson’s learning, you may have students who quickly guess that this is related to the Korean War, despite any mention of Korea being deliberately left off the clues. Take that feedback from students but don’t reveal who is correct at this stage.

Explain that the clues were missing one vital piece of information: that Monica Felton’s trip in June 1951 was to Korea. Congratulate any students who made the link and tell them that they will find out more about Monica Felton’s story later in the lesson.

ACTIVITY 1: HOW DID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ‘SELL’ THE KOREAN WAR? (SLIDES 6–7)

Briefly recap verbally (or ask students to do this themselves) on last lesson’s learning: why war broke out in Korea in 1950, and how British troops were a key contributor to the UN forces.

Before going into the resources, ask the question of the students: ‘How would you expect the British people to react when war broke out?’

Students then watch the newsreel from September 1950 (we suggest from 2’06” to 9’30”) and answer the questions on Resource sheet 1.2B. There are two differentiated versions to choose from, depending on the ability of your students/class: page 1 has open-text response, page 2 has scaffolding in the form of options to choose from.

Take feedback on how the government persuaded British people that sending troops to Korea was necessary and worthwhile.

ACTIVITY 2: HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS OPPOSITION TO THE WAR? SIGNIFICANCE CRITERIA (SLIDE 8)

Slide 8 introduces students to the study of opposition to the war.

If you are choosing to extend this enquiry across two lessons, there will be scope for students to speculate about why people might oppose the war, perhaps making links to previous knowledge of the suffering of the Second World War, to the first use of the atomic bomb in 1945, or perhaps to more contemporary examples of opposition to war, such as the massive protests against the Iraq War.

Tell students that they will examine some case studies of people who opposed the war and that their job will be to measure how ‘significant’ the opposition was. They will need to come up with some criteria to assist in that process – how could or should we measure how significant the opposition was? Give them one or two ideas to get them started and then ask each pair to come up with at least two more ways of measuring it. Take feedback then go through our suggestions on Slide 8.

ACTIVITY 3: HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS OPPOSITION TO THE WAR? CASE STUDIES (SLIDES 9–15)

Slide 9: Give each pair of students one of the five different case studies (they are all on Slides 11–15 and on Resource sheet 1.2C). They need to read the information about their person or group and complete the grid (shown on Slide 16 and Resource sheet 1.2C (page 1), which asks them to find out:

- why their person/group opposed the war
- the nature of their opposition
- how they were received by others in Britain
Section 3 | Enquiry 1 An unpopular war? Why did Britain go to war (again) in 1950?

Hopefully, armed from Activity 2 with how they might measure ‘significance’, they will be able to manage column 5 and give their case study person or group a significance rating.

Depending on your group and whether you are extending Lesson 2 over two lessons, you could then either rotate the role cards around, giving the students other rows to fill in, or else invite pairs to feed back verbally to the rest of the class, with you as the teacher filling in the grid on the whiteboard.

PLENARY (SLIDE 17)

After feedback (in whatever form) on all case studies, students now return to the enquiry question.

To scaffold this, Resource sheet 1.2C (page 7) provides a choice of adjectives (also shown on Slide 11) to describe the opposition. Students can circle the word(s) they think best describes it (or come up with their own). They need to write down between one and three pieces of evidence on their sheet to support their choice of words.

Finally, to reflect on what they have concluded, and to judge overall significance, they place their sticky note on a continuum of significance. They should be able to justify their position according to the criteria that they have come up with for the Activity on Slides 7 and 8.

SELECTED LESSON POWERPOINTS

LESSON 1.1

Enquiry 1: An unpopular war? Why did Britain go to war (again) in 1950?

Why did Captain John Shipster take his golf clubs to war?

Follow the clues to find out more

Clue #1
It was really terribly, terribly cold. I remember we went to ground for just twenty minutes and in that time, we froze to the ground and our machine guns froze up. As we tried to get up, our clothes were stuck to the ground with dry ice because it was twenty degrees below zero. We did have petrol heaters in the huts but sometimes they used to set fire to your sleeping bag... and that wasn’t always very funny. Captain Albert Stackpool, a British Army officer

Clue #2
‘They give you a stretcher...’

Audio clip from Private Patrick Knowles

Starter part 1
Listen to the one-minute audio clip from an interview with Captain John Shipster. Then discuss the following questions:

• Which country do you think Captain Shipster is from?
• To which country do you think he was sent to go to war?
• Why do you think he took his golf clubs?
• What might that tell us about his expectations of this war?

Starter part 2
Now examine the five more clues that will be displayed on the board. On your whiteboard or Resource sheet 1.1.A, write down:

• In which country do you think this war might be happening?
• Which countries do you think the soldiers have come from?
• What were the conditions like in the war?
• Why do you think this war might be happening?

Make sure that you can support your answers with evidence from the clues.
LESSON 1.1 overview

Content covered in the rest of this lesson:

- Why did war break out in Korea in 1950?
- What happened during the Korean War?

Why did war break out in Korea in 1950?

- On 25 June 1950, the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) invaded South Korea.
- The United Nations was quick to respond and encouraged its members to support the South. Many countries sent troops, including the USA, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa.
- Explanation A: Some historians believe that the war happened mainly because of tensions between the USSR and the USA, who were using Korea as a ‘puppet’ in their Cold War.
- Explanation B: Other historians believe that the war was more to do with internal tension inside Korea.

Why did war break out in Korea in 1950? Explanation grid.

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Enquiry overview: Why did Britain go to war (again) in 1950?

- During the Second World War, Korea was occupied by Japanese troops.
- After the war it was divided.
- The North was led by a communist, Kim Il Sung.
- The South was led by Syngman Rhee. He was not very democratic but he was highly anti-communist.
- The Soviet Union supported the North while the South was under the influence of the USA.

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LESSON 1.1 (continued)

Why did war break out in Korea in 1950?

Activity 1 recap
Which of the following statements do you most agree with?

- “War broke out in Korea because of tension between the USSR and the USA.”
- “War broke out in Korea because of tension between the USA and the USSR.”
- “War broke out because of internal tensions, which were made worse by the tension between the USA and the USSR.”

What happened during the Korean War?

Activity 2
- Watch the short video clip, which introduces the war.
- Read the timeline on the next slide, then use Resource sheet 1.1C to place the four maps in correct date order.

Timeline of the Korean War

25 June 1950 - North Korea invaded South Korea with approximately 50,000 troops. North Korean forces overran the South. By September 1950, an advancing line of south-east Korea was under threat.

27 June 1950 - The United Nations sent troops to Korea. The UN and USA vs North Korean forces reached a deadlock between 36th and 37th parallel, in early September 1950. The UN forces were drawn back beyond their original border (the 38th parallel) within weeks.

28 October 1950 - North Korean forces withdrew completely. Despite recovery from China, the UN approved aid to achieve the North Korean borders. By October 1950 US troops had reached the Yalu River and the border with China.

25 October 1950 - 260,000 Chinese troops entered North Korea as the war progressed. Chinese forces eventually crossed abandoned DMZ.

4 January 1951 - Chinese troops entered North Korea, toeing the UN and South Korean troops back. Armies faced cold winter weather and atrocities.

March 1951 - the UN and South Korean troops were able to regain territory. They retook Seoul in March 1951.

April 1951 - Chinese and UN troops launched another offensive. In April 1951, across the river, Peiping suffered heavy losses. Scarcity of food supply, hit by UN food blockade led to Korean War famine


July 1953 - armistice was signed in July 1953. The war was officially ended. North Korea remains divided today and the border remains a tense and heavily fortified area.

The never-ending war

Over the three years of war, 1950–1953:
- The UN suffered over 30,000 casualties during the war, most of whom were US troops. There were around 500,000 Chinese casualties.
- Britain suffered 1,078 killed in action, 2,674 wounded and 1,060 missing or taken prisoner.
- Korea suffered 1.3 million casualties - with equal numbers from the North and South - and one in ten Korean civilians died.

At the end of the war:
- There was an armistice (ceasefire) in 1953 but no peace treaty - ever! So, technically speaking, the two countries of North Korea and South Korea are still in a state of war.
- Neither North nor South Korea obtained the unified Korea that they were both fighting for. The border along the 38th parallel remains today.
- Relationships between the two countries are often very tense.

Plenary

Write a 25–50-word caption to go with this photograph. Make sure you include:
- Why you think the war broke out.
- What had happened in Korea by July 1953.
Lesson 1.2 Overview

Content covered in the lesson:
- How did the British government ‘sell’ the Korean War to the British people?
- How did British people respond to the war?
- How do we judge the significance of opposition to the war?
- Who opposed the war and why?

Monica Felton starter

Monica Felton was a Labour Party politician who was a government employee working on the planning of Beveridge in 1941, one of the new towns built in post-war Britain. She described herself as a socialist and a pacifist.

Felton went on a trip in June 1950. Her trip made national headlines in papers such as The Daily Mail.

Felton’s trip was debated in Parliament.

Felton missed an important meeting in Westminster in June 1951.

Monica Felton was 65 years old in 1951.

Felton published a book called That’s Fifty I Went in 1954.

Why was Monica Felton sacked?

- Your clues were missing one vital piece of information: whereabouts did Monica Felton go on her trip in June 1951?
- The answer is of course: Korea.
- You will find out more about Monica Felton’s story later in the lesson.

How did the British government ‘sell’ the Korean War to the British people?

- You have already studied why war broke out in Korea in 1950, and how 16 countries, including Britain, provided troops or support of some kind to the UN forces fighting North Korea.
- Back in Britain, the majority of the population welcomed British involvement in Korea, although some people were concerned that government funding might be diverted from health and welfare towards a war in Asia.
- So how did the government persuade British people that sending British troops to Korea was necessary?

Activity 1
Watch this newsreel from September 1950 and answer the questions on Resource sheet 1.28.

How did British people respond to the war?

- Most historians agree that the war produced some significant but short-lived anxiety. Some people even re-dug their Anderson shelters from WW2!
- There continued to be a high level of interest in the war during the first year (as we saw in the newsreel), but by 1952 there was less interest as the war slowed down.
- What we will study today is the people and groups who were opposed to British involvement in the war. We are going to measure how significant the opposition was.

Activity 2
How could we measure/judge how significant opposition was? E.g. were there more people who supported or opposed the war?
With your partner, come up with two more ways to measure the opposition.

How do we judge the significance of opposition? Significance criteria

- Were they a majority?
- Did more people support or oppose the war?
- Did their words or actions change anything? Did anybody take any notice?
- What was the reaction of the media/Parliament/ others to those who opposed the war? Were they silenced? How did they treat opponents?
- How serious was the opposition? E.g. mid-criticism of certain aspects / outright condemnation?
- Were the people who opposed the war important individuals?
- Was the opposition organised?
LESSON 1.2 (continued)

Who opposed the war and why?

Activity 3
In your pair, you will receive one role card. It will give you details about one person, group or organisation who opposed the war in Korea.

- Fill in your grid (on the next slide or Resource sheet 1.2C).
- Measure the significance of their opposition by giving it a number from 1 to 5 (1 is insignificant opposition, 5 is highly significant opposition).

You need to be ready to feed back to the rest of the class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Why did they oppose the war? What did they do? How many were killed in Britain? How significant? 1-5?

Who opposed the war and why?

- Monica Felton
- Harry Politi/CopGB
- James Cameron
- Joseph Needham
- Hewlett Johnson

Opposition case study: Communists

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was led by Harry Politi. They were strongly anti-American. They argued that the war was being fought for the USA money and to spread their version of communism over the world. Politi wrote that “British soldiers were being forced to fight on other people’s behalf”.

The CPGB held 7,000 campaign meetings in 1952 and also sold 4,000 copies of its own anti-communist “The Daily Worker” to their members across the country. They wrote lots about the impact of the war on Korean civilians. They also closely followed the USA’s of using nuclear bombs in Korea.

Their journalist, Alan Warren, visited Korea in July 1950 and wrote a letter called “I saw the Truth in Korea”, claiming that the US�nvasion of Korea was worse than the Nazi bombing of Coventry.

RESPONSE

- Most British newspapers and many British people were anti-communist. This meant that any actions by British communists were usually heavily criticised, including their view on Korea, even though most British people were anti-communist about the war. Therefore they failed to gain much sympathy or support.
- Some anti-communist newspapers in London were sacked for circulating community peace petitions. There was even one story that a 17 year-old student had been dismissed from his job for writing a pacifist letter to his father.
- Hewlett Johnson, the anti-American feeling of the CPGB was shared by others. A survey in London in 1950 found that people were not buying the USA’s by trying to support them.

Opposition case study: Joseph Needham

- The People’s Republic of China claimed that the United States had started a campaign of technological warfare. Supposedly, the US had dropped viruses on crops, causing crops in China and North Korea to fail two months from January 1953.
- Many left-wing Asians in Britain were sympathetic to the PRC. Needham visited China in 1922 and was invited to China. He was a member of the Chinese Anti-Asian League, which was based in the United Kingdom, and the United Front of Chinese Students in the UK. He was a member of the Chinese Students’ Union and was involved in protests against the war.
- He corresponded with Joseph Needham who visited China and North Korea in the summer of 1953. During this time, he wrote to two captured American soldiers who claimed to have been involved in dropping the bombs.
- When he returned to Britain, Needham went on to become a historian and writer, working on the Chinese question. In 1957, he urged other scientists to study the claims.

RESPONSE

- Many scientists were critical of the evidence and Needham had received a letter from an American soldier who visited China and North Korea, which claimed to have been involved in dropping the bombs. Needham was one of the first to demand an end to the use of chemical and biological warfare.
- He found that there was no evidence of widespread contamination by the British and allied soldiers.
- The 1956 International Congress of Genetists in Stockholm was attended by the British author Howard Lovell. He was a member of the Chinese Student League and was involved in protests against the war.
- Hewlett Johnson, the author of the piece in the Daily Worker, was involved in protests against the war. He contacted the Chinese government and was a member of the Chinese Students’ Union.

Opposition case study: Monica Felton

- Monica Felton was a campaigner helping to design and build a peace village in North Korea. She was a government employee and had nieces in the Korean War.
- She went to Korea in summer 1951 and visited several villages in the area. She was aware of the horrors of the war and how it was affecting the people.
- She later returned to Korea in 1951 and visited several villages, including those affected by the war. She was aware of the horrors of the war and how it was affecting the people.
- She returned to Korea in 1951 and visited several villages, including those affected by the war. She was aware of the horrors of the war and how it was affecting the people.
- She told Hewlett Johnson that she had seen the effects of the war and how it was affecting the people.

RESPONSE

- There was a public outcry. Felton was attached to the British parliament and had been an important figure in the war.
- She was a member of the Women’s Institute and had helped to design and build a peace village in North Korea.
- She had a series of meetings in London on June 1951, which attracted hundreds of people. The British Association reported that women openly wept at her descriptions of violence against women.
- The British Association reported that women openly wept at her descriptions of violence against women.
- Some individuals decided to protest over her speaking, and 60 Labour MPs went to hear her speak in 1951.

Opposition case study: Hewlett Johnson

- Hewlett Johnson was a well-known public intellectual. He was the author of several books and was a member of the British government.
- He was a member of the British delegation to the 1951 peace talks in Geneva.
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RESPONSE

- Hewlett Johnson was the voice of the British government and was a member of the British delegation to the 1951 peace talks in Geneva.
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How significant was opposition to the war?

Plenary

1. On your sheet, circle which of these words you think best describe British opposition to the Korean War.

- Sincere
- Insignificant
- Unimportant
- Controversial
- Insufficient
- Important

2. Write down one to three pieces of evidence to support your view.

3. Now write your name on your sticky note and place it on the continent on the right side of the map to show your overall view of the significance of opposition.
ENQUIRY 2
A FORGOTTEN WAR? UNEARTHING THE VOICES OF BRITISH VETERANS OF THE KOREAN WAR
A two-lesson enquiry by Rachel Steels

ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY
These two lessons are designed to introduce students to the fact that the Korean War has become a forgotten war in Britain and to reflect on the reasons for this.

A key element is students hearing the voices of the veterans, but students will also get the chance to use other source material to place these voices into context.

In addition, students will see how learning about the veterans’ experiences can make the Korean War a remembered war, and they will engage with the concept of memorialisation.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS

• Why the Korean War is a forgotten war in Britain, using the voices of the veterans and recent scholarship as evidence on this issue.
• Why Korea should not be forgotten.
• How the Korean war has been memorialised in Britain.
• How oral testimony (what veterans choose to share) reflects the concerns of the society at the time they speak and how history is constructed by people living after the events.

TARGET AGE RANGE
The lessons are designed for use with Key Stage 3 and fit well within a scheme of work on Conflict in the Twentieth Century, alongside studies of the First or Second World War.

The resources can be used with or without the support and scaffolding that we have provided, depending on the ability level of your students.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE
In recent years, academics have taken more interest in the British experience of the Korean War. For example, Grace Huxford has written books and articles including The Korean War in Britain: Citizenship, Selfhood and Forgetting (2018) and appeared on radio programmes about the Cold War: https://coldwarconversations.com/episode31/.

Unearthing forgotten voices is of interest to all historians. As Huxford (2016) comments: ‘E. P. Thompson’s famous introduction to The Making of the English Working Class (1963), highlighting those previously excluded from the historical narrative, was not just a call to re-orientate the subjects a historian should study, but to actively “rescue” historical subjects – through recording, archiving and cataloguing’ (p. 201)
Huxford argues that the Korean War came at a time when World War II dominated the historical narrative of Britain in ‘its finest hour’, fighting a morally justified war, alone at times, against an evil enemy that sought to take over its way of life. This war overshadowed Korea, particularly as Britain (with its own Empire-led dominance in decline in the 1950s) was not leading the military campaign but was a junior partner in a UN force.

Moreover, Korea was in a faraway place that few had heard of and was not in a position to threaten invasion of Britain.

The veterans did not feel that they could talk about their experiences, as they felt that their war could not match up to that of their fathers in World War II. The silence of the veterans contributed to the war becoming a forgotten war.

However, from the 1980s, this attitude began to change. According to psychologist Nigel Hunt, veterans’ attitudes began to shift when they saw how the veterans of the Falklands War were celebrated. (NB This was a war with a high media profile but far fewer British casualties than Korea – 255 British servicemen were killed.) The Korean veterans wanted to share their own experiences. This change was boosted by the fact that the Falklands War coincided with the retirement (from employment) of many veterans, who now had more time to reflect on their military service and trauma (cited in Huxford, 2016, p. 214).

So, in view of the fact that Korean veterans have become increasingly eager to talk about their experiences, combined with the fact that those still alive are in their late 80s and that next year is the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the war, now seems a fitting time for students to learn more about this ‘forgotten war’. 

**CURRICULAR RATIONALE**

These lessons seek to introduce students to how and why certain events and people’s experiences are remembered in society. Some events that fit with dominant historical narratives or with national identity are remembered while other events or experiences can remain obscured.

By understanding something of the veterans’ military experiences in Korea, students can develop an understanding of this phenomenon and also take part in making Korea not a ‘forgotten war’ but one that is remembered today.

Through these lessons, students can gain an awareness of concepts such as ‘national identity’ and some understanding of historiography, particularly:

- how history is constructed
- why some events are selected while others are not
- how selection of what events to study and how to study them changes over time

The new Ofsted framework from September 2019 focuses on curriculum design that provides opportunities for students’ moral and cultural development. This topic helps students to consider how Britain has portrayed itself through history and how history reflects cultural attitudes at the time when it is written.

The lessons also allow students to use oral testimonies. They will see how oral histories change.

To start with, veterans did not want to speak about Korea, but more recently they have done so and now want their war to be remembered. What people say about events that they have experienced changes according to the changed context.

Through studying the experience of British soldiers in Korea, students can also understand the substantive concept of ‘National Service’ and what that meant for people in the 1950s. They can also make links with and compare and contrast soldiers’ experiences and the types of fighting in the Korean War with experiences in previous wars, particularly the First and Second World Wars.

**REFERENCES**


OVERVIEW

The enquiry comprises two lessons. It is envisaged that it would be taught in Year 8 or 9, building on students’ study of other wars in the twentieth century.

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<tr>
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<th>Key content</th>
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<td><strong>Lesson 1:</strong> Why has the Korean war been called a forgotten war in Britain?</td>
<td>Students consider what veterans say are the reasons why Korea became a forgotten war. They then look at the work of academic Grace Huxford, and consider her explanations of wider reasons why Korea became a forgotten war. They then summarise these reasons under different headings and write about which reasons are the most important and why.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 2:</strong> Helping people to remember the Korean War</td>
<td>Students develop an overview of the British soldiers’ experience in Korea through veterans’ accounts. (Optionally, they then find out about the nature of warfare, e.g. trench warfare, guerrilla warfare and civilian suffering, and compare this with previous wars.) Students finally reflect on why Korea should be remembered. Students write a message to appear on or with a Korean War medal. By doing this, they can become active participants in helping to ensure that Korea is not forgotten. (Optionally, a classroom Korean War memorial can be created – but note that this is a major focus of Enquiry 3, so you won’t want to do both.)</td>
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**LEsson 2.1 BREAKDOWN: WHY HAS THE KOREAN WAR BEEN CALLED A FORGOTTEN WAR IN BRITAIN?**

**STARTER (SLIDES 1–8)**

Show students Slides 4 and 5, which lists casualties of some of the conflicts of the twentieth century. Ask them:

- which wars they know about
- which wars Britain was involved with
- why they know about some wars but not others

If you have not already covered this, then use Slides 6–8 to give them a brief overview of the Korean War, and explain that they will be learning about this war and will be reflecting on its role in British history.

**ACTIVITY 1: LISTENING TO THE VOICES OF THE VETERANS (SLIDES 9–10)**

Slide 9 presents a short clip describing what happened when the veterans came home after their war service and what some veterans feel about the war being forgotten.

**BEFORE YOU START**

You will need:
- Lesson PowerPoint 2.1
- Resource sheet 2.1A (Veteran testimony)
- Resource sheet 2.1B (Video recording grid)
- Resource sheet 2.1C (Huxford extracts)
Students then discuss what the clip tells them. Some students might need prompts for what to look for, such as:

- scale of British contribution
- memorial (or lack of it)
- destruction
- experience of veterans
- what it was like to return
- contrasting attitudes of UK and South Korean governments

**Slide 10:** They then read the veterans’ testimonies (on Resource sheet 2.1A) about what happened when they returned from Korea, and use the table on page 2 of that sheet to record what the veterans say about why Korea became a forgotten war.

An alternative approach (for stretch and challenge) would be to ask students to use the extracts to test the views expressed in the video clip – how representative are they? Or could the video be simply the views of two particularly unhappy veterans?

Whole-class discussion about what we have learnt so far about why Korea became a forgotten war.

**ACTIVITY 2: WHO DOES REMEMBER THE KOREAN WAR AND HOW? (SLIDE 11)**

**Slide 11** hyperlinks to a clip about Scottish veterans of the Korean War. We recommend using the first 6'30" (up to the point when the presenter asks what Danny would have made of it). However, please watch the whole 12-minute clip yourself to make your own judgement. The video was made by BBC Scotland, tracing the story of one young soldier killed in Korea.

As described on the slide, watch the clip, then discuss what this film tells us about the Korean War. In particular, note that it was not seen as being as important as World War II.

As they watch, students can record what they learn on Resource sheet 2.1B.

**ACTIVITY 3: THE LONDON KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL (SLIDES 12–13)**

Students then consider the memorial set up in London in 2014 to the Korean War. **Slide 12** has just the image. Discuss what they think of it. Then give them more information on **Slide 13** and discuss the memorial, using the prompts on **Slide 13**.

These discussions should lay a helpful foundation for the later tasks on memorialisation.

**ACTIVITY 4: HISTORIAN GRACE HUXFORD ON KOREA AS A FORGOTTEN WAR (SLIDES 14–15)**

Students read the speech bubbles on **Slide 14**. These are extracts from historian Grace Huxford’s article in Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 27, ‘The Korean War never happened: forgetting a conflict in British culture and society’.

Using **Slide 15**, draw out in class discussion what she says about why Korea became a forgotten war.

Then provide students with Resource sheet 2.1C (page 1 includes the same four extracts plus six more). Page 2 provides a recording sheet to analyse these explanations as to why Korea became a forgotten war. Some students could do this without the help of the headings on the Resource sheet.
Students then consider which reasons are linked and decide which is the most important and why. The Resource sheet provides scaffolding if needed.

Whole-class feedback to test their understanding of the main reasons why Korea became a forgotten war.

**PLENARY (SLIDES 16–17)**

Use the quotes on Slide 16 and the linked clip to explain that veterans today want their voices to be heard. Compare this with their attitude when they came back from Korea. Perhaps refer back to veteran Bill Hall, who said, ‘We waited too long to talk about it and by that time the Korean war was forgotten about.’

Use Slide 17 to reflect on the fact that, in history, some people only get a voice if others choose to tell their story. For example, in the past, the voices of enslaved Africans were not heard. By learning about the Korean War, students can help to make Korea a remembered rather than a forgotten war.

**LESSON 2.2 BREAKDOWN: HELPING PEOPLE TO REMEMBER THE KOREAN WAR**

**STARTER (SLIDES 1–3)**

Students listen to the sound file – the voice of Sir Michael Caine, who fought in Korea while on National Service. Use the first 3’15”.

This clip recaps the last lesson and links to this one. Michael Caine reiterates the ‘forgotten war’ theme but then also vividly describes his experiences.

If you listen through the rest, he then begins his description of the fighting conditions.

**ACTIVITY 1: BRITISH ARMY EXPERIENCES IN KOREA (SLIDES 4–9)**

In groups, students study the pack of ten photographs presented on Slides 5–9 and on Resource sheet 2.2A. These are photographs (mostly from the collections of the Imperial War Museum), predominantly showing British troops.

You might wish to differentiate this work by selecting particular photographs for particular students to look at.

Students should use these photographs to make some initial judgements about the British experience. Slide 4 provides hints on what to look for.

You will need to consider how long you want students to spend on this task, as it could easily fill a lesson in its own right. You may, for example, want to scale back Activity 2 below in order to allow more time to really explore the photographs and even to use them in a presentation.

**[OPTIONAL] ACTIVITY 2: COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN THE KOREAN WAR (SLIDE 10)**

You could now move straight to Activity 3 (that is what we recommend), but if you want to spend more time on the combat experience and on understanding the course of the war and comparing the types of warfare with other twentieth-century wars, then lengthen your scheme of work to allow this activity. It uses two video clips and a timeline. Which pathway you choose will depend on your students’ prior knowledge of the Korean War, the available time and your priorities for your teaching.

Slide 10: Students watch a short clip giving an overview of the Korean War and then use a detailed timeline (Resource sheet 2.2B) to reach judgements about the main development and the types of warfare. Hopefully, students will be able to see similarities with World Wars I and II.
ACTIVITY 3: VETERANS’ VOICES: WARTIME EXPERIENCES IN KOREA (SLIDE 11)

Students read the veterans’ testimonies on Resource sheet 2.2C and use page 2 of the sheet to analyse what the veterans say.

To extend this activity, you can find interesting additional testimonies here:

www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-48064775/british-korea-war-veteran-remembers-injured-child
(use 4’30”–8’40”)

www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KMmuTVeLeI&feature=youtu.be (use 31’52” – 36’42”)

PLENARY (SLIDE 12)

Use Slide 12 to prime students to reflect on what they have learnt. They need to choose some aspect of the Korean War that they want people to remember: something they found particularly surprising, moving or shocking, and/or something that might mean this is no longer a ‘forgotten war’.

They record their memory on Resource sheet 2.2D on a photo of a UN Korean War medal.

Use these medals to create a classroom Korean War memorial, so that the war is no longer a forgotten war in your class or school at least.

Students then reflect on how their learning about the Korean War has helped them to take an active role in history-making.

SELECTED LESSON POWERPOINTS

LESSON 2.1
LESSON 2.1 (continued)

How has the Korean War been remembered in Britain?

Who does remember the Korean War and how?

This is a clip about Scottish veterans of the Korean War. It was made in 2010 to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War. The main focus is on the story and the relatives of a veteran, Danny McCall, who was killed in Korea.

As you watch the clip on Resource sheet 2.1A, record what you learn about:
- Danny McCall
- The experiences of the veterans
- Affiliates to the veterans in South Korea
- Whether the war is forgotten in South Korea
- Any other aspects of the war

How should we view the Korean War Memorial?

In 2014, a £1 million memorial was built to the soldiers who died in the Korean War. It is between the Thames and the Ministry of Defence in London, which is already the site of other military tributes. It was paid for by the South Korean government, and by Korean companies and Koreans living in Britain.

How should we view this monument? As:
- a fitting tribute that should make all veterans happy?
- a reasonable start?
- too little, too late?
- something that should make the British government feel ashamed?

What do historians say about why the Korean War has become forgotten?

The Korean War was largely viewed as a distant war on a little-known peninsula.

The Korean War could not be used to support the notion of national identity. Rather, an "underdog" triumphing over unquestionable evil, Britain had been a junior partner in a conflict whose aims, methods and outcomes had been at least unclear.

The Second World War continued to exert a powerful grasp over national memory for the remainder of the century.

In the early 1950s the image of the Second World War was satisfying as a morally unimpeachable conflict, where Britain had stood alone in 1940 and eventually conquered tyranny.

Dr Grace Huxford

What do British veterans say about the Korean War?

Read what the veterans say on Resource sheet 2.1A.

Fill in the table about your findings.

Veterans now want the war to be remembered

Hopefully somewhere down the line somebody will listen to this.

The government may have locked their records away but mine are staring me in the face. I can’t forget the madness which savaged more people in three years than Vietnam did in ten.

It’s nice to know it’s down on record for future generations… it shows somebody cares…

Kevin Conwell, Durham Light Infantry in 2010

Raymond Bennett, Royal Leicesters Regiment in 2010

David Halley, veteran, speaking in 1998

Reasons why Korea has become a ‘forgotten war’

Read Huxford’s comments on Resource sheet 2.1C.

1. In what ways do they back up what we already know about why Korea became a forgotten war?
2. What new reasons does she suggest?
3. Sort the cards into different headings.
4. Write an explanation in your own words under different headings.
5. Which reason(s) are linked?
6. Which reason(s) are more important than others?
LESSON 2.1 (continued)

Unearthing hidden voices

Plenary

History is about listening to people from the past. But sometimes people can only have a voice if we give them a voice.

Whose forgotten voices have we learnt about today?

LESSON 2.2

Enquiry overview: A forgotten war? Unearthing the voices of British veterans of the Korean War

Lesson 2.1
Why has the Korean war been called a forgotten war in Britain?

Lesson 2.2
Helping people to remember the Korean War

Recap

Listen to what Sir Michael Caine says:

How does he back up what we already know about Korea?
What does he say about his experiences as a soldier?

Initial impressions of the British soldiers’ experience in Korea

Use the photographs in your Source bank (Slides 5–9 or Resource sheet 2.2A) to gather impressions of the war in Korea. Consider:

- Terrain
- Climate
- Types of warfare
- The Chinese Army
- How the war affected Korean civilians, including children
LESSON 2.1 (continued)

Timeline of the Korean War 1950–53

- This brutal three-year war left millions of North and South Koreans dead, and over 100,000 casualties for the United Nations forces involved.
- British casualties were high: 1,078 killed in action, 2,574 wounded and 1,060 missing or taken prisoner.
- Estimates suggest that at least two million North and South Korean civilians died and at least 50,000 children became orphans.

What the veterans say about the fighting

- Gather evidence from the veterans' testimonies on Resource sheet 2.2C about:
  - What it was like fighting in Korea
  - Trench warfare
  - What the soldiers say about the effects of the war on the Korean people and the cities in Korea
  - The Chinese Army

Then use all the evidence to complete your overview of the British soldiers' experience in Korea.

Korea does not have to be a ‘forgotten war’ and you can help

On your own copy of the United Nations Korea medal (Resource sheet 2.2D), write something that you remember about the Korean War – for example, something that has surprised you, shocked you or moved you.
ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY
The Korean War (if it is studied at all) is usually presented as part of the Cold War or from the point of view of particular nationalities who fought in it. In contrast, this resource aims to explore the impact that the war had on a variety of participants at the time.

It also considers how memory of the war became ‘lost’, in Britain at least, and then how the memory was recovered by British military veterans.

The resource then broadens its focus to consider which participants in the war or victims of the war students might include in a memorial and for what reasons.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS
• The immediate impact of the Korean War on military veterans, civilians and participating countries.
• The extent to which British military veterans ‘forgot’ about the war between 1953 and the 1980s.
• The subsequent process of gradual memorialisation of a neglected war.
• Design of a new British Korean War memorial.

TARGET AGE RANGE
Lessons are designed for use with Key Stage 3. But they could also be used to complement a study of the Korean War at GCSE.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE
In her major work The Korean War in Britain: Citizenship, Selfhood and Forgetting (2018: also summarised in her introductory article in this publication), Grace Huxford has lucidly explained both the reasons why the Korean War was little studied or talked about in Britain in the decades following the war, and also the process by which that began to change from the 1980s.

The research points to various factors: that the war was presented as a UN policing action (despite the reality on the ground) – which consequentially diminished media interest; that it was morally dubious; and that it was inconclusive – it ended with a tense ceasefire, a score draw, rather than victory. Many UK veterans found little interest in their war stories when they came home, and for the British public and media the whole conflict was overshadowed by the still-recent memory of the Second World War.

Huxford then documents how the veteran voice finally emerged from the shadows. Around the time of their retirement in the 1980s, many military veterans in Britain and the United States found time to
Section 3 | Enquiry 3 Impact and memory. How should the Korean War be remembered?

recall this conflict of their youth and wished it marked in some way. This recovery of interest was strongly linked to the 50th anniversary of the Korean War in 2003, which helped to prompt the creation of new memorials. Some veterans also made sponsored visits to newly democratised and grateful South Korea, which validated their war experience in ways that had not usually occurred in their home countries. Therefore, we see that the act of commemoration and of memorialisation was both a result of and a reason why Korean veterans found their voice. This is the context for this enquiry, which seeks to understand the power of memorialisation both to drive and reflect understanding of past conflict and to validate, yet also challenge, popular perceptions of war.

A second strand to this enquiry is to ensure that the death and destruction suffered by civilians are acknowledged. The damage and casualties were no great secret – Seoul was captured by the two sides several times, for example, and was left in ruins by the end of the war. But this story did not particularly fit with the narrative that each side wanted to promote. In essence, the Americans promoted a narrative of containing communism. South Korea promoted a narrative of national survival. North Korea and China promoted a narrative of heroic resistance against American imperialist aggression. None of the sides were particularly anxious to acknowledge the horrific cost of the war. Up to three million civilians died from bombing, massacres, crossfire and revenge killings. Over a million soldiers on both sides died in battle, from exposure to the elements or as prisoners of war.

However, this amnesia in the historical record was to some extent challenged by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Korea from 2005 to 2009, which aimed to give public voice to the trauma experienced by many Korean families during the war. This was sometimes the first time these stories were heard (Choe Sung Han, 2007). Tasha Kitcher, in her supporting article in this publication, notes that ‘The Commission gave a voice to many whose stories had not been told for years under authoritarian leadership. Despite this, the Commission was seen as slow, unproductive, and costly... the Commission estimated that 100,000 South Koreans died at the government’s hands – systematically slaughtered by the army.’ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work unearthed a picture of devastation.

In this enquiry, the final outcome is for the students to design their own new war memorial. The process is carefully designed to ensure that they look at these scholarly concerns regarding memorialisation and perception of the war. It was not possible to encompass the work of the Commission without extending this enquiry still further; however, civilian suffering is essential background to the key issue of Lesson 3.3, which is for the students to consider whether, and if so how, to memorialise civilian as well as military dead.

CURRICULAR RATIONALE

This resource would be suitable as part of a study of the twentieth century at Key Stage 3 in the English National Curriculum for history.

Equally, it could be used as part of a study of British history, where it could consolidate students’ understanding of substantive core knowledge about warfare in general and growing knowledge of Britain’s place in geo politics over time.

The resource is also designed to build a deeper understanding of specific terms such as ‘memorial’ and ‘memorialisation’.

In terms of second-order concepts or disciplinary knowledge, pupils would be revisiting important foci that they should be experiencing over time, both because these form part of National Curriculum expectations and because, at Key Stage 3, they anticipate related GCSE concepts. In this enquiry, the specific concepts of handling evidence, change and continuity, historical interpretations, and similarity and difference (diversity) will feature prominently but will also overlap with other concepts such as significance.

Each of the three lessons could stand alone, and even within each lesson some activities could be omitted or used self-standing. There is a lot of material packed into these three lessons and you will need to select carefully for the time you have available.

REFERENCES


## OVERVIEW

Students will gauge the depth of impact of the Korean War on British military veterans, US military veterans at the Battle of Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir, victims of a massacre of Korean civilians and participating countries in general.

They will trace the process by which many British military veterans ‘forgot’ the conflict between 1953 and the 1980s, before deliberately ‘recovering’ the memories of their lost youth on retirement. This process will be set against evidence of the war’s place (or lack of it) in British culture and public life since 1953.

Lastly, students will design a new British Korean War memorial, considering whether it should just be restricted to British veterans or whether it should be widened to include participants from other United Nations allies, veterans of communist states and Korean civilian victims.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
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| **Lesson 1:** Who was most deeply affected by the Korean War between 1950 and 1953? | The main objective of this lesson is for students to gauge which types of people and which countries might have been most deeply affected by the Korean War 1950–53. They will do this through investigations of:  
  - British military fatality  
  - two wider episodes from the war itself  
  - details of casualties, country by country |
| **Lesson 2:** Why did some British military veterans forget the Korean War and deliberately remember it again years afterwards? | In this lesson, students trace how the Korean War was largely forgotten by many British veterans between 1953 and the 1970s, but how afterwards their memories were gradually recovered through the process of commemoration.  
Students will complete a living graph where they plot the way in which veterans’ attitudes changed over time and how they came to terms with their wartime experiences. This is contrasted with the level of awareness from the wider British public. |
| **Lesson 3:** Who should be remembered on our memorial and how? | The aim of this lesson is for students to design an appropriate new memorial. They take their inspiration from a range of other memorials from around the world.  
They will also have to debate and decide which groups of people encountered in the previous two lessons might be commemorated in this new British memorial.  
This debate will be deliberately complicated by the possible inclusion of Korean civilian casualties and casualties, and veterans from all participating states, including China and North Korea. |
LESSON 3.1 BREAKDOWN: WHO WAS MOST DEEPLY AFFECTED BY THE KOREAN WAR BETWEEN 1950 AND 1953?

STARTER: WHO WAS AFFECTED BY THE DEATH OF CORPORAL BELSAY? (SLIDES 1–7)

Reveal Slides 4–6 quickly, and in sequence, zooming in on the location, the small village of Bickleigh in Devon (Slide 4), the church and the memorial (Slide 5) and then details of Corporal Belsay’s death (Slide 6). Draw attention to two particular details:

- that he went missing in action and his body was never recovered
- that he had recently married Joyce West – shortly before he went to Korea

Give out a copy of Resource sheet 3.1A, which is a large version of Slide 6. Ask students to draw lines or use letters to mark on the scale the people who would be affected by this day and the degree. NB this is not evidenced. They are thinking about it as a human being from their experience.

Draw out two further points:

- The vast number of and range of people who are affected by a single death. Once you add up all the relatives, colleagues and friends, you have a long list already. The British casualties may not have been enormous in Korea, but every death is significant to a large number of people.
- Most obviously, that the degree of effect depends on how close they were to him.

In Activity 1, students are going to find out more about the Battle of Jangjin (Chosin) where Corporal Belsay went missing, presumed dead.

ACTIVITY 1: WHO WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN MOST DEEPLY AFFECTED BY FIGHTING CONDITIONS AT THE BATTLE OF JANGJIN (CHOSIN) RESERVOIR? (SLIDES 8–10)

Slide 8 introduces the geographical location of Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir, and the photograph shows the mountainous terrain of Korea.

Slide 9 reminds students that this was the battle where Corporal Belsay went missing while British troops and other United Nations forces were retreating in dreadful winter conditions, forced back by Chinese communist forces, who had recently entered the war for the first time.

Play the video from the link provided. The clip graphically describes the freezing conditions in which soldiers of both sides fought and perished. It shows black and white photographs and film of frozen bodies.

This comes from the reputable and internationally produced documentary Korea: The Never-ending War, which was shown by the BBC in 2019 (watch from 50’33” to 57’22”).

www.youtube.com/watch?v=DoSRwmuVYyI

Slide 10 describes groups of people on both sides of the conflict who would have been affected by the fighting at Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir. They are also on Resource sheet 3.1C as sorting cards. Give a set to each pair of students (along with Resource sheet 3.1B, showing an impact line). Ask them to place the cards on the impact line to show the extent to which each group might have been affected by the battle.

Finally, discuss whether having greater knowledge of the fighting conditions in which Corporal Belsay died might change students’ minds about their answers to the starter activity.
ACTIVITY 2: WHO WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN MOST DEEPLY AFFECTED BY THE NO GUN RI INCIDENT IN JULY 1950? (SLIDES 11–13)

(This activity follows exactly the same pattern as Activity 1, so one way of streamlining this lesson to make it manageable if you are short of time will be to make Activity 1 and 2 alternatives. One half of the class tackle Activity 1, on the Battle of Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir, and the other half tackle this activity, the No Gun Ri incident.)

Slide 11 shows the bridge at No Gun Ri where crowds of South Korean refugees sheltered. As the slide explains, numerous South Korean witnesses testified that they were fired on by US forces from the air and by infantry who feared that North Korean soldiers and spies might be concealed in their midst.

Slide 12: From the link provided, show a second clip, which comes from the same documentary Korea: The Never-Ending War that featured in Activity 1. It contains graphic eyewitness testimony of the incident (watch from 32’47” to 37’25”).

www.youtube.com/watch?v=DoSRwmuVYyI

Atrocities were committed against Korean civilians through the course of the war by both sides, but this famous incident is well presented in this clip.

Slide 13 describes individuals or groups of people who were, or might have been, affected by the incident. They are on Resource sheet 3.1D as a card sort. Print out a set for each pair. As in the previous activity, students agree the extent to which they think each person or group of people described might have been affected by the incident and place them on the impact line on Resource sheet 3.1B.


Slides 15–16 detail the casualties of each combatant country (and a few non-combatant ones still participating).

They are on Resource sheet 3.1E as a card sort. Once again, give out a set to each pair to organise into order, starting with the country most deeply affected at the top, to the country least affected at the bottom.

Lead class discussion about the order in which different pairs have placed the cards and take a vote on the most-agreed order, particularly those they have put in their two, three or four positions.

PLENARY (SLIDE 17)

Slide 17 is deliberately untitled. It shows a US bombing raid on North Korea. Simply show it and ask students’ views as to why we have selected this slide to sum up the lesson.

It should be obvious in the discussion that the country (or countries) that suffered most from the Korean War were North and South Korea and in particular, the civilians of both, who saw parts of the Peninsular reduced to rubble amid great suffering.

Bombing was not the whole story of civilian impact, of course, as you will find out from other enquiries.
LESSON 3.2 BREAKDOWN: WHY DID SOME BRITISH MILITARY VETERANS FORGET THE KOREAN WAR AND DELIBERATELY REMEMBER IT AGAIN YEARS AFTERWARDS?

STARTER (SLIDES 1–4)

Slide 3 shows a photograph of Bill Speakman in 1953 and of a Victoria Cross. Bill Speakman was awarded a Victoria Cross (VC), Britain’s highest award for military bravery, for his service in the Korean War.

Play the clip from the Pathé Newsreel for February 1952, which shows Speakman returning to his home town of Altrincham in Cheshire, following the announcement of the award of the Victoria Cross.


Then allow pairs a limited amount of time to discuss the questions on Slide 4 before leading some class discussion based on student comments.

ACTIVITY 1: THE BILL SPEAKMAN STORY (SLIDES 5–6)

This activity is a bridge between the starter and the rest of the lesson. The starter should have aroused students’ interest in Bill Speakman. Slide 5 continues his story in five highlights (or lowlights), including a video report on the arrival of his ashes in Korea.

Slide 6 then gets students used to using the graph (on Resource sheet 3.2A – ideally print this out A3 size) that will be used in all the main activities for the lesson, as they plot Bill Speakman’s relationship with and attitude to his Korean War experiences. The exact placement is unimportant, but it is vital that:

- Students get a V-shape of some sort, reflecting the nadir when he sold his VC and (arguably) a peak when his ashes were welcomed back to Korea as, once again, a hero.
- They understand the two axes – the bottom is time, the upright is degree of remembrance.

Point out the aim of the lesson, which is to consider some wider evidence to plot two more lines on their graph. The intention is to use two different colours to plot what students think happened to:

- veteran memories of the war over time (more generally – was Speakman’s line typical?)
- the British public awareness of and memory of the war over time

ACTIVITY 2: WHAT WERE ATTITUDES TO THE WAR IN 1953? (SLIDES 7–10)

Activity 2 is entirely focused on where students start their graph.

(NB Given the time constraints that you are probably under and the importance of getting to Activity 4, you could fast-forward through this activity by simply telling students where to start their graph on the remembrance axis. Quite high, we suggest, or wherever they pitched it for Bill Speakman. But if you have the time this gives you more evidence and some fascinating video resources relating to 1953 and 1954.)

Lead discussion about where each line might start on the vertical axis if the only available evidence was the Pathé newsreel from the starter about Bill Speakman’s reception in Altrincham.

Now move on to some new video evidence – another newsreel. Slide 8 explains some important background information and definitions.

Play the Pathé newsreel clip on Slide 9. This shows the public welcome in September 1953 (two months after the armistice that halted fighting) of former British prisoners of war, together with interviews with some returnees playing down rumours of communist brainwashing.

www.britishpathe.com/video/pows-home-aka-korea-p-o-w-s-return-to-lyneham
Lead class discussion of the questions on Slide 9.

Finally move on to a third piece of video evidence. Slide 10 provides a clip from a British feature film from 1956, A Hill in Korea. Play the first three minutes.

https://archive.org/details/ahik5345435

Lead class discussion of the questions on Slide 10 and also discuss where the two clips taken together show that the British public’s awareness or memory of the war might start on the vertical axis of the living graph.


(NB The most obvious way to fit this lesson into a tighter time frame is for students to only plot one line – either the ‘veteran memory line’ or the ‘wider public awareness line’ – and then to compare their lines at the end of the activity. This halves the amount of evidence that they have to consider and reduces the complexity of the plotting.)

Resource sheet 3.2B has the evidence on Slides 12–14 as a card sort. They have to sort them and use them to plot two lines on their graph (Resource sheet 3.2A). This evidence relates to the first two decades after the war – to the mid-1970s.

Point out that some cards refer to a particular date, which could be marked with a cross on the graph, while others refer to a trend over time, which can be used to help them judge the overall position of the line on the graph. Model the process for students, using a couple of cards as examples.

Students will need a fair amount of time to read and discuss all these cards. You could drip-feed the cards in three stages – just the blue ones first (which relate to the veteran line), then the red ones (the wider public) and finally the graded ones, which could be either.

Once again, remember that it is more important that they get a convincing rough shape for the line than they worry too much about the detail.


(NB This activity is the heart of the lesson, so do make sure you get to it! Here, again, the most obvious way to fit this activity into a tighter time-frame is for students to plot either the ‘veteran memory line’ or the ‘wider public awareness line’ – and then to compare their lines at the end of the activity.)

Play the following brief clip from the popular BBC comedy Fawlty Towers, in which John Cleese (playing hotel owner Basil Fawlty) states that he killed four men during the Korean War. Prunella Scales, playing his wife Sybil, ridicules this by claiming that Basil poisoned them as a result of his cooking for them in the Army Catering Corps.

https://twitter.com/fawltytowers_/status/1025063852986287409?lang=en-gb

Lead a brief discussion about whether this clip alters their living graph for the early 1970s.

Now give out Resource sheet 3.2C (which reproduces evidence cards on Slides 16–19). These cover the second period of the graph, the period from the 1980s to the present.

Once again, with 21 evidence cards students will need a good amount of time to read them and sort them and plot them on their graph. So once again you could drip-feed it in three stages – just the blue ones first (for the veteran line), then the red ones (the wider public) and finally the graded ones, which could be either.
PLENARY

Allow time for pairs to compare their graphs (in broad shape, not in detail).

If time allows, you should also finally agree a whole-class version of the living graph, for the entire period and with both lines.

Finally, use Slide 20 to return to the story of Bill Speakman from the starter. Consider how far his life fits the pattern they have plotted for veterans more generally. How typical is his story?

PREPARATION/HOMEWORK FOR NEXT LESSON

Note that there is a suggestion for preparatory homework before Lesson 3.3. If you are doing that, then brief it now – give each student one of the Korean memorials (Resource sheets 3.3A) and the list of questions to ask about memorials (Resource sheet 3.3B). NB Discourage students from going online to find out about their memorial. We want them to approach it as it stands, without context, in the first instance.

LESSON 3.3 WHO SHOULD BE REMEMBERED ON OUR MEMORIAL AND HOW?

BEFORE YOU START

There is a lot of flexibility in this lesson. It all depends on how seriously you want to take the creative commission of designing the memorial. Doing that properly could take a couple of extra lessons.

And if you also deeply consider the issues of who should be remembered, that will add to the time you need. So, we offer two tracks in this lesson plan:

• The fast-track, which should fit in a normal lesson (with preparatory homework).

• The expanded version (online only), which significantly expands Activity 2.

PREPARATORY HOMEWORK

Another way to help fit this material into a lesson is with some preparatory homework. Well before the lesson, give each student one of the Korean memorials (Resource sheet 3.3A) and the list of questions to ask about memorials (Resource sheet 3.3B). This will speed up the starter and Activity 1 a lot – leaving you enough time for the rest of the lesson. NB Discourage students from going online to find out about their memorial. We want them to approach it as it stands, without context, in the first instance.

STARTER (SLIDES 1–5)

Slide 3 shows one of the British memorials, the Korean Veterans Memorial, at the National Memorial Arboretum, Staffordshire, UK. Slide 4 has some information about it. Ask any students who had this as their homework image to give their assessment of it.

Ask:

• Is it a good memorial? Why?

• Does it do justice to the people and issues that we have been examining? Why?

Slide 5 then introduces the commission for the lesson, which is to design a new memorial for the National Memorial Arboretum in Staffordshire for the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice in 2023.

BEFORE YOU START

You will need:

• Lesson PowerPoint 3.3 Fast-track
• Resource sheet 3.3A (Memorial images for homework)
• Resource sheet 3.3B (Questions to ask about memorials for homework and lesson)
ACTIVITY 1: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OTHER KOREAN WAR MEMORIALS? (SLIDES 6–16)

(Once again, preparatory homework can give you a running start on this activity.)

Slides 7–16 introduce another five memorials from around the world. Each image is followed by an information slide. Show each in turn and ask one student who has studied this either for homework or in class time to share their opinions on this memorial.

Once all memorials have been viewed, allow time for groups/pairs to consider which memorial most appeals to them and why. Lead class discussion, taking student comments.

Get them to note down any key features of the memorials they would like to use in their own memorial.

ACTIVITY 2: WHO SHOULD BE REMEMBERED ON OUR NEW MEMORIAL? (SLIDE 17)

(This is where the expanded version departs from the fast-track version. Fast-track reduces the issue of who should be commemorated to a single slide instead of a sequence of three activities with video support.)

Slide 17 offers six categories of people who were impacted by the war as combatants or civilians. They were all studied in some way in the previous two lessons. This task reviews that prior learning by students giving supported views on who should be commemorated.

Encourage debate and stress that there is no right answer. Students could all do it differently if they wished.

If you follow the expanded version there are six slides for Activity 2 covering these decisions:

- Should the memorial commemorate just British casualties or all UN casualties?
- Should the memorial commemorate Chinese and North Korean casualties?
- Should the memorial commemorate the millions of Korean civilians who died?

ACTIVITY 3: HOW SHOULD THEY BE REMEMBERED? (SLIDES 18–19)

The rest of the lesson should be devoted to students sketching out or describing their ideal memorial. There won’t be time in a single lesson to draw it or model it in detail (that could be a follow-up homework if you have that luxury!). The emphasis needs to be on the choices they have made and the reasons for those choices.

They have already decided who should be on their memorial, so they now have to create a memorial befitting those people. Slide 18 repeats the commission/briefing.

Slide 19 encourages them to focus on:

- **Materials** (what will the memorial be made of so that it lasts/matures over time?)
- **People** (should it show people, and if so, what kind of people and how should they be represented? Realistic, like statues, or symbolic or abstract?)
- **Symbols** (e.g. flags, icons?)
- **Words** (quotes from veterans, inspirational texts, religious texts, names of the dead, statistics, information about the war?)

The important thing is that whatever choice they make, they make it for a reason, based on their study of the Korean War: the veteran stories and the civilian stories.

Some may wish to prepare alternative designs. Encourage this. The commission will be interested in a range of ideas to choose from.
PLENARY (SLIDES 16–17)

This should focus on students feeding back on their work - explaining the choices they have made. As a possible model for your feedback, Slide 20 introduces an interview with a Year 9 student, Felix, from Cottenham Village College in Cambridgeshire, talking about his design for a British memorial to the United Nations forces. It could be a slightly intimidating piece in many classrooms. With his erudition and thinking, he sets the bar quite high. But his explanation of the reasons for his design are an exemplary model! And because he finished his memorial to 3D model stage, it gives something concrete for a plenary discussion, as it is likely that the students will only have got to the early stages of design in the time available.

Finally, Slide 21 reintroduces Bill Speakman, VC from Lesson 3.2.

- What might he (or his relatives) think of the various proposed designs?
- Who else do you think would like or dislike your memorial?

SELECTED LESSON POWERPOINTS

LESSON 3.1

Enquiry 3: Impact and memory How has the Korean War been remembered?

Enquiry overview: How has the Korean War been remembered?

Lesson 3.1 Overview

Content covered in this lesson:
- The death of Corporal Belsay
- The Battle of Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir
- The No Gun Ri Incident
- Casualties

The home village of Corporal Belsay

Starter
Who was affected by the death of Corporal Belsay?
Section 3 | Enquiry 3 Impact and memory. How should the Korean War be remembered?

LESSON 3.1 (continued)

The memorial to Corporal Belsay

- Badge of the Royal Marines
- Capt J. E. Belsay R.M.

The death of Corporal Belsay

- Rank and name: Corporal Janis Edward Belsay, Royal Marines
- Age at death: 21
- Circumstances of his death: 20 November 1950, At the Battle of Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea
- Missing in action, body never recovered
- No known grave
- Name commemorated on a United Nations plaque in Korea
- Family details: Lived in Devon, Had been recently married in September 1950 to Joyce West in Tavistock, Devon

Who would have been most deeply affected by the death of Corporal Belsay?

A. His wife, Joyce
B. His parents
C. His fellow platoon, who may only have known him for a little time
D. The enemy soldier who may have killed him
E. His former school friends
F. The padre who brought news of his death to his wife and parents
G. The local priest who may have been comforting his wife and children beforehand. (He knows is in the local church memory)
H. His brothers or sisters
I. His grandparents
J. His aunts, uncles and cousins
K. His adult friends from Devon
L. His parents’ friends
M. Other local people who knew him by sight
N. A local person who reported his death

Here is a list of people who might be affected by the death of Corporal Belsay:

- Mark on the impact scale (Resource sheet 3.18) with a letter or by drawing a line, how affected you think they would be. (You have no evidence for this – only your common sense as a human being.)

Battle of Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir

- This is the battle where Corporal Belsay died.
- British troops were supporting their US and South Korean allies.
- United Nations forces had been advancing towards the Yalu River (the border with China) when they were forced back in dreadful winter conditions by Chinese communist forces who had entered the war for the first time.
- Watch the video on the right to find out more about this battle.

The No Gun Ri Incident 26–29 July 1950

- Slide 11 shows a bridge at No Gun Ri.
- Between 26 and 29 July 1950, South Korean refugees sheltered there.
- Numerous witnesses testified that they were fired on by US forces from the air and by infantry who feared that North Korean soldiers and spies might be concealed in their midst.
- Watch the clip to find out more about this incident. The video includes eyewitness testimony.
Lesson 3.1 (continued)

Who would probably have been most deeply affected by the No Gun Ri Incident at the time it happened in July 1950 and immediately afterwards?

- Not really affected at all
- Directly but not deeply affected
- Moved but not directly affected
- Quite deeply affected
- Most deeply affected

In terms of casualties, which countries were most deeply affected by the Korean War between 1950 and 1953?

- Not really affected at all
- Directly but not deeply affected
- Moved but not directly affected
- Quite deeply affected
- Most deeply affected

Lesson 3.2

Lesson 3.2 Overview

Content covered in this lesson:
- Use video evidence to make a living graph of the Korean War experience of Bill Speakman VC
- Make a living graph to compare the changing attitudes to the war of the British public and of British veterans who served in the war
- Compare Bill Speakman's story with other veterans' stories.

What can Pathé News tell us about Bill Speakman and attitudes to the Korean War?

Starter
What impression does the newsreel give of:
- a) Bill Speakman?
- b) Speakman's family?
- c) Altinham, Speakman's home town?
- d) Support for the Korean War among the British public?

How does it give these impressions through:
- Music?
- The voiceover (main script)?

The Bill Speakman story

In 1949, Bill Speakman VC finally left the British army.
In 1949, he stole £103 from a woman's purse in Gibraltar. He returned the money and probably would have avoided punishment. Soon afterwards, he said he wanted a new roof for his home. He said he had trouble controlling his alcohol drinking.
In June 2019, Bill died.
In 1993, he was hosed down in South Korea at his own request.

This video describes the reception in Korea.

In 2010, Bill Speakman VC returned to the area for the first time since the 1950s. A £100 bill was paid for by the South-Korean government. He was very moved by it.

In 2015, Bill Speakman VC was given his replacement medal for his South Korean Government, which he wore proudly.
In 2015, Bill Speakman VC was given a sub-machine gun, which he had been promised.
LESSON 3.2 (continued)

**Plotting Bill Speakman’s story**

**Activity 1**
This lesson is about how the Korean War was forgotten and then remembered by veterans and the public. You will be using a graph like this (Resource sheet 3.2A). To get used to using it, plot the events of Bill’s life that you have just found out about.

**Video evidence 2: Pathé newsreel**

**Activity 2B**
What impression does the newsreel give of:
A. British prisoners of war returning from Korea in September 1953 (two months after the armistice that ended it)?
B. Crowds waiting to greet the men?
C. Public suspicion about them?
Is the newsreel as positive about the war as the earlier one about Speakman in Ainfach?
Now you have two pieces of evidence, where would you start your line?

**Video evidence 3: Feature film, 1954**

**Activity 2C**
What can the 1954 feature film *A Hill in Korea* tell us about attitudes towards the Korean War?
- How is the music intended to make the audience feel?
- Who is the film dedicated to?
- How are the soldiers introduced? What impression does it give about them?
Now you have three pieces of evidence, where would you start your line?

**Why did some British military veterans forget the Korean War between 1953 and the 1970s?**

**Activity 3**
You will be given Evidence cards A–F (Resource sheet 3.2B). These will help you to plot the mid-20th century part of your graph from 1953–1970.

1. What date does it refer to? This will tell you where it belongs on the bottom axis.
2. Some cards have a particular date that could be marked with a cross on the graph.
3. Others refer to a person or event, which can help you to judge the overall position of the line on the graph.
4. Who is the evidence about? Veterans’ attitudes – coloured line? Public attitudes – coloured pink or blue? This will tell you which line it belongs on.
5. Is the war forgotten or remembered? This will tell you how high or low to plot it.
For example, where would you put this card on your graph?
Once you have plotted your graph, discuss the relationship between the two lines.

**Why did some British military veterans deliberately remember the Korean War from the 1970s onwards?**

**Activity 4**
- Does this clip alter your living graph for the early 1970s?
- Look at Evidence cards 1–26 (Resource sheet 3.2C), which cover the period from the 1980s to the present.
- Use these to plot the rest of your graph from the 1970s onwards.
- Try to agree a whole-class version of the living graph.
Lesson 3.3 Overview

Content covered in this lesson
- Compare Korean War memorials from around the world
- Decide who should be commemorated on your memorial
- Design your new memorial and write an explanation of your design

Korean Veterans Memorial, National Memorial Arboretum, Staffordshire, UK

Starter
Study the information about this memorial on the next slide.
- Do you think this is a good memorial? Why?
- Does this memorial do justice to the people and issues that we have been examining? Why?

Information about the memorial
- The memorial includes four boulders, each representing one of the four years in which the British Armed Forces participated in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953.
- Each boulder has a metal plaque on it, explaining what happened in each year.
- There are three flags flying, those of Britain, South Korea and the United Nations.
- Surrounding the memorial are 25 trees that typically grow in Korea.
- The memorial was opened in 2000 by the Korean Veterans Association on the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

Design a new Korean War memorial
Your commission
Suppose that the existing Korean Veterans Memorial is to be replaced but on the same site.
- Your task is to design a new memorial that will be ready for opening in 2023 on the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Korean War.
- You should be able to justify:
  - Who you have included or excluded from the memorial and why.
  - What materials, symbols, images and words you have included and why.
- You can make more than one design if you wish to cover different options.

Learn from other Korean War memorials
Activity 1
- Study the war memorials on Slides 7–10. Use these questions to guide you.
- Which memorial most appeals to you and why?

Information: Chinese communist memorial to the Korean War
- The memorial shows General Peng Dehuai leading Chinese soldiers across the Yalu River from the border city of Dandong in October 1950.
- The soldiers were sent to help North Korea fight UN forces, who were close to the Chinese border and might threaten communist China itself. Chinese troops helped to push back the UN troops.
- The soldiers were officially known as ‘volunteers’, which avoided the Chinese government having to declare war against UN forces.
- ‘For Peace’ is written in English and Chinese at the foot of the statue. Chinese support for North Korea was meant to end the war and bring peace to the whole of Korea.
- The Chinese saved North Korea from defeat. In China, the Korean War is known as the ‘War to resist US aggression and aid Korea’.
- The memorial forms part of a museum about Chinese involvement in the Korean War.
- The museum was built in Dandong in the 1990s.
LESSON 3.3 (continued)

**Information: The Statue of Brothers war memorial in Seoul**
- The statue shows two Korean soldiers from the Korean War embracing across a split concrete dome.
- The taller, well-armed soldier with a helmet represents a South Korean soldier reunited on a battlefield with his younger, unarmed smaller brother from the North Korean Army.
- The split concrete dome represents a Korea still divided between two states.
- The inside of the dome includes a floor map showing 16 allies from United Nations forces who assisted South Korea in its war with North Korea and communist China.
- The memorial is intended to show the past sufferings of the Korean people and their determination to achieve national harmony, unity and prosperity.
- The memorial was opened in 1994, after South Korea became a democracy in 1987.

**Information: US Korean War Veterans Memorial, Washington DC**
- This memorial shows 19 larger-than-life stainless steel statues of members of the US Armed Forces in combat gear, warily crossing a field during the Korean War.
- The ground is planted with low-lying juniper bushes to look like a Korean rice paddy field.
- The statues deliberately include all the different ethnic groups who served in the American Army, e.g. African-Americans, Native Americans, etc.
- There are no statues of other nationalities or of South Korean civilians (although the countries who took part as US allies are listed on another part of the memorial).
- The memorial was opened in 1995 by the US and South Korean presidents.
- In 2015, Samsung, a South Korean company, paid money for the maintenance of the monument.

**Information: Korean War Memorial in the port of Cartagena, Colombia, South America**
- The metal sculpture shows a sixteenth-century Korean ship called a Gaeobukseon (a turtle ship). This was used to defend the country against a Japanese invasion.
- The ship stands on a stone platform, which includes a plaque and sculptures of cannons.
- Two flagpoles come out of the ship flying the Colombian and South Korean flags.
- The memorial is located in Cartagena because Colombian troops who were sent to support United Nations forces started their sea journey to Korea from Cartagena. Colombia was the only South American country to take part in the Korean War.
- The memorial links how Korea resisted Japanese aggression in the sixteenth century with how Colombia helped South Korea to resist North Korean aggression in the twentieth century.
- The memorial was paid for by the South Korean government and built in 2016.

**Information: Memorial at the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, Pyongyang, North Korea**
- This group of larger-than-life statues shows North Korean soldiers charging fiercely behind a North Korean flag.
- In North Korean propaganda, the Korean War is referred to as a war of liberation to free South Korea from its puppet government and US occupation.
- It is described as a victorious war, thanks to the brilliant leadership of Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s first communist dictator. At different times since the war, North Korea has sometimes mentioned Chinese military support, which helped it to survive, and sometimes claimed victory just for itself.
- The museum was built on its present site in 1963.

**Here’s one I made earlier!**
In this video, Felix from Cottenham Village College explains the design that he came up with for his new Korean War memorial.
ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY

The enquiry consists of an introductory lesson on the reasons behind UN intervention in the Korean War followed by source-based case studies of the roles of Turkey, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada. The case-study lessons include guiding questions for teachers to use if they want to supplement the source material.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS

- The UNO, its origins and its role in the Korean War.
- The role of Turkey, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands as part of the UNO force in Korea.
- The reasons for the UNO’s involvement and their place in the Cold War.

TARGET AGE RANGE

The lessons are designed for use with Key Stage 4. Some suggestions for adaptation for Key Stage 3 are suggested in the curricular rationale.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE

This enquiry aims to contextualise students’ understanding of the role of the United Nations in the Korean War. It then builds on this contextual understanding with the use of source-based case studies on four of the countries involved in the UN coalition.

By way of an introduction to the role of the UN in the Korean War, Isaacs and Downing’s Cold War (2008) has an excellent chapter on Korea (and accompanying documentary) that discusses the reasons behind UN intervention. More recently, Jeremy Black’s The Cold War (2015) also addresses the role of the UN, although it tends to focus on the military aspects of intervention. Digging further into the political and financial pressures of UN member states, it is worth reading about the implementation of Marshall Aid in Europe in Tony Aldous’s The Marshall Plan (1997). Also, regarding the repercussions of the Korean War in Europe, Martin Dedman and Clive Fleay’s article ‘Britain and the European army’ (1992) gives a detailed overview of the possibilities of a European army in the early 1950s. For the UN coalition’s experience of the Korean War, the roles of Commonwealth countries in Korea are treated in some detail in an excellent article by Brian Catchpole, ‘The Commonwealth in Korea’ (1998). In this publication, Margot Tudor (page 30) examines the changing dynamic of the UN security council at the time of the Korean War.
As argued in Sellin (2008), contextualisation of source material is vital for helping students to understand and utilise historical evidence. This is particularly relevant to any study of the Korean War, which both needs to be seen as part of the much bigger development of the Cold War but was also very complex in its own right. UN members that joined the USA in Korea were not exempt from the financial and political pressures of the Cold War period. Lesson 1 helps students to consider the varied issues that led to its involvement in Korea, particularly the pressures of the Cold War that UN member states faced at the time.

The use of case studies in Lesson 2 also gives students an opportunity to build their skills in analysing sources. Woolley (2003) has argued for the benefits of challenging students with long extracts and ample time to read and criticise source material. In addition, the Canada case study could develop into an oral history project that uses the large number of interviews with Canadian veterans of the Korean War that can be found on thememoryproject.com (see full links in the Canada case study itself – 4.2D). Using closely linked sources from an archive is a skill that is familiar to most professional historians and has been demonstrated to be of use in the classroom in Evans et al. (2004).

In the author’s view, the most useful aspect of creating these case studies for Lesson 2 was to learn more about the fascinating individual stories, from a wide range of nations, that emerge from the Korean War. Personal accounts and experiences can often be lost when students are led to focus on the high power politics of the Cold War period. In these case studies:

- Students can read of an American soldier’s amazement at the solidarity shown between Turkish soldiers when taken prisoner by the Chinese.
- They can get a sense of the tension felt by a Canadian soldier on patrol in the demilitarised zone during the signing of the armistice that ended the war.
- They can see that the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia, though not a military vessel, played a highly significant role in the lives of many of those wounded in the conflict.

Students should, ultimately, enjoy reading about the past; this can only help to foster the spirit of historical enquiry.

**CURRICULAR RATIONALE**

This enquiry begins with an assessment of the UNO’s role in the Korean War and the processes and events that led it to intervene in the conflict. It then continues with four source-based case studies on the role that Turkey, the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark played in the Korean War. Its aim is to enable students to contextualise their understanding of the UNO’s involvement in the Korean War.

The involvement of the UNO in Korea is treated very briefly in current GCSE exam specifications that include the Korean War. Cambridge IGCSE, for example, has had questions in the exam that ask ‘why did the UNO get involved in Korea?’, but this is given generalised coverage in course materials, and Western Europe is depicted as a homogenous mass that followed the USA into Korea as one unified bloc. In addition, coverage of European involvement in the Cold War (with the exception of East Germany, Hungary and Poland) is lacking in current GCSE course material. This is problematic, as it leaves students with the assumption that all countries in Western Europe automatically supported the USA and its aims throughout the Cold War.

In contrast, Western Europe in 1950 was home to a diverse range of political opinions and sympathies regarding the USA’s desire to intervene in the Korean Peninsula. Against this background of diversity, it is no surprise that the financial assistance proffered by the USA to Europe through Marshall Aid seems to have played a role in gathering support for the UNO coalition.
The enquiry also aims to develop students’ understanding of and use of source material. The guiding questions for each case study lead students to consider the context surrounding each source that they are confronted with. Following McAleavy (1998), this is a useful way to help students to understand that a source only produces evidence when it is understood in its historical context. The guiding questions also encourage students to make connections between the sources and work with them as a set to produce a judgement. This helps students to reason carefully about forming their own opinion, requiring them to make an effort to reach the most plausible interpretation of each country’s role in the Korean War based on contextual understanding and source material (Pickles, 2010) TH143.

This enquiry can be adapted for use with students at Key Stage 3. For example, the four case studies could be used to show the extent and variety of European involvement in the Cold War. The Danish case study is the most suitable for this, with an engaging range of material on the role that the hospital ship Jutlandia played in the Korean War. This study could also be used to emphasise the role that non-combatants played in this conflict, particularly the significance of the Jutlandia for injured soldiers fighting for the UN coalition.

The first lesson would also make an ideal introduction to the origins of the UNO and its role in twentieth-century Europe for Key Stage 3. Source 2 in Lesson 1 is likely to be the most useful here as it shows the wide range of countries that contributed to the UNO coalition that fought in Korea. This could be used to show both the diversity of nations within the UNO and the wide range of ways in which they were involved (from large-scale military involvement to non-combatant roles). Lesson 1 could also be used in conjunction with a model United Nations group in school to showcase how the UNO worked in practice during the 1950s.

### SCHEME OF WORK

#### OVERVIEW

This enquiry begins with a single lesson to explain why the UN got involved in the Korean War. It leads students to examine the causes for the intervention of the UNO, the contributions made by its different members to the coalition and how US financial support influenced the countries in the coalition.

In Lesson 2, students work in groups to investigate four source-based case studies examining the roles of Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey and Canada in the Korean War. Each case study includes carefully selected sources plus a set of guiding questions, but these are by no means exhaustive. The main point is digging into the sources.

Lesson 2 should be seen as a flexible source bank that you can use in many different ways.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 1:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Why did the UN join the USA in the Korean War?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aims to:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Establish and tease out students’ prior knowledge and preconceptions about the UN and the Korean War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Help students to understand the process that led the UN to intervene in Korea in 1950.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Develop students’ understanding of the factors influencing the UN’s decision (the USSR’s boycott and the influence of the USA and of Marshall Aid).</td>
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</table>
### Lesson 2:
How significant was the contribution of the UNO in the Korean War?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aims to:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Expose students to a range of source-based material from four different countries involved in the UNO coalition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop students’ use of sources as evidence for building an historical argument.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Help students to understand the wider context of the UNO’s role in the Korean War.</td>
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### LESSON 4.1 BREAKDOWN: WHY DID THE UN JOIN THE USA IN THE KOREAN WAR?

**STARTER (SLIDE 1–4)**

This Source 1 and all the other sources are on Resource sheet 4.1A. Students highlight a keyword and image on the source that help them to identify its message. A useful way to support students with sources like this is to ask them:

- Was the source/artist for or against something, and if so, what?
- How can you tell?
- Why was it produced at this specific time?

The source is very rich, and teachers should make sure that students notice at least some of these features:

- The UN appears large and powerful in the form of the large hand.
- The ‘UN hand’ is reaching out to stop the communist aggressor, the Chinese, attacking the Republic of Korea, which appears wounded and broken.
- The people challenging the communist aggressor contain the flags of some of the 53 nations that condemned Chinese support for North Korea in its invasion of the South. The actual number who did so is 44, but this is exaggerated in the poster.
- Students may link ‘Stop! Criminal!’ and ‘through United Nations – Peace!’ to the UN’s role in establishing and enforcing international law after the Second World War and think that this was justified as a policing action.
- The poster is American in origin and is therefore highly critical of communism.

Also make sure that they spot Britain in this visual.

**ACTIVITY 1: WHY DID THE UN PASS RESOLUTION 83? (SLIDES 5–8)**

Explain the context of the UN and the Security Council using Slides 5 and 6. Point out the empty chair in Source 2.

Students read Source 3, the extract from Cold War, then use a highlighter to bring attention to the causes that led the UN to adopt Resolution 83, which supported military assistance for South Korea. They then summarise each cause and write it on a line to show its importance in leading to UN intervention in Korea.

Feedback questioning could include:

- What role did the USA play in this process?
- Why did the USA take a leading role in this process?
• Why was the USSR absent from the Security Council?
• Would the vote have passed if the USSR were present? Why/why not?
• What was the status of China in 1950?

**ACTIVITY 2: WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE? (SLIDES 9–11)**

Students look at Source 3 and highlight the countries in answer to the questions on Slide 10. It is at a legible size on Resource sheet 4.1A. Students should be able to attempt the extension as this builds on knowledge obtained from Source 3.

Show the answers on Slide 11. Feedback questioning could include the following to gain an idea about students’ prior knowledge of UN involvement in Korea:

• Why did the USA and UK contribute to the most man-days in the Korean War?
• Why did some countries, such as Denmark, not commit military forces?
• Why did Canada (and other Commonwealth countries) provide so many troops?
• Why was Turkey involved in the Korean War?

Extension:

• Why didn’t the USSR or China send soldiers to support South Korea?
• Was China’s seat on the Security Council in 1950 fair (it didn’t represent the government that had power in China)?


Students look at Source 5, a table showing the amount of Marshall Aid received by countries in Europe. Students should follow the instructions on the slide to identify links between this information and the amount of time/soldiers that each country committed to the Korean War.

This is a good place to highlight the difference between causation and correlation. Just because things match up, it does not mean that one caused the other. It may allow you to establish a hypothesis but you need further evidence to decide whether the correlation is also a cause or consequence.

Feedback questioning could include:

• The UK received the largest amount of Marshall Aid and made the largest contribution to the war effort in Korea. Are these things linked? If so, why?
• Denmark, on the other hand, received relatively little in terms of Marshall Aid and committed only a hospital ship to the Korean War. Are these things linked? If so, why?
• The Netherlands received a much larger amount of money in aid than Turkey or Greece, yet Turkey and Greece made much greater military contributions to the Korean War. Why do you think this was?
• ‘The extent of UN involvement in the Korean War was dependent on financial aid from America.’ How far do you agree with this statement?
PLENARY (SLIDE 14)
Students reach an overall answer to the enquiry question about the causes behind UN intervention in Korea. They should add to their initial understanding, taking into account the factors shown on the board and using the sources that they have been given during the lesson.

LESSON 4.2 BREAKDOWN: HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UNO IN THE KOREAN WAR?

Important! Please note that this lesson is intended to be optional, and teachers are encouraged to use the case studies as best fits their scheme of work. The guiding questions shown in each case-study pack are not exhaustive but are there to help students to understand the sources if required. Each case study has a slightly different angle, as described below.

CASE STUDY 1: DENMARK
Guiding questions aim to:
• Demonstrate the initial Danish reaction to the Korean War.
• Demonstrate the role of the hospital ship Jutlandia.
• Help students to use provenance to analyse a source.

CASE STUDY 2: THE NETHERLANDS
Guiding questions aim to:
• Demonstrate how the Dutch contribution to the Korean War changed over time due to the context of the Cold War.
• Develop students’ understanding of the role of Marshall Aid in Cold War Europe.

CASE STUDY 3: TURKEY
Guiding questions aim to:
• Develop students’ understanding of battlefield conditions in the Korean War.
• Reveal the attitude to the Korean War of a Turkish prisoner of war.
• Help students use an eyewitness source to corroborate the claims of a recent article.

CASE STUDY 4: CANADA
Guiding questions aim to:
• Help students to understand the battlefield conditions.
• Evaluate the role of Canada’s forces and Canadian attitudes to the war.
• Make inferences from source material.
**STARTER (SLIDES 1–5)**

Use Slides 1–5 to explain how to use the case-study packs. Students should note that each case-study pack contains sources related to a different country that was involved in the Korean War.

**ACTIVITY: HOW DID YOUR COUNTRY CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNO COALITION? (SLIDE 6 AND SOURCE PACKS)**

In small groups, work through the guiding questions in your case study.

**PLENARY (SLIDE 7)**

Students prepare a verbal answer to the enquiry question ‘How significant a role did members of the UN play in the Korean War?’

They should use the language suggestions made on Slide 7.

They should make use of evidence from the sources and country they have studied to justify their answer.

**BEFORE YOU START**

You will need:

- Lesson PowerPoint 4.2
- Resource sheets 4.2A–D (Source packs for Netherlands, Denmark, Turkey and Canada. Print enough copies for every student to get one country each)
Section 3 | Enquiry 4 The UNO intervention. Why did the UNO join the USA in the Korean War?

SELECTED LESSON POWERPOINTS

LESSON 4.1 Overview

Content covered in the lesson:
- Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?
- Who was in the multi-national force?
- What was the role of Marshall Aid?
- Review: Why did the UN join the USA in the Korean War?

Lesson 4.1 Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?

What was the United Nations Organisation?
- Established in 1945 to promote international co-operation and peacekeeping.
- Initially, the UN had 51 member states.
- Major decisions (called Resolutions) were voted on by the Security Council.
- In 1950, the Security Council consisted of five permanent members:
  - The Republic of China
  - France
  - The USSR
  - The UK
  - The USA

Lesson 4.1 Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?

Source 3:
The UN Security Council votes to intervene in the Korean War.

At the State Department’s urgent request, a special session of the UN Security Council was called by the Secretary General Triger Lie for Sunday afternoon. The Soviet Union had walked out of the Security Council in January 1950 to protest the UN decision not to admit Communist China, and it was still boycotting the Council in June.

Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea’s aggression and called for withdrawal of the 38th Parallel. Two days later, on 27 June, the UN went even further by calling all member states to extend military aid to South Korea.

With the Soviets absent from the Security Council, the UN voted for the first time to send a military force to assist one country attacked by another.’


Lesson 4.1 Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?

2. Who was in the multi-national UN force?

Led by the United States, 21 countries of the United Nations took part in the Korean War, including:

- USA
- Turkey
- Denmark

Stop! Criminal!

Starter:
Look at Source 1.
1. What is the message of this source? Highlight a keyword and a line of text that helps you answer this question and be ready to share your answer.
2. Come up with a possible answer to the enquiry question: Why did the UNO join the USA in the Korean War?

Source 1: An American poster produced during the Korean War. The number ‘53’ refers to the number of countries in the UNO that condemned Chinese Intervention in Korea.

Lesson 4.1 Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?

Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?

In June 1950, the United Nations adopted Resolution 83, stating that its members should provide military assistance to South Korea in its fight against the communist North.

A Resolution is the formal name given to a decision made by the United Nations.

Why did the UN pass Resolution 83?

Activity 1
1. On your own copy of Source 3, highlight the causes that resulted in the United Nations’ decision to intervene in Korea.
2. Copy the line below into your book. Write a summary of each cause on the line, showing how important you think each cause was. An example has been done for you.

Not Important

Causes that led to UN intervention in Korea

Vital

The Security Council condemned North Korea’s aggression

Why was in the multi-national UN force?

Activity 2
The table on the right (Source 4) shows which UN members joined the UN force in the Korean War.

1. On your own copy of this table, highlight which country:
   a) Contributed the most man-days.
   b) Contributed an aircraft carrier plus over 50,000 man-days.
   c) Contributed a hospital ship.
   d) Provided the third-largest contribution in man-days.
   e) Was situated closest to the Middle East and also contributed soldiers.
   f) Provided 819 men.

2. (Extension): Which members of the Security Council did not contribute to the UN force? Why do you think this was?
LESSON 4.1 (continued)

Who was in the multi-national UN force? Answers

1) Contributed the most man-hours. The USA
2) Contributed an aircraft carrier plus over 50,000 man-hours. The UK
3) Contributed a hospital ship. Denmark
4) Provided the third-largest contribution in man-hours. Canada
5) Was situated closest to the Middle-East and also contributed soldiers. Turkey
6) Provided 819 men. The Netherlands

Extension: China had emerged as a communist country after a large civil war. However, its seat on the UN was held by its previous, non-communist government (in Taiwan), which was now effectively powerless.

The USSR had boycotted the UN in 1950 in protest over China’s seat not being given to China’s communist government. The USSR was also a communist country and offered its support to North Korea.

3. What was the role of Marshall Aid?

- Marshall Aid was financial aid given by the USA to countries in Europe after 1948.
- This money was to support the development of their economies and infrastructure as they recovered from the effects of the Second World War.
- In total, the USA provided $15 billion in financial assistance to recipients of Marshall Aid.

Why did the UN join the USA in the Korean War?

Plenary
Review your initial ideas about the enquiry question from the start of this lesson. What reasons can you now add to show why the UN intervened in Korea? Think about:

- The USSR’s boycott of the Security Council
- The members of the Security Council
- The amount of support given by each country
- The influence of the USA

LESSON 4.2

Lesson 4.2 Overview

Case studies: How significant a role did members of the UN play in the Korean War?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content covered in the lesson: Case studies of how:</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contributed to the UN force 1950–53.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each case study has a source pack. On the front of the source pack, you will find the name of the country and a summary of its contribution to the UN coalition that fought in the Korean War.

Guiding questions:

1) Read Source 2. From the first paragraph, what can you infer from the source about Danish people’s reaction to the Korean War?
2) According to Sources 2 and 3, in what ways did the Julianea serve soldiers fighting in the Korean War?
3) Why do you think that the author of Source 2 describes the Julianea as a memorable chapter in history that Danes are proud of? Hint: Look at the provenance of the source to help you answer this question.
4) How significant was the Danish contribution to the Korean War? Use all of the sources and your own knowledge to help you to answer this question.
LESSON 4.2 (continued)

How significant a role did members of the UN play in the Korean War?

Activity
In small groups, work through the guiding questions for your chosen case study.

How significant a role did members of the UN play in the Korean War?

Plenary
Based on your case study, prepare a verbal answer to this question to share with the class.
In your answer you must:
• Refer to evidence in your case study.
• Make use of at least one of the words on the right to explain the significance of the country that you investigated.

SELECTED SLIDES FROM THE CASE STUDIES

Resource sheet 4.2A
Enquiry question: How significant a role did members of the UN play in the Korean War?

Case study 1: Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total man-days contributed</th>
<th>Number of people sent to Korea</th>
<th>Supporting units sent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>630</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 hospital ship, the Jutlandia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource sheet 4.2A
Case study 1: Denmark

Guiding questions:
1) Read Source 2. From the first paragraph, what can you infer from the source about Danish people’s reaction to the Korean War?
2) According to Sources 2 and 5, in what ways did the Jutlandia serve soldiers fighting in the Korean War?
3) Why do you think that the author of Source 2 describes the Jutlandia as ‘a memorable chapter in history that Danes are proud of’? Hint: Look at the provenance of the source to help you to answer this question.
4) How significant was the Danish contribution to the Korean War? Use all of the sources and your own knowledge to help you to answer this question.

Resource sheet 4.2A
Case study 1: Denmark

The Jutlandia is a memorable chapter in history that Danes are proud of. When the Danish government published advertisements to recruit medical personnel for the Korean mission, they were deluged with applications from around the country. For instance, when they needed to hire 42 nurses, 4,000 nurses applied nationwide. It was also the case for doctors. As a result, they were able to dispatch the best medical team with the most successful treatment rate among all the other multinational medical teams dispatched to Korea at the time.

During the Korean War, around 5,000 U.N. soldiers were treated aboard the Jutlandia, and only 20 of them died. A number of U.N. soldiers were found to have attached a memorial to their military identification tags stating, “Please let me be treated on the Jutlandia if I am injured.” The medical staff on the ship also left a deep impression among Koreans as they also treated thousands of civilians, mostly young children. This was made possible by the state-of-the-art technology of the Jutlandia as well as the humanism of the staff on board.

Source 2: Article from the Korean Herald from: 2018 – the author is Ms. YoungJum, Korea’s ambassador to Denmark. The article was written in celebration of the 65th anniversary of the dispatch of the Jutlandia to Korea.

Resource sheet 4.2A
Case study 1: Denmark

‘Wow, talk about luxury. I even had my own stateroom. I also had the best looking blood technician God ever put on the face of this earth. Young, sweet, blonde, slim, gorgeous... but she also was the lady who did the blood smears each morning...’

Source 3: A young marine patient, after his second of three wounds during the Korean War

Resource sheet 4.2A
Case study 1: Denmark

Video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5r69Jmz8hI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gZ85QmZ55U

Source 4: The hospital ship Jutlandia is inspected by the Danish King before departure to Korea.
Section 3 | Enquiry 4 The UNO intervention. Why did the UNO join the USA in the Korean War?

CASE STUDIES (continued)

Resource sheet 4.2A
Case study 1: Denmark

Jutlandia was originally a combined passenger and cargo ship, but it was rebuilt to fit the requirements of a hospital ship, when the Danish Government decided to support the UN Forces in 1950. The ship could accommodate more than 350 patients, and it was fitted with state of the art operating rooms and equipment. Furthermore the doctors on board were some of the most prominent surgeons at the time, and during the mission they performed ground breaking medical procedures. Even today Denmark still commemorates the efforts of Jutlandia and its crew during the Korean War, which is especially due to a famous song – ‘Jutlandia’ by Danish Troubadour Kim Larsen, who described the heroic deeds performed on the ship.

Source 8: Articles from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark website, 2013

Resource sheet 4.2B
Case study 2: The Netherlands

Guiding questions:
1) Read Source 1. What did the Dutch government initially offer as its contribution to the Korean War? In what way did the Netherlands change its contribution to the conflict?
2) Look at Source 2. How much did the Netherlands receive in Marshall Aid from the USA? How does this compare with other European countries? What does this suggest about the relationship between the USA and the Netherlands during the 1950’s?
3) Read Source 3. What do you think the author means by ‘the increase of military spending became a condition for aid’?
4) According to Source 4, what was the USA’s aim in providing aid to Western Europe in 1951?
5) Using all the sources, explain the reasons behind the Netherlands’ contribution to the Korean War.

Source 4: ECA International Guidance. A US government document written in 1951. The ECA was the government department that administered the Marshall Aid.

Resource sheet 4.2C
Case study 3: Turkey

I told the Chinese commander of the camp that I was in charge of my group, if he wanted anything done, he was to come to me, and I would see that it was done. If he removed me, the responsibility would fall on him but on the man next to me, and after that on the man below him. And so on, down through the ranks, until there were only two privates left. Then the senior private would be in charge. They could kill us, I told him, but they couldn’t make us do what we didn’t want to do.

Discipline was our salvation, and we all knew it. If a Turk had questioned an order from his superior to share his food or lift a stretcher, the way I understood some of your men did, he would literally have had his teeth knocked in. Not by his superior, either, but by the Turk nearest to him. The Communists made attempts to indoctrinate us... but they failed completely, and eventually gave up.

Source 8: A Turkish officer’s account of his experience as a POW in the Korean War.

Resource sheet 4.2D
Case study 4: Canada

Source 4: A photograph of a Royal Canadian Regiment patrol (right) receiving a briefing by a Japanese Osage from the 31st Division. This patrol was often flown by the UN coalition as observer planes during the Korean War.

Source 8: Archival footage from a Canadian Army review showing the formation of the First Commonwealth Division on 28 July 1951 under the command of Major General James Jessop.
ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY
This enquiry seeks to engage students with the different interpretations of the famous Battle of the Imjin River, in particular the events of Hill 235 and the experience of the Glosters (the Gloucestershire Regiment). The principal outcome is for students to build a narrative from a range of contemporary source material. Students will also explore the different ways in which the battle has been interpreted, particularly the contrast between the way it is remembered with reverence in the Republic of South Korea and the relative lack of attention paid to it in Britain.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS
• Different interpretations of the Battle of the Imjin River.
• How the same source material can be used as evidence to support a range of interpretations.
• How the source material can be used to create a narrative of the battle.
• The importance of the battle in the context of the war.

TARGET AGE RANGE
The enquiry is designed for use with Key Stage 4. It targets GCSE in terms of skills and knowledge; however, it can easily be used in a Year 9 Cold War study, or as a case study on how to use historical evidence at Year 9, GCSE or A-level.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE
The Korean War is known as the ‘forgotten war’. Dr Kathryn Weathersby, Professor of History at the Korea University, explains that this is because it is a messy, unresolved war that festers and has been wilfully forgotten (Weathersby, 2019). Professor Thomas Hennessey of Canterbury Christ Church University agrees and goes on to evidence this, particularly in Britain, with the obvious lack of memorials. Hennessey also suggests that sandwiched between World War II and the Vietnam War, the Korean War is lost. It was rarely on the front page and, particularly after 1951, was merely known for being the ‘war of the hills’ (Hennessey, 2019). According to Dr Grace Huxford, the England cricket team’s Ashes victory in 1953 got more media attention than returning troops at the end of the Korean War (Huxford, 2019).

Interestingly, Huxford did identify that media interest went up slightly after the Battle of the Imjin River, suggesting that it was, if nothing else, worthy of reporting (Huxford, 2019). Huxford carefully explores
the value of using veteran testimony as they describe individual experiences of battle, but also the problems with using such life-telling narratives as they come from a range of military personnel with a range of experiences, motivated to tell their stories for a range of reasons (Huxford, 2015). This enquiry focuses on getting students to learn from these narratives.

British Voices, The Imperial War Museum, Age UK and the Korean War Legacy Foundation have been tirelessly recording veterans’ accounts for the past decade. Traditional accounts of the Battle of the Imjin River tell the tale of the heroic 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment (aka the Glorious Glosters), holding back wave after wave of Chinese soldiers at Hill 235, allowing the majority of UN forces to retreat and regroup and stopping the Chinese advance on Seoul. Over 500 of the original 773 men were taken as prisoners of war, 59 were killed and 34 later died in captivity. It remains the bloodiest battle fought by the British since World War II. After the war, Koreans officially referred to Hill 235 as Gloster Hill. In 1957, a memorial was unveiled, and in 2014 this was expanded into the impressive Gloucester Valley Bridge and memorial garden. In Britain there is substantial reference to the Glorious Glosters; at the Soldiers of Gloucester Museum in the City of Gloucester there is a small plaque attached to the city war memorial, and the MoD Barracks near Gloucester were renamed Imjin Barracks.

However, there is a counter-narrative that suggests that while the action may have helped to stop the Chinese advance on Seoul, the battle itself was a chaotic catastrophe – that the Glosters’ last stand was a military blunder, leading to the capture of hundreds of soldiers. At the heart of this resource, therefore, is a consideration of how far these narratives stand up to scrutiny in light of the available source material.

**CURRICULAR RATIONALE**

In the past four decades, teachers, exam boards and textbook publishers have grappled with how to meaningfully engage students with historical evidence. It will always be a somewhat artificial endeavour without the academic rigour of proper historical research, but most teachers agree that it is an essential skill for students to learn. What they disagree about is how to teach it. Ashby’s research in Project Chata (Concepts of History Teaching and Approaches) suggested in 2004 that students ‘all too often learn interrogation routines for dealing with sources that have little to do with understanding of these sources as historical context’ (Ashby, 2004 p. 45).

This challenge is very evident when looking at exam questions. How can a student be expected to evaluate the utility of a piece of evidence without first using that evidence for a specific enquiry? This is why we often see superficial evaluation or stock phrases used incorrectly such as reliability or bias. Howells says that students need to first have an ‘acquaintance with the source material’ (Howells, 2007, p. 30). Teachers must avoid being sucked into exam rhetoric; ‘the relationship of student and source appears to be of what the student can do to the source rather than what the source can do for the student’ (op.cit, pp. 32–33).

This resource attempts to address the issue Howells raises. Using historical evidence is interesting, motivating, engaging, challenging and proper history. In this resource students will work like historians to build a narrative of the famous Battle of Imjin by using source material from the time, just as a historian would. The underlying principle is summarised again by Howells when he states that we should ‘concentrate on sources as the building blocks of a positive and constructive history. We should see sources as tools, not as suspicious and dubious.’ (op.cit, pp. 33, 35)

A secondary intent in this resource is to expose students to new aspects of the Korean War narrative. Most Korean War teaching resources focus on the causes and consequences of the war, or the war in the Cold War context. Those that do examine the actual theatre of war tend to concentrate on the American experience, with the British troops rarely featured in any depth. In this resource students will gain an opportunity to understand the importance of the Battle of the Imjin River to the Korean War and as part of the British experience of the war.

REFERENCES


**SCHEME OF WORK**

**OVERVIEW**

This enquiry comprises two lessons, which aim to give students a detailed understanding of the Battle of the Imjin River. Ideally the lessons should be used in a single sequence.

Lesson 1 aims to get students engaged with evidence to create a narrative of the events at Imjin River, April 1951.

In Lesson 2 students are then asked to write their own account of how UN forces were able to halt the Chinese Spring Offensive. Students finally consider how important they think the battle was and consider how it was or should be remembered.

**Extension:** To support teacher understanding a summary overview of events is provided, which could be shared with students if time allowed. There is also a list of materials to extend teachers’ knowledge, such as Grace Huxford’s podcasts on the use of testimonies or documentaries such as the *20th Century Battlefields 1951 Korea*, which gives a particularly detailed account of the events at Imjin River.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Lesson 1:**  
Using evidence to build a narrative of what happened at the Battle of the Imjin River | It starts with an overview of the events of the Korean War from June 1950 to April 1951 and sets up the idea of stalemate. Teachers can use as much or as little of the material provided as required by their particular curriculum and the contextual knowledge of their students. As a result, Lesson 1 might need to be extended into a second lesson.  
Lesson 1 then provides students with a rich variety of contemporary evidence such as testimonies, military records and photographs, which they use to gain an understanding of the Battle of the Imjin River. Students are asked to use the evidence to back up assumptions about the battle (Option A) or find key facts (Option B).  
Students recap the war so far and then use a selection of contemporary evidence to build a narrative of the battle. |
| **Lesson 2:**  
How to write an account of the Battle of the Imjin River | Lesson 2 draws on the information gathered in Lesson 1. With this in mind, the lesson begins with a recap of the battle.  
Students are then asked to write their own account of how UN forces were able to halt the Chinese Spring Offensive. This draws on their knowledge of the battle, but then extends their narrative by forcing them to use these facts to address the specific demands of the question. A range of features are suggested for students to use in their accounts.  
To wrap up this enquiry students are asked to revisit how the battle is remembered. There is a valuable opportunity for students to argue the case for more appropriate memorialisation of Imjin in Britain. |
LESSON 5.1 BREAKDOWN: USING EVIDENCE TO BUILD A NARRATIVE OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THE BATTLE OF THE IMJIN RIVER

STARTER/ACTIVITY 1: THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KOREAN WAR 1950–51
(SLIDES 1–8)

Slides 4–8 provide an overview of the Korean War. If you have already used other enquiries in this book or already spent some teaching time on the war, you may not need this at all. So how you use this depends on the speed at which you wish to go through it and whether it needs class time. The maps and information could simply be printed off for student reference.

However, assuming that the background is needed, ideally you should talk the class through the main developments of war prior to 1951. Students then make their own copy of the basic diagram on Slide 4 (and Resource sheet 5.1B) and use the information they can gain from Slides 5–8 to make the diagram into a useable summary.

ACTIVITY 2: WHY ARE WE LOOKING AT THE BATTLE OF THE IMJIN RIVER, APRIL 1951?
(SLIDES 9–11)

The aim of this activity is to help students to see that the Battle of the Imjin River was highly significant. Show Slide 9 and simply ask students to explain how they know the battle was significant and who felt that it was significant. This could possibly lead on to further discussion about whether it was similarly significant back in the UK, but it is best to delay that until Lesson 2. For these purposes, we really want to emphasise its strategic significance within the context of the war.

From this point, you could move straight to Activity 3. Alternatively, you could use Slides 10–11 to fill in more detail about the build-up to the battle. Remember, the focus of this enquiry is on using the source material about the battle. Don’t run out of time to properly consider those sources. If there is any risk of that, then you ought to expand this first lesson into two:

- Lesson 1A would be the overview and context (Activities 1 and 2).
- Lesson 1B would be Activity 3.

ACTIVITY 3: WHAT HAPPENED AT THE BATTLE OF THE IMJIN RIVER?
(SLIDES 12–17)

Start by playing the sound file hyperlinked on Slide 12. We have suggested listening as far as 3’14. However, 3’14–4’15 is also useful but note that there is one mild curse word.

At this stage, simply ask students to listen.

Follow this up by using Slide 13 to highlight how historians find sources like this so useful and how they could make inferences from what Tommy Clough is saying even though he does not say it. Inference is a vital skill in using sources and writing history. Then ask students to listen to the clip again but this time trying to identify at what points in the clip each of these inferences listed on Slide 13 can be made.

Slide 14 then sets up the main task for the rest of the lesson. Students will need Resource sheet 5.1C evidence pack (also shown on Slides 15–17) and Resource sheet 5.1D.

Students can work in groups or independently and you can select/reduce the number of sources for students to make it more accessible. However, don’t worry too much about which sources to cut. They are all useful so you can select randomly.
PLENARY (SLIDE 18)

When students have finished examining the sources, they should collate their findings and report back. This could be done individually, in pairs or as a class.

LESSON 5.2 BREAKDOWN: HOW TO WRITE AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF THE IMJIN RIVER

STARTER/ACTIVITY 1 (SLIDES 1–3)

You will need to decide how much recap is needed.

• If this is a follow-on from Lesson 1, then students can refer to their narratives from the previous lesson.

• Or you could use a documentary clip such as 20th Century History 1951 Korea (Dan and Peter Snow, BBC 2) to set the scene.

ACTIVITY 2: WRITE AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF THE IMJIN RIVER (SLIDE 4)

Students are now ready to write their own account of how UN forces were able to halt the Chinese Spring Offensive. They draw on their knowledge of the battle from the sources they examined in Lesson 1 and their understanding of the key features of writing an historical account.

Resource sheet 5.2A provides a writing frame for their writing. You may wish to add to or remove some of the prompts in order to support or challenge students.

ACTIVITY 3: SHOULD IMJIN RIVER BE BETTER REMEMBERED? (SLIDES 5–7)

Whether you proceed to this activity (or how you set it up) will depend on whether you have used either of the Key Stage 3 enquiries (Enquiries 2 and 3) that give similar opportunities to study and create memorials.

For these notes, however, we are assuming that this is relatively new territory. And, even if you have tackled the earlier enquiries, the fact that this memorialisation is in the context of a specific and significant battle gives this a different dimension from Enquiries 2 and 3.

Slide 5 reminds students how the battle is remembered in South Korea. Slide 6 overviews its memorialisation in Britain (there are memorials but they are much less prominent and less creative). Make sure that you add any local examples if there is one near your school.

Slide 5 asks students to compare the two and consider possible reasons for the differences.

Slide 7 then offers some explanations.

You could tackle this as a ‘four corners’ debate. You will need to label the four corners of the room A to D in advance. Slide 7 provides students with four possible reasons, A to D. They need to choose which they most agree with and move to that corner of the room. The teacher can direct a debate, challenging students to justify their decision.

ACTIVITY 4: PLENARY (SLIDES 8–9)

We bring the learning on this topic together by making the case for a better Imjin memorial in Britain. In arguing their case, this allows students to use:

• their knowledge of the events of the battle
• its significance within the war
• its current memorialisation
• the experiences of the soldiers
in arguing their case.

Use Slide 8 for class discussion. Students together come up with arguments. Alternatively, you could suggest some to them and they repeat the ‘four corners’ strategy.

Finally, on Slide 9, they are invited to write to the UK War Memorials Trust persuading them to create a monument to honour those who fought at Imjin River. The site shows that the British government takes memorialisation very seriously.

There are four headings suggested that they can use to support the case, and also Resource sheet 5.2B provides a writing frame. However, not all students will want or need these prompts and they should be encouraged to come up with their own.

SELECTED LESSON POWERPOINTS

LESSON 5.1

Lesson 5.1 Overview

Content covered in the lesson:
• Background: The main developments in the Korean War 1950–51
• Focus: Why we are studying the Battle of the Imjin River
• Evidence: Making inferences from sources about what happened at the battle
• Conclusions: What happened at the Battle of the Imjin River?

Background: What were the main developments in the Korean War 1950–51?

Activity 1
• Here is a very basic summary chart of the main phases of the Korean War 1950–51.
• The diagram would not make much sense to anyone who has not studied the war.
• Your task is to use the next four pages to add dates, countries, events and other facts and figures that will turn this from a skeleton into a useful summary of the events.
LESSON 5.1 (continued)

Focus: Why are we looking at the Battle of the Imjin River?

Activity 2
- How do we know that the Battle of the Imjin River was significant?
- Who lost it was significant?

The British Forces
- The UN front line forces were deployed along the 38th parallel to meet the Chinese advance.
- The British 29th Infantry Brigade (BIB) and supporting UN and ROK forces were positioned to stop a Chinese advance on Seoul and to protect the only road that the UN 3rd Infantry could use for retreat.
- The 29th BIB was under the command of Brigadier Tom Brodie and was split into four regiments holding a series of hills across a 3-mile line.
- They were much better trained (many were veterans of World War II) and armed than their Chinese opponents.

The Chinese Spring Offensive

Check your understanding
- 22 April 1951 – Chinese General Peng amassed over 300,000 soldiers. He planned to break holes through the UN defensive, recapture Seoul and push the Westerners out of Korea.
- The PVA (People’s Liberation Army) were only a small portion of the soldiers that had come up the Chinese communist forces.
- Peng sent numerous paratroops to probe the UN and ROK lines for weaknesses, then sent in huge numbers of less experienced troops to overwhelm the enemy, followed by his best men in the PVA to secure positions.

The evidence: What happened at the Battle of the Imjin River, 22 to 25 April 1951?

Activity 3A
- Listen to Tommy Clough’s account of the battle. Listen from the start to 3:14.
- Note how this has been recorded on your table.
LESSON 5.1 (continued)

Making inferences from Tommy Clough’s testimony

Historians tend to look at a source and ask “how is it useful?”, not whether it is useful. They can do this by making inferences. This means gaining new knowledge even when certain things are not spelled out. So, from Tommy’s story, we can learn that...

You can see a photo of Tommy Clough here: https://www.royalgazette.com/uk/xnews/gazette-news/article/royal-gazette-4244

LESSON 5.2

Lesson 5.2 Overview

Main features of this lesson:

- Recap of the main events of the battle.
- Selecting relevant information from sources to use in your narrative.
- Comparing memorialisation of the battle in Britain and on South Korea.
- Arguing for a new memorial to the battle.

What happened at the Battle of the Imjin River?

Activity 1

Recap the main events of the battle from the last lesson.
LESSON 5.2 (continued)

Write an account of the Battle of the Imjin River

Activity 2
Write an account of how UN forces were able to halt the Chinese Spring Offensive.
History is always controversial. But we can say that the Battle of the Imjin River saved Seoul from capture in 1951. Your task is to explain this in an account. You have gathered lots of information from the sources. You now need to select the relevant information and turn it into a narrative.

Your narrative could feature one or more of these elements:
• What the Chinese were trying to achieve
• What the UNO forces were trying to achieve
• Why the Imjin River area was important
• The seriousness of the fighting
• Any particularly important or interesting events in the battle
• The end results of the battle

How the battle is remembered in South Korea

Activity 3
Compare how the Battle is commemorated in South Korea with the British memorials on the next slide.
Why might there be these differences?

Why is Imjin River remembered more creatively in Korea than in Britain?

Activity 3 (continued)
Which of these explanations do you most agree with?

A. South Korean people wanted to honour the Glories for their role in saving the ROK from communism.
B. South Korea’s government is keen to remind Britain and other UN countries of their commitment to the ROK in case the North ever invades again.
C. The Korean War was largely forgotten in Britain because it was overshadowed by the Second World War, which finished only five years before. Korea did not have an impact on Britain at home like the Second World War did.
D. The Korean War has never been settled. For many years, it was unresolved, as it was a short conflict in a distant land. Unless you knew someone in the war, people did not know much about it.

Make the case for a better memorial

Activity 4
Come up with FOUR reasons why Britain should erect a better memorial for Imjin River.

A. B. C. D.

Make the case for a better memorial

Activity 4 (continued)

UK War Memorials is funded by the UK government and records, maintains and accepts applications for UK memorials. You can find their website here: www.ukwmemorials.org
They even have a ‘create a new memorial’ page with a help sheet: www.ukwmemorials.org/create-a-new-memorial

Activity 4 (continued)
Write a letter to the War Memorials Trust persuading them to create a monument to honour the Battle of the Imjin River.
Choose two or three of the following points to back up your case:
1. The importance of the battle to the war
2. Casualties
3. Bravery
4. Prisoners of war
ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY

This resource will enable students to explore a key controversy from the Korean War – whether or not the US used biological weapons against civilians in North Korea and China in contravention of the modern-day ‘rules of war’.

The resource will also enable students to think about how certain we can be of the answers to historical questions and about the contested nature of historical evidence and the way in which it is interpreted.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS

- The reasons for the emergence of allegations of biological weapons usage by the USA during the Korean War.
- The nature of the debate surrounding the allegations of biological weapons usage, both at the time and subsequently by historians.
- Analysis and evaluation of a range of evidence on either side of the debate, leading to the development of a considered argument.

TARGET AGE RANGE

The lessons are designed for use with Key Stage 4, particularly as context for those studying the development of the Korean War for AQA’s GCSE unit on Conflict and Peace in Asia 1950–1973.

Students at Key Stage 5 studying Mao’s China may also find this resource useful to gain an insight into the way in which the communist regime operated during the early period of his rule.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE

The debate over whether the US used biological weapons during the Korean War is one that continues to this day, with arguably no clear resolution. The Chinese, Russian and North Korean governments still maintain that the US attempted to spread diseases such as cholera and the plague, through the dropping of infected insects on civilian populations in North Korea and China during the war – the US continues to strongly refute these allegations (Ryall, 2010). As recently as March 2019, the North Korean government reiterated its belief that the US was involved in biological warfare during the Korean War through state media publications (Pyongyang Times, 2019). Historians associated with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, an American thinktank with significant links to both major political parties and part-funded by the US government, have played a key role in continuing to rebut the allegations.
The issue reveals a number of interesting aspects about the Korean War and the broader Cold War. Most obvious is the question of how benign the US actions were at this time – were they, in the words of Arthur Schlesinger (1946), providing the ‘brave and essential response of free men to Communist aggression’ (p. 23), or were they the more cynical actor highlighted by Cold War revisionists like William Appleman Williams (1959)? The germ warfare debate presaged future stains on US foreign policy and military conduct, such as the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam during the 1960s, the covert intervention in Cambodia in the 1970s and the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq in 2003.

Furthermore, Ruth Rogaski (2002) has highlighted that the issue of germ warfare ‘should be seen as a key symbol of China’s modern condition in the twentieth century world’ and that the story combines two key ‘motifs’ that were ‘central to the condition of New China: China as a victim of imperialism, and China as a victim of nature’ (p. 382). Grace Huxford’s (2018) analysis of the work of the Red Dean, Hewlett Johnson (who is cited early in the resource), highlights the fact that his work raised ‘important questions about the limits of democratic citizenship and acceptable behaviour during wartime’ (p. 150). Additionally, the issue of biological warfare was a way in which ‘the Cold War broadened the scope of military weapons and what constituted a military target in the British imagination’.

**CURRICULAR RATIONALE**

One of the most challenging aspects of the Korean War for students relates to the long stalemate between 1951 and 1953. The allegations of biological warfare come within this part of the topic and could be used by teachers to develop knowledge of this phase of the war. In particular, it would provide useful context for those delivering the AQA GCSE unit on Conflict and Peace in Asia 1950–1973, especially the bullet point covering the ‘Development of the Korean War’. This paper has a source-based component, and work done through the tasks should enable students to develop their skills in this aspect of historical thinking.

Additionally, students at Key Stage 5 covering units on Mao’s China may find this resource useful to gain an insight into the way in which the communist regime operated during the early period of his rule. The Korean War is usually covered as part of most A-level specifications on this topic.

More broadly, this enquiry should help students to develop their ability to handle evidence and think about how historians use it to make claims about the past. Students often see historical evidence in very black and white terms – either it is ‘useful’ or it isn’t. The evidence that students will grapple with in this enquiry has been deliberately chosen to make students pause and consider the status of the evidence before rushing to judgement. Students will have the opportunity to assess the strength of different pieces of evidence while considering their content and provenance. In this topic, the evidence is highly contested by historians on different sides of the debate, thus helping students to consider how problematic much historical evidence can be, and that it can be interpreted in different ways. Students will then have the chance to use their determinations on the evidence to inform a written piece that reflects the uncertainty inherent in making many historical claims.

**REFERENCES**


SCHEME OF WORK

OVERVIEW
The aim of this sequence is for students to wrestle with the inherent problems and uncertainty involved in trying to get to some sort of ‘historical truth’, while getting their teeth into a controversial and intriguing aspect of the Korean War itself – whether or not the US used biological warfare against North Korean and Chinese civilians during the conflict.

In the first lesson of this two-lesson enquiry, students grapple with some academic reading and summarise how the allegations – and US rebuttals – developed during the war itself.

In the second lesson, students will engage with a range of evidence, leading to a piece of extended writing and finally discussion of the continuing relevance of this debate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 1:</strong> Why and how did allegations of biological warfare by the USA develop during the Korean War?</td>
<td>The enquiry starts by students considering the story of the ‘Red Dean’ of Canterbury, Hewlett Johnson, and his role in raising awareness of biological warfare allegations in Britain. They will then get into the situation in the Korean War in 1952, when the allegations first surfaced, and explore why biological weapons were and remain so controversial. They will also consider the issue of weapons of mass destruction more generally. The main part of this lesson will require students to read a 500-word academic article that summarises when the allegations arose and how the USA responded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 2:</strong> How convincing is the evidence about US biological warfare?</td>
<td>Students engage with a range of evidence on both sides of the debate. They evaluate the source material and consider its value or otherwise as evidence in the debate. This leads to a piece of extended writing, where students will respond to the lesson question with supports in place to assist them. Finally, students will return to the overall enquiry question (Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?), with particular reference to ongoing tensions between the US and the DPRK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LESSON 6.1 BREAKDOWN: WHY AND HOW DID ALLEGATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BY THE USA DEVELOP DURING THE KOREAN WAR?

STARTER: HEWLETT JOHNSON’S PETITION (SLIDES 1–5)

After a brief preamble introducing the lesson sequence, the starter itself is on Slide 4. You should show students the image and ask them to think about what the image shows. The question prompts on the slide point to why the piece of paper is so long, and why it might have been photographed in this way.

After brief discussion, use Slide 5 to reveal the provenance of this photo source and ask students why a British clergyman (that term might need explaining) would have a petition from thousands of Chinese people at this time during the Korean War, considering the background about Hewlett Johnson, the so-called ‘Red Dean’, that is provided. Teachers could use a ‘think, pair, share’ model here and then ask students to think about any details that are surprising or shocking.

This starter not only raises the content issue – the biological weapons controversy – but it also takes you straight into the ‘contested evidence’ aspect. So it is worth extending the discussion to consider the petition as evidence to answer:

• what they think about the fact that a Christian priest is also a communist sympathiser
• how trustworthy the petition might be as a source of Chinese public opinion
• why communist governments like those in the USSR and China might find someone like Johnson useful, especially during that specific time period

LINK: CONTEXT – THE KOREAN WAR IN 1952 (SLIDE 6)

This is not an activity, just teacher talk.

Simply outline the position that the Korean War had reached in early 1952 – particularly for those new to the topic.

However, if you have been studying the conflict, you might use this opportunity to test student knowledge of the conflict and the broader Cold War conflict at this stage. You could white out a key word from each bullet point (e.g. movement, nuclear, armistice, 38th, etc) and ask them to supply the missing information from memory.

ACTIVITY 1: WHAT ARE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND WHY ARE THEY CONTROVERSIAL? (SLIDES 7–8)

Students now have the opportunity to understand what biological weapons are and why their use is considered controversial. Slide 7 provides some basic information about the position of biological weapons within international law and in popular imagination.

Slide 7 includes a link to the film poster for On Her Majesty’s Secret Service, also available here, where you will also get a plot summary if you want: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Her_Majesty%27s_Secret_Service_(film)#/media/File:On_Her_Majesty%27s_Secret_Service_-_UK_cinema_poster.jpg

This could lead into a discussion about how the poster/film is not really useful evidence about biological weapons but it is useful evidence that the issue was in the public consciousness.

Slide 8 places biological weapons within the context of the modern-day concept of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and also asks students to consider their own responses to weapons of this type.
Students could discuss the questions given on Slide 8 before writing short answers to them—or perhaps discuss the first two more general questions and then write their answers to questions 3 and 4. The aim is that students should reflect on the differences between biological and other types of deadly weapons and think about what has made the prospect of germ warfare a frightening one to civilian populations over time.

Biological warfare is, in some respects, fairly ‘low-tech’ compared to something like nuclear warfare. If students have studied ‘Medicine through Time’ courses, they will have considered epidemic diseases and societal reactions to them in the past. Biological warfare does bring the prospect of a modern equivalent. Students may have encountered biological warfare issues in popular culture, and we all know the sense of panic that can be created by germs spreading, from our shared experience of the 2020 coronavirus. Germs scare us!


Slide 9 presents a basic introductory overview of the story of the allegations, which is then developed by the academic reading.

The academic article referred to on Slide 10 is an abridged extract from M. Leitenberg’s, ‘China’s False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United States during the Korean War’. He is a prominent American academic on this issue. It is shown on Resource sheet 6.1A. If you want to consult the full article, you can find it here: [www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/chinas-false-allegations-the-use-biological-weapons-the-united-states-during-the-korean](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/chinas-false-allegations-the-use-biological-weapons-the-united-states-during-the-korean)

Slide 10 prompts students first of all to read through the extract. Students may need some support reading the material and you should use your preferred whole-class reading strategies to support them in this.

It is recommended that students should have the opportunity to discuss and pull apart the key vocabulary in the text while reading through.

You might also use a text-marking strategy, which we have modelled in Resource sheet 6.1B. This simply helps students to start reading attentively by looking for specific features.

Slide 11 then provides a tool to summarise the key information graphically. (If you are familiar with Thinking Maps, then this is an example of a Sequencing Map.) Students should aim to answer the questions using no more than 50 words per box. The blank Sequencing Map is provided as Resource sheet 6.1C. This can be particularly effective if you print it out at A3 to give the students more space to write.

Page 2 of Resource sheet 6.1C provides further support in the form of possible responses for the sequencing grid. You could use these as sorting cards – jumbled up so students match to the right section. Finally, page 3 has the answers, the completed grid, which also appears in the PowerPoint as Slide 12.

We have offered a range of strategies because it really is vital to the lesson that students understand the way in which the accusations developed. This will help to ensure that they have a firm outline of the topic before analysing the evidence for themselves in the second lesson of the enquiry.
ACTIVITY 3: EXTRA CHALLENGE – SPOTTING LEITENBERG’S VIEWPOINT (SLIDES 13–14)

There is an opportunity for additional challenge here on Slide 12 by asking students to identify the personal perspective of the historian. Leitenberg is one of the leading historians who has refuted the communist allegations of US impropriety on this issue, and that point of view can clearly be detected in the loaded language used at times in the text: examples are extracted on Slide 14, such as in the last paragraph, when he states that ‘in subsequent years, other criticisms [of the allegations] and admissions were even more telling’. This should help students to see historians as conveyers of arguments rather than people who just dispassionately retell the facts.

PLENARY (SLIDE 15)

Students have the opportunity to reflect on the key knowledge gained in the lesson by thinking about:

• a question they have that remains unanswered
• one thing they already knew
• two new things they learned

You could provide a printout of Slide 15 and ask students to write on the template, or use sticky notes and ask them to stick their questions or points on the slide as it is projected on the board.

LESSON 6.2 BREAKDOWN: HOW CONVINCING IS THE EVIDENCE ABOUT US BIOLOGICAL WARFARE?

BEFORE YOU START

You will need:

• Lesson PowerPoint 6.2
• Resource sheet 6.2A (Evidence pack)
• Resource sheet 6.2B (Evidence recording sheet)
• Resource sheet 6.2C (Degree of certainty continuum)

STARTER – RECAP TASK (SLIDES 1–3)

This sorting exercise on Slide 3 recaps and retrieves content from the previous lesson. Students put the basic outline of the story of the allegations into chronological order. The correct order is F-C-A-D-B-E.

ACTIVITY 1: HOW CONVINCING IS THE EVIDENCE ABOUT US BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DURING THE KOREAN WAR? (SLIDES 4–15)

( NB The evidence pack is provided both as Resource sheet 6.2A and also as slides in the lesson presentation, so you can use them flexibly in modelling and setting up the task and in feedback stages.)

Students study the different sources provided and, for each one, complete the relevant section of the table (on Slide 5 and Resource sheet 6.2B). For each piece of evidence, they should briefly say whether or not it supports or opposes the allegations, provide a score out of five for how convincing the evidence is in supporting or opposing those allegations, and then make some justification for their choice.

The recording table (Resource sheet 6.2B) should be enlarged to A3 if possible. It might be useful to model the thinking and table-filling process with students with one of the sources first before letting students loose on the rest of the evidence pack.

The purpose is to help students to see that while some evidence may on the surface offer clear support for a particular argument, that evidence may not be very convincing when issues such as its provenance are factored in. This could be seen in Source C, which clearly supports the allegations but given, the origins of the evidence (being created by the communist government of China for propaganda purposes), is not likely to be seen as convincing. Shade could also be cast on apparently more convincing evidence – for example, students might see the historian Leitenberg as being more convincing, but the information about the status of his evidence, as shown in Source F, may raise further questions for students.
It may be useful for students to work in pairs or threes for this task, or you might allocate certain sources to particular groups of students. Alternatively, you could choose pairs of sources that contrast and look at the utility of those sources as evidence for historians studying this issue. Sources A and J might provide a good contrast, for example.

This activity needs most of a lesson to work properly – at least half an hour, and you could easily spend longer depending on how much discussion and feedback you want.

**ACTIVITY 2: HOW CERTAIN CAN WE BE THAT THE USA USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR? (SLIDES 16–17)**

This lesson culminates in a written response. Students are doing two things here:

- Saying whether they believe the allegations.
- Saying how certain they are (based on the evidence they have studied).

Whichever view they take (believe or not believe), **Slide 16** invites students to put themselves on the spectrum of certainty between 0% and 100%. In the box on Resource sheet 6.2C (page 1), they explain their degree of certainty with reference to the sources.

**Slide 17** (also page 2 of Resource sheet 6.2C) provides some writing stimulus (vocabulary and sentence starters) for their written answer, which you could print out.

Feedback could be provided by sharing exemplar work using a visualiser or by asking students with contrasting views on their ‘level of certainty’ to share aspects of their work with the whole class.

**PLENARY (SLIDE 18)**

This final task brings us back to the overall enquiry question (Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?) through a recent (2019) article created by the North Korean government. Students should think about why the issue of US biological weapons remains a ‘live’ debate and controversy in the modern day.

Draw their attention to the comment on the spending of the Department of Defense, which includes money allocated for a biochemical warfare plan. How should they take this information when we also know that North Korea wish to undermine the morality of US claims to global leadership?
Contested evidence. Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?

Lesson 6.1 overview

- The context – the Korean War up to 1952
- What are biological weapons?
- The accusations against the USA
- An academic perspective evaluating Milton Leitenberg’s conclusions about the accusations

The petition

- This photograph shows a petition. It was signed by over 13,000 Chinese people, including 410 Chinese Protestant pastors (church leaders).
- It was brought back to the UK from China by the Dean of Canterbury, Hewlett Johnson.
- It was a petition against the alleged use of bacteriological weapons by the United States against China.
- Johnson himself was known as the ‘Red Dean’ and was a well-known supporter of Stalin and the Soviet Union.
- He had been awarded the Soviet Order of the Red Banner of Labour and also the Stalin International Peace Prize in 1951.

Discuss

Are there any details here that are surprising or shocking or that you would like to investigate further?

Context: The Korean War to 1952

- 1950–1951 was the ‘movement’ phase of the war, as UN and communist forces retreated and advanced rapidly.
- The USSR achieved nuclear weapons capability in 1950.
- July 1951: Armistice negotiations began to try to end the conflict in Korea.
- War reached stalemate phase around the 38th parallel. There were high casualties on both sides but little movement of the front lines.
- The communists regime in China had only been in power for three years at this point and was still establishing itself. Its intervention in Korea should be seen as part of this.
- Allegations of bacteriological warfare surfaced in the spring of 1952, China and North Korea accused the United States.

What are biological weapons?

- Biological weapons are germ deliberately spread to harm your enemy. They are also sometimes called bacteriological weapons and germ warfare. They still mean the same thing.
- Biological weapons are an example of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- There are three main categories of WMD: biological, chemical and nuclear.
- The concept of WMD is modern, particularly associated with the 2000s and the Iraq War. However, the use of biological weapons was prohibited as early as 1925 under the Geneva Protocol – which was agreed at the League of Nations.
- In the 1950s, the biggest fear was that of nuclear weapons. However, the Cold War increased popular awareness and fear of a wide range of weapons that could be used against civilians.
- This is reflected in popular culture, where various films and TV programmes of the time depicted germ warfare – notably the 1990s James Bond film ‘On Her Majesty’s Secret Service’. The villain, Blofeld, is brainwashing his ‘Angels of Death’ to smuggle biological weapons (such as anthrax germs) into Britain and around the world. (Click the green icon to view the film poster.)

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Activity 1

1. Why do countries build WMD?
2. Why is the use of WMD controversial?
3. How do biological weapons differ from other WMD?
4. Why might a country use biological weapons rather than other WMD?
Section 3 | Enquiry 6 Contested evidence. Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?

**ENQUIRY 6.1 (continued)**

**What is the big story of the allegations against the USA?**

- Early 1952: North Korean and Chinese governments formally alleged use of biological weapons by the USA. Allegations included that fleas, mosquitoes, spiders and flees, carrying diseases such as plague, smallpox and cholera, had been dropped by US planes.
- March 1952: The USA immediately refuted the allegations and Secretary of State Dean Acheson called for an International Red Cross investigation. This was vetoed by the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council.
- September 1952: The Needham Commission (established by an organisation called the World Peace Council) confirmed that there was evidence that the USA had used biological weapons against Korea.
- February 1953: Chinese government produced two captive US Marine Corps pilots to confirm that the allegations were true.
- These allegations have been strenuously denied by the USA to this day, while Chinese and North Korean governments continue to support the claims. Historians are divided on the issue.

**Summarise Leitenberg's answer to each question in 50 words (or less)!**

1. What claims were made about US biological weapons development before the Korean War?
2. What specific allegations did China make about the use of biological weapons during the Korean War?
3. What claims were made about China's investigations by the USA?
4. What were some weaknesses of these investigations described in the extract?
5. What was the US response to these allegations?
6. What weaknesses about the investigations were raised after the war?

**Academic reading task**

**Activity 2**

**What is the big story of the allegations against the USA?**

You will be given an article written by historian Milton Leitenberg (Resource sheet 6.1A). It tells you the big story of how the allegations developed and how the USA responded to them.

1. Read through the extract.
2. Summarise the key points from the extract – using the questions and chart on the next slide (or Resource sheet 6.1C). Summarise your answer to each question in 50 words or less.

**What is the big story of the allegations of US biological warfare during the Korean War? Answers**

1. What claims were made about US biological weapons development before the Korean War?
   - Soviet scientists were working on biological weapons, but the US did not.
2. What specific allegations did China make about the use of biological weapons during the Korean War?
   - China claimed US planes dropped biological weapons on their soldiers.
3. What claims were made about China's investigations by the USA?
   - The US claimed they were conducted by a commission of experts.
4. What were some weaknesses of these investigations described in the extract?
   - They were conducted by US experts, who were not impartial.
5. What was the US response to these allegations?
   - They denied the allegations, but did not provide evidence to support their case.
6. What weaknesses about the investigations were raised after the war?
   - The US did not provide evidence to support their case.

**Consider these three extracts from Leitenberg's article. What do they suggest about his view of the strength of the allegations?**

**Extract 1**

The Chinese and North Koreans' allegations are supported by multiple sources, including medical records, eyewitness accounts, and laboratory analysis. The International Committee of the Red Cross verified some of the Chinese claims.

**Extract 3**

In subsequent years, other allegations and admissions have been made. For example, a US military officer admitted to using biological weapons in Vietnam.

**Plenary: What have you learnt today?**

A question about today's lesson I would like answered

One thing I knew already

Two things I learnt today
Section 3 | Enquiry 6 Contested evidence. Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?

**Lesson 6.1**

Why and how did allegations of biological warfare by the USA develop during the Korean War?

**Lesson 6.2**

How convincing is the evidence about US biological warfare?

**ENQUIRY 6.2**

**Lesson starter**

Recap the last lesson by putting the following events in correct chronological order:

A. - The US requests to have the international Red Cross investigate the charges — denied by the USSR.

B. - Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, rejects the Nixondem Commission report.

C. - The North Korean government alleges biological weapon usage by the USA. The Chinese government later reinforces this.

D. - The USSR establishes two investigations tackling by its own front organisation, the World Peace Council (the ICO, and Nixondem Commission) – these ‘confirm’ US biological weapons usage.

E. - Tibor Meray, a Hungarian journalist, reports in 1959 that Chinese officials had sold to Polish and Yugoslav counterparts that the allegations were likely a hoax.

F. - US government allegedly compiles with ex-Japanese WWII scientists involved in biological weapons development.

**Lesson 6.2 Overview**

Content covered in this lesson:

- Recap the key moments in the debate
- Examine and evaluate the evidence
- Summarise your conclusions
- Answer the enquiry question using appropriate language of certainty

**How strong is the evidence to support the claims that the USA used biological weapons in Korea?**

In this lesson, you are going to examine some of the evidence yourselves about whether or not the USA used biological weapons in the Korean War.

- The evidence itself is highly contested and you should treat it with caution.
- It is vital that you read not just what each source says, but also the information about its creation. This will help to determine whether it is strong or weak evidence.
- Some of the sources are documentary, while others provide factual information.

**Task**

You have been given ten sources of evidence to consider. They all relate somehow to the allegations that the USA used biological weapons in the Korean War.

Study the information and complete the table on the next slide (Resource sheet 6.2E).

**Source A**

‘In the light of all these and other similar facts, the Commission had no option but to conclude that the American Air Force was employing in Korea methods very similar to, if not exactly identical with, those employed to spread plague by the Japanese during the Second World War.’

**EVIDENCE PACK**

Information about the origins of the source

The International Scientific Commission for the investigation of the Facts concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China – Final Report. The Commission was headed by British scientist Joseph Needham, who had long been an expert on China.

The ISC was an organisation that was part of the World Peace Council – A Soviet-backed organisation designed to promote ‘peace’ around the world.

**Source B**

(The U.S. had been pursuing an active biological warfare program since 1941. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, the Americans absorbed the more advanced Japanese BW research and began an accelerated development program at Fort Detrick, Maryland and other secret facilities. They had already conducted secret tests by spraying anthrax over San Francisco Bay in Alaska and elsewhere. (Jha. invades in the German documentary CodeName Anthrax.) Now they had to test them in real war conditions, on ‘guinea’ and ‘nude’ that stubbornly refused to yield to conventional military force and the psychological superiority of the Goebbels and Himmler’s freshwater German Christian man. If you want to know how deadly and fundamentally racist the Korean War was, read Bruce Cumings’ excellent The Korean War.)

According to Sapozhnikov (a Russian biologist), dropping a few rats with plague-bearing-wheeled fleas, contaminated feathers, disease-carrying insects etc. into slave and famine areas where ‘hot rats’ were hiding was very tempting and effective, both on an experimental and operational level.

**EVIDENCE PACK**

Information about the origins of the source

From an article by George Burchett in Counterpunch (written in February 2018). Burchett is the grandson of Wilfred Burchett, a communist sympathising journalist from Australia. Counterpunch is a radical left-wing political magazine.

**Source C**

Information about the origins of the source

- Chinese propaganda poster from the Korean War era. The caption reads: “Vaccinate everyone, to crush the germ warfare of American imperialism!”
- The Chinese government launched a Patriotic Hygiene Campaign to fight back against the alleged biological attacks.
- The population was mobilised in a mass campaign to eradicate all fleas, rats, mosquitoes and flies in the country.
Section 3 | Enquiry 6
Contested evidence. Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?

ENQUIRY 6.2 (continued)

Source D

**Evidence Pack**

Information about the origins of the source

This is a Chinese photograph of a vial containing infected fleas allegedly spread by the United States.

Source F

**Evidence Pack**

Information about the origins of the source

The evidence used by historians like Milton Leitenberg to refute the Chinese and North Korean allegations has itself been challenged by other historians. The historians Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagermann have written extensively on US use of biological weapons and broadly agree that they were used. They say about Leitenberg’s evidence:

“The claim that two places were concocted to fool foreign visitors does not prove that all the sites of alleged biological warfare were also concocted. Our research in Chinese and Korean archives shows that the Chinese army in Korea and the Korean medical service serving with it identified occurrences of plague in 13 places during February and March 1952 as well as outbreaks of smallpox, enteric fever, and smallpox-like diseases. The Soviet documents, if they are genuine, add a twist to the main documentation which, so far, is to be found in the Chinese and United States archives. Questions raised by the documents about their source, who ordered the falsification of evidence, and motive would need to be resolved.”

Source H

**Evidence Pack**

Factual Information

- The United States gave immunity to Japanese scientists from Unit 731, which was a germ warfare research organisation from Japan during the Second World War.
- This was in exchange for obtaining the research data and information that they had developed.
- This information was withheld from other war-time allies and the grant of immunity was covered up by the USA for many decades.

Source I

**Evidence Pack**

Factual Information

- Two of the key sources of evidence produced by China and North Korea for allegations of germ warfare were captured US prisoners of war who co-operated in being involved in dropping infected insects in Korea and China.
- The USA claimed that these contortions were extracted as a result of torture and brainwashing.

Source J

**Evidence Pack**

Information about the origins of the source

“The Koreans stated that the Americans had supposedly repeatedly exposed several areas of their country to plague and cholera. To prove these facts, the North Koreans, with the assistance of our advisers, created false areas of exposure. In June–July 1952 a delegation of specialists in bacteriology from the World Peace Council [the Nieceham Commission] arrived in North Korea. Two false areas of exposure were prepared. In connection with this, the Koreans insisted on obtaining cholera bacteria from corpses which they would get from China.”

Source E

**Evidence Pack**

Information about the origins of the source

Written by historian Milton Leitenberg to the New York Review of Books in 2018. Leitenberg is a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland.

Source G

**Evidence Pack**

Information about the origins of the source

On 6 April 1952, the New York Times published an article demonstrating that the photos presented by the People’s Daily were fraudulent. It was pointed out by one scientist that infected lice and fleas would not be able to survive the freezing temperatures of North Korea in winter.

L Ji Shifang, a domestic opponent of the regime, said that “This is all communist propaganda in an attempt to get the world to hate America; don’t listen to all that rubbish!”

How certain can we be that the USA used biological weapons during the Korean War?

**Task**

Do you believe the allegations or not? “Yes” or “No” will do.

1. Now draw a line from the text box to the arrow showing how certain you are, based on the evidence that you’ve seen.
2. Then justify your choice in the text box, providing a balanced evaluation of the evidence you have examined.
**ENQUIRY 6.2 (continued)**

### Summary question: How convincing is the evidence about US biological warfare?

**Word bank:**
- USA
- China
- North Korea
- Soviet Union
- insects
- cholera
- plague
- Reedham Commission report
- Unit 731
- Leidenberg
- Pathologie Hygiene Campaign
- fraudulent
- hoax
- strong evidence
- convincing
- unconvincing
- Endo Scott-Hagemann

**Starter sentences:**
- The evidence against the USA is...
- The strengths/weaknesses of this evidence are...
- The USA claimed that...
- The strengths/weaknesses of the US evidence are...

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### Why is the use of biological weapons in the Korean War a controversial subject?

**Task**

Study this article then consider:

1. Why do you think the North Korean government still refers to these allegations of biological weapons usage in the present day?
2. What does that reveal about the wider debate?

---

Excerpt from the North Korean Pyongyang Times on 28 March 2019

The fact that US forces in South Korea have continued to push ahead with a plan for biocological warfare has recently been disclosed, giving rise to serious concern among the South Korean people. According to the biocological defense program budget assessment list for the 2019 fiscal year worked out by the US Department of Defense, the US earmarked US$15.14 million more budget, or 1.5 percent more than last year. For the budget plan, a biocological warfare plan targeting enemy biological weapons and agents, which last year totaled US$101.08 million, was increased to US$102.62 million this year. The US Defense Department noted that this increase is aimed at increasing the US forces' defensive capabilities, which is in line with the general biocological weapon policy and other related policies.

Already in 2018, the US made an experiment on germ weapons by shipping live anthrax into its base in Daejeon, Kangyung Province, and built a lab into its military base in Pyeongtaek in 2019 to conduct a bacteriological weapon development experiment. In April 2017, it brought relevant equipment for carrying out the biological weapon test at the No. 8 of Pusan port, a port for the US forces' exclusive use, which is furnished with the general biocological weapon and other related facilities.

Such moves are reminiscent of the attacks by the US forces committed in the past. During the Korean war (1950–1953), they used germ weapons, whose use had been prohibited worldwide, from the winter of 1951 in order to recover a war defeat.
ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY
This enquiry investigates why, despite the signing of an armistice in 1953, there has been no genuine peace in Korea. It explores the continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula during the following decades of the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. It incorporates recently unearthed and original primary sources, along with compelling historical interpretations.

The four lessons can be taught sequentially; however, there is also scope for their integration, as stand-alone lessons, at various points in an overall study of Korea in the Cold War or of contemporary international relations.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS

• Different interpretations as to why the Armistice took so long to arrange at the end of the Korean War.
• How primary source accounts of Korean civilians can further our understanding of the enduring impact of the Korean War.
• The academic analysis of the relationship between the USA, USSR and their allies in the Korean Peninsula.
• The ways in which the different sides in the Korean War, and the Cold War more widely, attempted to influence the narrative of the Korean War and its aftermath.

TARGET AGE RANGE

The lessons are primarily designed for A-level students, especially those taking modules on the Cold War. However, the focus on enhancing students’ skills in identifying and elaborating on the tone, utility and overall value of sources is very relevant to GCSE, and selected lessons or activities could be used in that context.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE

The continuous tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War serve as a key opportunity to explore the historical debate regarding why the conflict did not end.

The dominant historical focus on the Korean War has been on relations between the two superpowers and the tumultuous events of 1950. However, an often overlooked yet vital area of scholarly focus relates to why the war was prolonged beyond 1951, and also how tensions between North and South Korea have persisted after the war and even in the aftermath of the Cold War.
A range of historians, such as Weathersby, Cumings, Towle and Foot, have examined the reasons why the war continued beyond 1951. The traditional emphasis, evident in the work of Towle, has focused on the fractious negotiations between the two camps regarding prisoner of war exchanges. Weathersby, however, has centred her investigation on the role of the USSR and China persisting with the war, even in the face of opposition from North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, who was desperate to bring it to an end. Foot has given priority to the various factors that impinged on Eisenhower’s negotiating position and slowed the USA’s push for an armistice. Cumings has also furthered a ‘revisionist’ perspective by highlighting the perpetuation of US bombing on North Korea and its impact on the continuation of the war. An analysis of these various viewpoints thus gives students an opportunity to explore, in worthwhile depth, why the war did not end in 1951.

An overview of the civilian experiences of the war opens up another unexplored source of historical analysis that has been neglected. The work of authors such as Max Arthur and Joshua Levine has helped to highlight and sharpen historical analysis of military and civilian voices from World War I and II. The incorporation into the enquiry of personal accounts from Korean civilians enhances our understanding of what impact the conflict had on ordinary people and how the war has left a long-term effect.

The relationship between the two Koreas after the signing of the Armistice has been mostly neglected in Cold War depth studies. The relationship between the USSR and USA, along with their proxy allies, in the period of the 1960s to 1980s has predominantly focused on regions outside of Asia. However, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the period persisted, and, at various points, threatened to re-escalate into war. In classroom analysis, and in popular historical discourse, the relations between the superpowers and their proxies is treated as one of a dominant leader and a subservient follower. Although there has been a range of analyses of the USA’s relationship with the leadership in South Vietnam, analysis of the continued relationship with South Korea has been comparatively neglected. However, by investigating inter-Korean tensions, we can also investigate the degree of influence and control exercised by the USA and USSR over their allies. There is an opportunity to explore the extent to which the two superpowers ‘managed’ the dispute on the Peninsula and the occasions when it diverged from their allies. The question of whether the Koreas constitute ‘proxies’ can therefore be challenged and debated in the enquiry.

The enquiry continues beyond the Cold War to explore why there has still not been a peace treaty and why the divide on the Korean Peninsula remains one of the most intractable disputes in the contemporary era.

**CURRICULAR RATIONALE**

The scheme of work and activities have been framed to develop students’ abilities to evaluate primary sources and historical interpretations, as well as to understand the reasons the war continued.

It will be especially beneficial for students undertaking A-level modules related to the Cold War and international relations in Asia. The scheme is chronologically framed, so doing it as a continuous sequence at A-level should build a fuller, enhanced comprehension of why the conflict has proven to be intractable. Although the focus of the unit is on A-level courses, there are several activities that could be used with younger students as ways to introduce them to the process of using sources effectively.

A key aim of this unit is to improve students’ understanding of how differing interpretations of the past are constructed. The scheme of work has drawn inspiration from the 2004 HMI updates to McAleavy’s interpretation types (1993). A range of academic interpretations from historians have been incorporated, alongside fictional accounts from films and popular personal accounts to help students to develop their disciplinary skills.

Korean film clips have been included as part of the enquiry, drawing on the work of Lang (2002), who indicated that films can serve as a powerful medium to examine and evaluate differing interpretations of the past at A-level.
In selecting what sources to use and what activities to build to explore them, the enquiry has also drawn on the work of Riley (2000), who argued that sources need to be used as part of a cumulative journey with a clear purpose – specifically in this enquiry to comprehend why there has been no peace in Korea.

**SCHEME OF WORK**

**OVERVIEW**

The aim of the scheme of work is to develop a cohesive and developed understanding of why there has been no peace in Korea and why the conflict has proven so intractable. The scheme of work has also been framed to utilise primary sources and historical interpretations to enhance students’ conceptual understanding of causes and consequences, the role of evidence, and the similarities and differences in ordinary people’s experiences of war.

The scheme of work has been framed chronologically, with an overarching focus on key causal factors and events that have contributed towards the continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

By 1951, the war had essentially turned into one of stalemate with neither side close to a breakthrough. In Lesson 1, students analyse a range of historical interpretations for why the war dragged on until 1953.

As part of Lesson 2, students use primary accounts of Korean civilians to develop an understanding of how the war produced a range of similar and different experiences.

Lesson 3 centres on analysing and evaluating a range of factors and events connected to whether a war could have reoccurred on the Korean Peninsula in the remaining part of the Cold War.

The final lesson investigates why there has not been peace on the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War, with students giving an informed judgement based on their view of why the war has not ended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 1:</strong> Why did the Korean War drag on until 1953?</td>
<td>There will be an evaluation of historical viewpoints through an analysis of primary sources. Using primary sources, students are able to evaluate the viewpoints and make their own judgements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 2:</strong> How did the war leave an enduring impact on the Korean people?</td>
<td>Students analyse primary sources – accounts of Korean citizens’ experiences during the war. They will then create a memorial based on the experiences studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 3:</strong> Could a ‘hot war’ have erupted again in Korea during the Cold War?</td>
<td>Using primary sources to analyse key events in the Cold War era enables students to comprehend why the two Koreas did not find peace. It also allows students to investigate how and to what extent the ‘proxy’ allies abided by the direction of the major powers in the Cold War: the USA, USSR and China. Students will reach an overall judgement as to whether war could have reoccurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 4:</strong> Why has there not been peace in Korea even after the end of the Cold War?</td>
<td>Students analyse the various reasons as to why there has not been a rapprochement between the two Koreas since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a final exercise, students will be able to take on the role of negotiator in a mock summit, framed around finding the best potential solution to contemporary tensions on the Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCES**

LESSON 7.1 BREAKDOWN: WHY DID THE KOREAN WAR DRAG ON UNTIL 1953?

STARTER (SLIDES 1–4)

Slide 3 is a ‘think, pair, share’ activity. Using the image of the statue on the right side of the PowerPoint, students discuss the ‘starter questions’ on the left. Invite a variety of students to share responses in a whole-class discussion.

Background information:
The statue is in Seoul, South Korea. It is called the Statue of Brothers. It stands outside the Museum called ‘The War Memorial of Korea’, which was opened in 1994.

The upper part of the statue depicts a scene where an older brother, an officer in the South Korean army, and his younger brother, a North Korean soldier, meet in a battlefield and express reconciliation, love and forgiveness.

The lower tomb-shaped dome was built with pieces of granite collected from around Korea, symbolising the sacrifices made by Korean patriots.

ACTIVITY 1: HOW THE WAR OF MOVEMENT TURNED INTO A WAR OF STALEMATE (SLIDES 5–6)

Slide 5: Read the overview text on the slides, explaining how the nature of the war shifted. The maps come from an animated GIF that shows the changing frontline. It can be found here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War#/media/File:Korean_war_1950-1953.gif

Slide 6: Then students watch the trailer for the South Korean film The Frontline. The link is on the slide. As they watch, they should note down any key features of the war that are evident in the clip. Pay attention to both the translated dialogue and the visuals in the action. They could work in pairs – one watching the imagery, the other focusing on the subtitles.

ACTIVITY 2: WHY DID THE KOREAN WAR NOT END IN 1951? HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS (SLIDES 7–11)

This is an individual activity. Students complete the table on Slide 7 by summarising the main views of the historians on Slides 8–11. The table is larger on Resource sheet 7.1A (page 1), and the sources from Slides 8–11 are on pages 2–5.

The final two columns are an extension activity requiring independent research using the Internet and articles or book reviews online.

Here is a link that they might follow for Katherine Weathersby:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhEYUXaRul4
ACTIVITY 3: WHY DID THE WAR DRAG ON FOR TWO MORE YEARS AFTER 1951?
PRIMARY SOURCES (SLIDES 12–20)

Slide 12 provides a link to the next activity. It is a newsreel account of the signing of the Armistice. Note the tone of the narrator, who does not sound at all confident that the war is really over! The sense is of a significant moment but ‘lots of work still to do’.

Slide 13: Activity 3, then, is an individual activity. Students complete the table (also available in larger size as Resource sheet 7.1C (page 1)). They use the primary sources from Slides 14–20 (available as pages 2–8 of Resource sheet 7.1B). They focus on both content and overall value of the sources.

PLENARY (SLIDE 20)

Whole-class discussion returning to the key question for the lesson: Why did the Korean War drag on until 1953?

Encourage students to refer to the views of the historians that they have read and the primary sources that they have analysed to support their viewpoint.

LESSON 7.2 BREAKDOWN: HOW DID THE WAR LEAVE AN ENDURING IMPACT ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE?

STARTER (SLIDES 1–3)

Slide 2 is a ‘think, pair, share’ activity. Students explore the meaning of the statue shown on the introductory slide, using the questions as a stimulus. Encourage them to engage with it before you feed in the background information below as part of the class discussion.

Background information:
The statue is in Seoul. Like the memorial that started Lesson 7.1, it stands outside the museum called ‘The War Memorial of Korea’, which was opened in 1994.

This statue presents a heroic image of the South Korean war effort, with soldiers leading the people onwards. The statue is principally a South Korean nationalist/conservative view of the war as a common and arduous struggle led by the army. However, later perspectives throughout the enquiry will demonstrate that this is not always the received view of the conflict in South Korea. In particular, the primary source accounts used in this lesson expose flaws in the notion of a shared, proud and heroic experience.

The message of this statue and monument can be contrasted with the image that started Lesson 1. It can also be contrasted with a number of the survivor testimonies used in latter parts of the lesson.

ACTIVITY 1: HOW DID THE WAR LEAVE AN ENDURING IMPACT ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE? (SLIDES 4–13)

Slides 4–5 give an overview of the general experiences of South Korean citizens. You can read it and elaborate as much as is needed.

Slide 6 sets up the source activity. Explain it and model how to answer the questions using one of the sources – ideally Source 1 on Slide 7. Indicate the areas/columns of the table that need to be completed.

BEFORE YOU START

You will need:
• Lesson PowerPoint 7.2
• Resource sheet 7.2A (Activity 1 recording sheet and source pack)

NB Some sources are oral testimonies on YouTube, so students will need online access.
The table is available on Resource sheet 7.2A (page 1), and the sources from Slides 7–13 are on pages 2–8 of Resource sheet 7.2A.

Note 1: Sources 3, 4 and 8 require students to watch YouTube clips, so online access will be needed.

Note 2: if you are pressed for time you can leave out Sources 8 and 9.

Note 3: Students may note the absence of accounts from North Korea. The reason is that there are very few recorded accounts from civilians who lived through the war in North Korea. However, there are accounts in the sources, such as President Moon’s account (Source 6) of people who fled the North as refugees to the South.

**ACTIVITY 2: A MONUMENT TO KOREAN WAR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (SLIDE 14)**

Students should design (or simply describe) what they think would be a suitable monument or other form of remembrance of the Korean War and its impact on civilians.

**PLENARY (SLIDE 15)**

The plenary returns to the key question for the lesson: How did the war leave an enduring impact on the Korean people?

In pairs, students discuss the questions on Slide 15. Elicit responses from a range of students in the class. Encourage them to base their contributions on the sources they have examined.

**BEFORE YOU START**

You will need:

- Lesson PowerPoint 7.3
- Resource sheet 7.3A (Activity 1 photo sheet and sorting card descriptions to match them)
- Resource sheet 7.3B (Activity 2 plotting the events on maps)
- Resource sheets 7.3C (Activity 3 factor packs x 9 – one for each event)

NB Some sources are YouTube video clips, so students will need online access.

**LESSON 7.3 BREAKDOWN: COULD A ‘HOT WAR’ HAVE ERUPTED AGAIN IN KOREA DURING THE COLD WAR?**

**STARTER (SLIDES 1–3)**

Slide 2 is a ‘think, pair, share’ activity. Students consider the photo of the border area. Use the questions as stimulus. Encourage them to engage with it before you feed in the background information about the border area as part of the class discussion.

**ACTIVITY 1: HOW DID COLD WAR TENSIONS CONTINUE TO SHAPE EVENTS IN KOREA? (SLIDES 4–6)**

Activity 1 is a simple sorting exercise to introduce the events, developments and factors that will then be analysed through the rest of the lesson.

Show the images on Slide 4. Give out the Resource sheet 7.3A, which has the images and the descriptions A to I (which students can cut up and use as sorting cards if they wish). They match the images to the event and arrange the cards in a chronological order.

Note: Cards that cover the whole period can be placed at the beginning.
ACTIVITY 2: HOW DID COLD WAR TENSIONS CONTINUE TO SHAPE EVENTS IN KOREA? (CONTINUED) (SLIDES 7–8)

Ideally, this should be a pair activity: On the maps provided (also as Resource sheet 7.3B), students identify where each event mentioned in Activity 1 took place or where the factors occurred.

Additional questions for the students to consider while plotting the events/factors:

- What does the geographic spread of the events reveal about the nature of the conflict?
- Why did some of the events occur outside of Korea?
- What might this reveal about connections between the Koreas and Cold War allies?

ACTIVITY 3: COULD WAR HAVE BROKEN OUT AGAIN? (SLIDES 9–40)

Students ideally work in a group of three.

Each group needs a ‘war and peace’ arrow, as on Slide 9. Ideally get them to draw their own, or you could make a large one for them.

Each group also gets a range of sources related to three different events/factors, i.e. they investigate three different events/factors. You will see that some sources are shorter and simpler than others, so you might differentiate for accessibility or extra challenge for certain groups. The factor packs are on Slides 10–40 and on Resource sheet 7.3C.

- One group gets factors 1–3 (Slides 10–19).
- Another group gets factors 4–6 (Slides 20–31).
- The final group gets factors 7–9 (Slides 32–40).

The first page of each ‘pack’ summarises the event and provides some questions, then the following pages have a range of sources.

After answering the individual questions related to their three factors, the students should then discuss as their group where on the arrow they would place their factor and justify to the group why they have made their decision.
PLENARY: COULD A ‘HOT WAR’ HAVE ERUPTED AGAIN IN KOREA DURING THE COLD WAR? (SLIDES 41–42)

Slide 41 reviews Activity 3. As a whole class, discuss the various factors and where on the war/peace arrow students would put the factors, using the evidence they have been provided with.

This will merge naturally into the second part of the plenary (on Slide 42), which returns to the lesson question: “Could a “hot war” have erupted again in Korea during the Cold War?” and “Why did the conflict not finish with the end of the Cold War?”

LESSON 7.4 BREAKDOWN: WHY HAS THERE NOT BEEN PEACE IN KOREA EVEN AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR?

BEFORE YOU START

You will need:
• Lesson PowerPoint 7.4
• Resource sheet 7.4A (Recording sheet and Factor packs for Activity 1)

STARTER (SLIDES 1–3)

This is a ‘think, pair, share’ activity.

What do you think are the main obstacles to peace on the Korean Peninsula? Encourage students to base this on the work in the last lesson.

ACTIVITY 1: WHY HAS THERE BEEN NO PEACE TREATY? (SLIDES 4–22)

This is a carousel activity that will take at least half a lesson.

Information related to various factors that have prevented a peace treaty will be placed around the room. There are nine stations corresponding to the different factors. The factors are on Slides 5–20 and Resource sheet 7.4A, and are colour-coded for easy recognition.

• Factor 1: North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme
• Factor 2: Defectors
• Factor 3: North Korea’s human rights record
• Factor 4: US–Republic of Korea wargames
• Factor 5: ‘The Sunshine Policy’
• Factor 6: Bush – ‘axis of evil’ and sanctions
• Factor 7: Border clashes 2010: The sinking of the Cheonan and the attack on Yeonpyeong island, 2010
• Factor 8: New leaders: Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump
• Factor 9: Moon’s new ‘sunshine policy’ and summit diplomacy

Students circulate the room and fill in their table (Resource sheet 7.4A (page 1)), recording reasons why there has been no peace treaty.

Alternatively, you could have the students sitting still and the information being passed around table to table.

The groups will work at different speeds and the factors vary in complexity, but try to enforce a three-minute limit per factor, and then move to the next factor.
ACTIVITY 2: UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE – NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR MISSILE TEST
(SLIDE 21)

As preparation for the debate, the teacher sets the scene of the simulation:

Read the script: ‘Key global leaders have been requested to attend an emergency summit meeting in response to a recent missile launch by North Korea. Your role as a delegate from [a participant nation] will be to ensure that North Korea does not carry out another launch. Furthermore, you will work with others to seek a solution to the overarching tensions on the Korean Peninsula.’

A group of two to four students will then be given the role as the delegate team of an attending member state. The participant states include: South Korea, North Korea, USA, China and Russia (additional nations can include Britain or the EU).

Assign a role to each student: one student is the main delegate and another one or two students are supporting delegates. Students would need time to prepare for the three main areas of focus.

Note: This may require an additional lesson to allow time for research and preparation.

As a delegate representing a participant nation, the student’s role is to identify how they would seek de-nuclearisation and consider:

• what their demands may be
• what likely demands North Korea or other powers are likely to make
• how they may respond to those demands

Students would need to prepare an opening speech of one minute, stating their view in relation to how they would seek de-nuclearisation and what their demands may be.

THE DEBATE

• The debate would begin with an introduction by the teacher, who acts as the chair of the debate.
• Each participant state would give their opening speech of one minute.
• The floor would then be opened up by the chair (the teacher) to a moderated caucus. Students can challenge views or suggestions put forward by different speakers. They would make a request to speak by raising their hands. The teacher would call upon speakers to state their view.
• After a period of ten to 20 minutes of moderated caucus, the session can then be opened up for an unmoderated caucus, where delegates can seek to find common allies to draw up a shared agenda and written resolution, based on what they intend to do; allow 20 minutes. This would be done in a free format, in which students interact and find common agreement.
• Finally, the students would present different resolutions. After hearing the various resolutions, there would then be a vote on the different resolutions. The resolution with the highest approval rating would be passed.
• Props may be used – e.g. a blonde wig for the representative of the USA.

PLENARY (SLIDE 22)

How you handle this will depend on how the debate (Activity 3) has gone or whether you have tackled it at all.

But this returns to the theme of the whole enquiry: Why has there been no peace in Korea?
Enquiry 7: An unfinished war. Why was there no peace in Korea?

Lesson 7.1: Why did the Korean War drag on until 1953?

Starters

The statue on the right is called ‘The Statue of Brothers’. It is in Seoul, South Korea.

- Who do you think the figures at the top represent?
- What do you think the dome they are standing on represents?
- What impression of the war does this give you?
- What do you think is this statue’s main message?

How the war of movement turned into a stalemate

For a period of a year, the frontline in Korea moved dramatically. The initial invasion of the North pushed UN and South Korean forces to the Pusan Perimeter. After MacArthur’s landing of troops at Inchon and the UN advance northward, the front was pushed up towards the Chinese border.

However, by April 1951, the war had become bogged down into a stalemate, with skirmishes and battles fought over mountains and passes that were claimed, lost, then reclaimed by both sides. There was no sign of a decisive breakthrough on either side. Yet this war dragged on for another two years. Why, therefore, did peace talks drag on for two years?

Why did the Korean War not end in 1951?

Activity 2

Complete column 2 of this table using the interpretations on slides 8–11.

Extension: Understand that both historians and contemporary writers have used different sources to reach their conclusions. They have a particular viewpoint that shapes their analysis.

Lesson 7.4 Why has there not been peace in Korea even after the end of the Cold War?

Introduction to the Armistice
LESSON 7.2

Lesson 7.2: How did the war leave an enduring impact on the Korean people?

Starter

- What does this memorial show?
- What are the figures doing?
- Who are the figures representing?
- Where do you think the monument is located?
- What does this suggest about the nature of the war in Korea?
- What does it indicate about how the war may be viewed in Korea?

What was the general experience of war for Korean civilians?

- The Korean War was in large part a civil war. It had a direct impact on many Korean people across the Peninsula. It is estimated that over 2 million civilians from North and South Korea perished or went missing during the war.
- Those that survived were subjected to a range of hardships. A majority of people in areas where fighting occurred were robbed or conscripted to fight or work for the occupiers. A large number fled and became refugees.
- Families were divided. Many were traumatised by their experiences and struggled to survive in the harsh mountainous climate of the country.
- A substantial number did escape to safer areas, one example being the evacuation from Hungnam in North Korea by ship to South Korea.
- However, the daily grind of life in a war-torn country remained harsh. US and UN allies provided aid to the often starving and distraught people.

How did the war leave an enduring impact on the Korean people?

Activity 1

Use Sources 1–9 on the following slides and Resource sheet 7.2A to record answers to these questions.

Experience
What was the individual’s experience during the war?

Nature of war
What can you learn about the nature of the war from this account?

Impact
What was the long-term impact of the war on the individual?

Usefulness
How is the source valuable for understanding how Korean people experienced the war?

EVIDENCE PACK

Source 1:
“A child’s life during the Korean War” (The story of Jeom Yong Yeum)

I was 12 years old when the war started... At the time, I was a sixth grader, first year in middle school. During the time, because I was so young, I didn’t realise it was a war until after the war was over. I later heard on the news that there had been a war... I was not able to attend school because I remember that all the buildings were on fire. There was no classroom so I had to study underneath trees. When I was 12 years old, I had to carry rice on my back and wear the same clothes to walk 40 kilometres down the road to the nearest city. It was very tiring finding new refuge.

Video available at
www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_TekZh_5k

Lesson 7.2 overview and aims

In this lesson you will:

- Analyse how the Korean War impacted Korean civilians.
- Examine how the war left an enduring impact on people’s lives.
- Design and create a memorial dedicated to the civilian casualties of the Korean War.

What was the general experience of war for Korean civilians?

These are some of the hundreds of thousands of Koreans who fled south in the mid-1950s after the North Korean army struck across the border. Rumours spread among US troops that the refugee columns contained North Korean infiltrators, so the refugees themselves were sometimes subject to attack.

LESSON 7.1

Why did the Korean War drag on until 1953?

Activity 3

Complete this table using Sources 1–7 on slides 14–20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Its view on why there was a delay to the Armistice</th>
<th>Preference</th>
<th>Note and opinions</th>
<th>Source and evidence</th>
<th>Last date and reasons why the Armistice was delayed</th>
<th>Last date and reasons why the Armistice was delayed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Plenary

- Overall, what do you think was the main factor that contributed towards prolonging the war until 1953?
- Why do you think there was no peace treaty?
LESSON 7.2 (continued)

Activity 2
If you were to create a monument or other form of remembrance of the Korean War and its impact on civilians, what would you create? Design your idea and explain the reasons for your choice.

LESSON 7.3

Lesson 7.3: Could a ‘hot war’ have erupted again in Korea during the Cold War?

How did Cold War tensions continue to shape events in Korea?

Activity 1
- Match these images (shown larger on Slide 6) with the descriptions on Slide 5.
- Arrange the cards in chronological order.

Note: Cards that cover the whole period can be placed at the beginning.

LESSON 7.3 Overview and aims

In this lesson you will:
- Identify and sort the main events and factors that shaped inter-Korean relations from 1953 to the end of the Cold War.
- Analyse and evaluate primary sources related to the key events and factors that shaped diplomatic tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
- Reach a judgement on whether there was a potential for a reoccurrence of war in Korea during the Cold War.
LESSON 7.3 (continued)

How did Cold War tensions continue to shape events in Korea?

Activity 2
1. On these two maps, mark where each event or factor on Slides 5 and 6 took place or occurred. Use the larger maps on Slide 8 or Resource sheet 7.3B.
2. Add additional questions.
3. What does the geographic spread of the events reveal about the nature of the conflict?
4. Why did some of the events occur outside of Korea?
5. What might this reveal about connections between the Koreas and Cold War allies?

Could war have broken out again?

Activity 3
Work in a group of three. You will be given three of these events/factors to examine in detail.
1. Together, answer the questions that relate to each of your events/factors. The questions are in your source packs.
2. After answering the questions, discuss as a group where on the war/peace arrow you would put each event/factor, based on the evidence you have been given.

EVENTFACTOR CARD 1

Syngman Rhee removed from power
Syngman Rhee was forced from power in South Korea. After rigged elections were held, student protests successfully pushed for the resignation of Rhee. For a year, a fragile democratic government administered the country. A military coup led by General Park Chung Hee in 1961 ended the short democracy.

Activity 3A
Use your Sources 1–2 to find out:
1. What do the sources suggest about why Rhee was removed?
2. Do the sources agree at all? How do they differ?
3. Are the sources useful?
4. Using the sources, what impact did the event have on inter-Korean relations?

EVENTFACTOR CARD 2

Propaganda campaigns
Both North and South Korea continued propaganda campaigns throughout the period. Propaganda in the North was (and still is) used to promote the cult of the leader, anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism, as well as to emphasise ‘Juche’—self-reliance. Films, music and media were censored on both sides of the Peninsula.

Activity 3B
Use your Sources 3–7 to find out:
1. What do the sources reveal about the various methods of propaganda that have been used by North and South Korea throughout the conflict?
2. How did propaganda serve to maintain tensions on the Korean Peninsula? What was the effect of the propaganda on ordinary people?
3. How useful are the sources for an understanding of how propaganda was used to maintain Cold War tensions on the Peninsula?

EVENTFACTOR CARD 3

Kim Il Sung
Kim Il Sung maintained power from 1953–1994, when he died from a stroke. He used a mix of propaganda, terror and ideology to maintain control over North Korea throughout the period.

Activity 3C
Use your Sources 8–10 to find out:
How did the continued reign of Kim provoke a continuation of tensions on the Peninsula?

EVENTFACTOR CARD 4

Raids
In January 1968, a team of 31 North Korean commandos was sent to South to assassinate President Park Chung-Hee. They were intercepted by South Korean security forces. All but two were killed.

Activity 3D
Use your Sources 11–15 to find out:
1. What does the Soviet reaction to the attempted assassination on Park suggest about North Korean-Soviet relations?
2. Why and how does the Chinese view of North Korea’s actions differ to that of the USSR? (Source 11 and 13)
3. Can movies serve as useful tools of information/interpretations of an event? What are their strengths/limitations? (Source 15)
4. Why did the attempted assassinations not result in war?
LESSON 7.3 (continued)

The Vietnam War
South Korea became involved in the Vietnam War. President Park sent troops in 1964 to support the US intervention. 350,000 South Korean soldiers served in the war until their withdrawal in 1973. South Korea's decision to join resulted from various underlying causes, including the development of US-ROK relations, political benefits and the promise of economic aid from the United States. North Korea also sought to give aid and assistance to North Vietnam.

Activity 3E
Use your Sources 18–18 to find out:
1. What did the two Koreas achieve/hope to achieve from the Vietnam War?
2. What does Y. Kim in Source 17 indicate about why South Korea was worsening the situation in Vietnam?
3. Did participation in the war have a deep impact on inter-Korean relations?

The Axe Murder Incident, 1976
After a short period of détente in the early 1970s, tensions resurfaced with the Axe Murder Incident in 1976, which raised the prospect of a renewal in armed conflict. North Korean soldiers attacked an American work party trying to chop down a tree inside the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Two US army officers were killed in what became known as the ‘Axe Murder Incident’. Readiness levels for American troops in Korea were raised to DEFCON 3 and rocket attacks were considered. However, the South Korean president did not push for military action.

Activity 3F
Use your sources 15–22 to find out:
1. Were the US preparations for cutting down the tree on the second attempt an indication that war was a strong likelihood?
2. What do the Soviet and Chinese accounts (Sources 21 and 22) suggest about their perspective on the Axe Murder Incident?
3. Which source has the most value for gaining an understanding of why the incident did not escalate into war?

Assassination, coup and popular uprising
President Park was assassinated by his intelligence chief after an argument in 1979. A military coup directed by Chun Doo-hwan was opposed by protesters in the city of Gwangju, in May 1980. Student demonstrations, labelled as ‘communist sympathizers’, were brutally put down, with around 190 killed. ‘The uprising failed, but served to inspire pro-democracy movements in the latter part of the decade.

Activity 3G
Use your sources 23–27 to find out:
1. Was the North involved in instigating the riots in the city of Gwangju?
2. What do the sources suggest about America’s view of the Chun dictatorship and its actions in Gwangju?
3. What does the incident reveal about the relationship between the USA and its Cold War ally at the beginning of the ‘Second Cold War’?

Attacks
- North Korea attempted to kill South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan by planting a bomb in a museum in Yangon, Myanmar, during a visit by Chun. He survived but 22 people, including some government ministers, were killed.
- On 29 November 1987, a bomb planted on a Korean Air flight exploded over the Amurian Sea, killing all 115 people on board. Seoul accused Pyongyang, which denied involvement.

Activity 3H
Use your sources 28–30 to find out:
1. What do the attacks indicate about the North’s actions/approach in the 1980s? What was the nature of the attacks?
2. Was North Korea responsible for both attacks?
3. Do the concerns outlined by Kim Il Sung show that the North was less inclined to seek a confrontation? (Source 31)

Democracy
Pro-democracy movements swept South Korea. Free elections were held in 1987. After the release of Communists in the USDB in 1989, Kim II Sung was deprived of resources and support. This contributed to the North Korean famine in the mid-1990s. However, Kim continued to maintain firm control over North Korea and accelerated the development of a nuclear weapons capability.

Activity 3I
Use your Source 31 to find out:
1. What does the source suggest about how the USDB’s recognition of South Korea impacted on North Korea’s policy?
2. Is the source valuable in developing an understanding of why the end of the Cold War did not lead to peace on the Korean Peninsula?

Was a reoccurrence of war likely during the Cold War?

Activity 4
1. Where on this line would you place the events/factors you have studied?

2. Overall, was there the potential for a reoccurrence of war?

Peace
War
Lesson 7.4: Why has there not been peace in Korea even after the end of the Cold War?

**Starter**

What do you think are the main obstacles to peace on the Korean Peninsula?

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Lesson 7.4 Overview and aims

In this lesson you will:

- Identify and explain the main reasons why there has been no peace treaty in Korea after the end of the Cold War.
- Debate what may be the most effective means by which to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and move towards a permanent peace.

---

Lesson 7.4: Why has there not been peace in Korea even after the end of the Cold War?

---

Why has there been no peace treaty?

**Activity 1**

Around the room you will find sources and information about the main issues that have shaped relations on the Korean Peninsula from 1901 to the present. Some have improved relations; some have harmed them.

Analyse the information and sources using a table like this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How have these events made tensions worse?</td>
<td>Why may all this affect e.g. North Korea/USA?</td>
<td>How have these events made tensions worse?</td>
<td>How have these events made tensions worse?</td>
<td>How have these events made tensions worse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, pre-2015</td>
<td>Example 1: Song Byok</td>
<td>Source 3A: From an article by the Reuters news agency, 12 December 2019. News agencies research stories and then sell them to other organisations such as newspapers or TV networks</td>
<td>• The United States has had a military presence in South Korea for decades, which it and South Korea have long maintained as a deterrent against regional aggression.</td>
<td>The US has adopted a policy that permits conflict as a means of dealing with the threat posed by North Korea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Factor 1: North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, pre-2015

- 1990: Research reactor in Yongbyon is operational.
- 1994: North Korea agrees to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to access to nuclear facilities.
- 1995: North Korea withdraws from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- 2006: North Korea test fires a long-range missile.
- 2011: North Korea announces that it has conducted a nuclear test.
- 2013: North Korea announces that it has conducted a second nuclear test.
- 2015: North Korea announces that it has conducted a third nuclear test.
- 2017: North Korea announces that it has conducted a fourth nuclear test.
- 2018: North Korea announces that it has conducted a fifth nuclear test.
- 2019: North Korea announces that it has conducted a sixth nuclear test.
- 2020: North Korea announces that it has conducted a seventh nuclear test.
- 2021: North Korea announces that it has conducted an eighth nuclear test.
- 2022: North Korea announces that it has conducted a ninth nuclear test.
- 2023: North Korea announces that it has conducted a tenth nuclear test.

---

Factor 2: Defectors

**Example 1: Song Byok**

Song Byok was a prominent artist. His father drowned on their first attempt to cross the Yalu river, in 2008. When the artist finally left North Korea in 2009, he brought photos of his family with him.

**Source 2A:**

‘I was tortured by the Korean plate security in 2008, she yelled out loud, “I’ll have you both stoned in two months!” She beat me and tried to make me sign the document making my family leave…’

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Factor 3: North Korea’s human rights record

**Source 3A:**

From an article by the Reuters news agency, 12 December 2019. News agencies research stories and then sell them to other organisations such as newspapers or TV networks.

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Factor 4: US–Republic of Korea wargames

- The United States has had a military presence in South Korea for decades, which it and South Korea have long maintained as a deterrent against regional aggression.
- North Korea and China see the presence of US troops in South Korea as a threat and an affront. China has grown especially concerned by the US placement of a new anti-ballistic missile system, THAAD, in South Korea.

---

Factor 5: ‘The Sunshine policy’

The idea behind the policy was that persuasion was better than force, and that dialogue and economic sanctions would help to change the North and the future peace between the two Koreas.

- 2004: Two Koreas sign a joint Declaration of Seoul to restart six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.
- 2006: Six-party talks are launched.
- 2007: The Six-Party talks continue, but without any significant progress.
- 2008: The Six-Party talks are suspended.
- 2009: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2010: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2011: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2012: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2013: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2014: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2015: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2016: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
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- 2019: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2020: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2021: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2022: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2023: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2024: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2025: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2026: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2027: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
- 2028: The Six-Party talks resume, but without any significant progress.
Lesson 7.4 (continued)

Section 3 | Enquiry 7 An unfinished war. Why was there no peace in Korea?

Factor 6: Bush – ‘Axis of evil’ and sanctions

In January 2002, US President George W Bush labelled North Korea, Iraq and Iran an ‘axis of evil’ for continuing to build weapons of mass destruction. Bush was critical of the United Nations and said that no members of the UN’s most powerful body had refused to join the US-led ¿ONTO.

However, Bush was unable to prevent North Korea from doing so. It tested its first weapon in 2006 and later developed a delivery system.

Source: Extract from an article in the Irish Times newspaper.

Pyongyang accused Washington of adopting a hostile and aggressive stance and initiating the two sides toward renewed conflict. Critics of the new attack are North Korean, who condemned Mr Bush’s harsh words, saying they would only prompt more conflict.

The North¿s official Korea Central News Agency said: ‘The remarks were mainly US statements aimed at continuing with its policy of aggression against us. The remarks were also aimed at justifying the dispatch of US troops to the South and keeping up its hostile and aggressive policy.’

Factor 7: Border clashes 2010

The sinking of the Cheonan, March 2010

A South Korean warship, the Cheonan, was sunk near the disputed sea border with North Korea off Yeonpyeong island. Forty-six of 104 South Korean sailors on board were killed or missing.

A multinational investigative team led by South Korean military concluded that the warship was sunk by a North Korean torpedo from a midget submarine.

North Korea denied involvement. Its state¿run newspaper ‘Yŏngbyŏng’ commented: ‘The Cheonan sinking was fabricated by pro-US conservative administrations seeking to induce a standoff between the two Koreas.’

Factor 8: Kim Jong-un takes control

2018: May – The ruling Workers Party holds its first congress in almost 40 years, during which Kim Jong-un is elected leader of the party, although he has been chairman of the party since 2012.

2018: November – UN Security Council further tightens sanctions by imposing new sanctions on North Korea’s main exports, coal, by 50%.

2017: January – Kim Jong-un says that North Korea is in the final stages of developing long-range guided missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

2017: February – Kim Jong-un’s estranged half-brother Kim Jong-nam is killed by a highly toxic nerve agent in Malaysia, with investigations suspecting North Korean involvement.

UN Security Council debate: North Korea nuclear missile test

Activity 2

The scenario is that North Korea has just tested a new nuclear weapon. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have reached an all-time high. You are a delegate representing a participating nation. Your role is to identify:

a) how you would seek de-nuclearisation
b) what your demands may be
c) what likely demands North Korea or other powers are likely to make
d) how you may respond to those demands

Factor 9: Moon’s new sunshine policy and summit diplomacy, 2018

Moon’s new sunshine policy

2018: January – First talk in ten years between North and South Korea begins.

2018: April – Kim Jong-un becomes first North Korean leader to enter the South when he meets South Korean President Moon Jae-in for talks at the Panmunjom border crossing. They agree to end hostile actions and work towards reducing nuclear arms on the Peninsula.

Source: Comment by Robert Kelly, Korea analyst at the Lany Institute. The Lany Institute is an independent think tank that funds scholars to write articles on international affairs. The core argument of Kissinger’s statement – the idea that Kissinger’s article will be read by many people, even if it means undermining the views of the US, Japan, and the South Korean right are actually making the problem worse. The American relationship is not so great, that the US is often blamed for supporting repressive regimes in pre-democratic South Korea. And there is an increasing suspicion that the US military presence here magnifies South Korean foreign policy, a neo-colonial critique.”

The attack on Yeonpyeong island, November 2010

North Korea fired 170 artillery rounds, which killed two South Korean marines and two civilians and destroyed more than a dozen homes. This was the first attack on a civilian location since the 1953 truce. The South fired 110 rounds in return.

North Korea insisted that it did not fire first and blamed the South for the incident.

Sending was criticized for its late and weak response. It sent more troops and equipment but not the islands. The United Nations condemned. Most civilians left the island. Six days later, the US and South Korean forces, including an aircraft carrier, started exercises in the same area.
ENQUIRY OUTLINE

SUMMARY

The enquiry seeks to use British responses to the Korean War as a means to examine, in greater depth than might usually be the case, who ran Britain, for what purposes and by what means in the early Cold War years. The enquiry considers the responses of the Labour and Conservative governments of the period and institutions wielding power and influence that were not subject to the electoral process, such as the Civil Service and the army, which Hennessey (2013) has dubbed the ‘permanent state’. The enquiry will use both primary sources and wide-ranging scholarship. The latter will facilitate considerations of the purpose of disparate scholars when writing history.

KEY AREAS OF FOCUS

• The responses of the Labour and Conservative governments of the period to the Korean War and the motives and intentions behind these responses.

• The position and influence of the ‘permanent state’ on policy in Korea.

• Differing scholarly responses to all of the above issues.

TARGET AGE RANGE

The lessons are designed for use with Key Stage 5, although the content and skills are relevant to some GCSE courses.

SCHOLARLY RATIONALE

Different historians have taken different approaches to analysing the decision-making process behind British entry into the Korean War.

Recent ‘New Cold War’ historiography is paying closer attention to British influence on the US in the early years of the conflict. Kent (2005) argues that Britain encouraged US anti-communism and consequent ‘containment’ of the USSR. Britain wanted to protect its imperial interests but was not strong enough to do so. It therefore tried to co-opt the US into an anti-Soviet crusade, enabling British interests to be protected and forging a closer US–British relationship. Dockrill (1986) highlights how British intervention in Korea was motivated by a need to sustain the close relationship that had been developed with the US, founded on anti-communism, as Washington was insistent that Britain supply ground troops as part of the UN forces and so London complied.
However, the approach of the likes of Dockrill is at odds with the scholarship of contemporary leftist historians of British foreign policy. For example, Curtis (2003) questions British foreign policy through judicious interrogation of Britain’s motivations and its support for undemocratic regimes such as that of Syngman Rhee. Curtis argues that policies that are referred to by many historians as being ‘national’ or ‘imperial’ are invariably policies that also serve the interests of the British elite and/or its associated corporations.

Curtis (2003) also argues that there was a shared mindset between governments, the military and the Civil Service, to a great extent based on the fact that these elites generally came from very similar backgrounds, had the same schooling and consequently had a similar take on what Britain’s role in the world should be. In a similar vein, Hopkins (2001) has focused on the actions of Britain’s ‘permanent state’. Hopkins highlights the influence of British Ambassador to the USA Oliver Franks on British entry into the Korea conflict.

Huxford’s recent work (2018) has moved on to analysing the media response to British intervention in the Korean War and has also considered the treatment of dissenting voices who challenged the intervention. Huxford acknowledges the critique of British motivations offered during the conflict by one of these dissenters, the British Communist Party leader Pollitt (1951), where he notes an economic motivation for US–UK combat. However, contemporary historiography is yet to consider applying Hermann and Chomsky’s (1988) Manufacturing Consent position to the study of the Korean War, regarding the media’s role in supporting governing elite interests and marginalising dissent, even though such a line has been applied to other conflicts. This study will allow A-level students the capacity to engage with these ideas.

A similar situation can be seen with Gramsci (2005), an Italian neo-Marxist, and his seminal theory of ‘hegemony’. He argues that the media plays a key (super-structural, i.e. overarching) role in reinforcing the current economic system and the pre-eminence of the elites, by depicting events in a fashion beneficial to these elites.

REFERENCES


CURRICULAR RATIONALE

This enquiry is unashamedly ambitious – venturing into intellectual territory that most A-level classes never visit.

This enquiry seeks to advance students’ command of governance and elite power structures in Britain during the early stages of the Cold War, through a study of British responses to the Korean War. In the process, students will engage with original source material and consider what historians see as the purpose of their discipline and what influences their approach.

The resource is relevant to many options within A-level history courses that focus on British government and foreign policy, for example:

- Edexcel Paper 1, Option 1H: Britain transformed, 1918–97
- OCR History Unit Y113: Britain 1930–1997, with this latter including a designated focus on the Korean War

Moreover, some A-level modules have historical interpretations-focused bullet points, to which this enquiry readily applies, e.g. AQA unit 1G ‘Challenge and transformation: Britain, c1851–1964’, ensuring a relevant (however artificial the dichotomy might be) skills focus.
Yet extensive perusal of A-level textbooks and other resources pertaining to modern British history suggests that while diverse leftist scholarship relating to this period has permeated academia, it receives minimal attention at post-16 level (and arguably even less at Key Stage 3 or 4). This resource aims to rectify this situation. By accessing the radical questioning approaches of historians such as Curtis, Herman and Chomsky and Gramsci to a study of British responses to the Korean War, the resource will enable learners to ask penetrating questions about elite power in Britain during the early years of the Cold War, which they would otherwise probably not get access to, and so advance their historical understanding.

Furthermore, by bringing such scholarship into the history classroom, the resource aims to foster deeper analysis of what lies behind the construction of historical works, how the types of sources utilised affect the decisions that historians make, and how historians differ regarding what they see as the purpose of their scholarship. Such interrogation of source context and the historian’s methodology is actually something that examiners demand learners engage with, the Edexcel A-level coursework module being one example.

**SCHEME OF WORK**

**OVERVIEW**

It is envisaged that this sequence of three lessons will be taught at A-level, although some lessons might also be applicable for GCSE.

In the first lesson, primary sources are used to develop understanding of the 1950–51 Labour government response to the outbreak of the Korean War and the policies of the successor Conservative government. The lesson will also introduce the ways in which leftist historiography has focused on continuities between the foreign policy of Labour and the Conservatives.

In Lesson 2, some of the same primary documents, augmented by others, will be used to draw attention to the position of the Civil Service and the military regarding British entry into the conflict; such a focus may well be novel for students, given that the influence of these players is rarely addressed in the A-level classroom. Historiography pertaining to the influence of the ‘permanent state’ will also be introduced, which will facilitate questioning of ‘Who runs Britain?’ and ‘In whose interest?’

(Our intention had been that we then have a lesson and media sources examining how the media represented dissenting voices. Indeed, it was written. However, the fees that we were being asked to pay for reproducing even these shortened newspaper extracts meant that we had to ditch that lesson. However, we have included some notes that might help you explore that issue at the end of the notes for Lesson 8.2.)

In the final lesson, students will be introduced to ‘mainstream’ historiography on Britain and the Korean War. Students will be asked to consider how this differs from the scholarship that they have been given access to in the previous lessons but also to consider why. This will enable them to conclude the enquiry by making judgements on how historians differ with regard to an analysis of elite power in Britain and what they view as the purpose of their discipline, as well as what influences the approach that historians take.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Key content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 1:</strong> What was the response of the Labour and Conservative governments 1950–53 to the Korean War?</td>
<td>Students use government documents to complete a data capture, looking at the responses to the Korean War of the Labour government in 1950 and the Conservative government in 1951–53. Leftist historiography pertaining to continuities in British foreign policy post-World War II is then introduced as part of the same activity, and the activity is concluded by learners writing about what the likes of Curtis argue is motivating both Labour and Conservative governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 2:</strong> What was the response of the Civil Service and the military to the outbreak of the Korean War?</td>
<td>Students use government documents to complete a Venn diagram looking at Civil Service and military responses to the outbreak of the Korean War. Then students complete a data capture, looking at the apparent influence of the government, Civil Service and military respectively with regard to specific decisions or highlighted in specific documents. Historiography pertaining to the influence of the ‘permanent state’ is then introduced, and learners finish the lesson by creating a visual representation, with reference to government, Foreign Office and military, that conveys their roles in the decision to go to war in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 3:</strong> How do specialist historians approach the responses of the British elites to the Korean War?</td>
<td>A range of ‘mainstream’ historiography pertaining to the Korean War, e.g. Dockrill, Hopkins and Huxford, is introduced. Students are asked to note what the emphasis of this work is and then to contrast this with the more ‘radical’ scholarship that they have encountered in the previous lessons. Students then conclude the enquiry by completing a card sort, which gets them to consider why the scholars might be at odds with each other and which has much attention to context.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LESSON 8.1 BREAKDOWN: WHAT WAS THE RESPONSE OF THE LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS 1950–53 TO THE KOREAN WAR?

STARTER (SLIDES 1–5)

After introducing the overall enquiry and the lesson sequence, Slide 4 features a brief video newsreel about the start of the Korean War in 1950. Watch it and simply highlight that Britain participated as part of the UN forces.

Slide 5 offers a timeline of key events to summarise British involvement across the three years of the conflict.

Draw attention to key issues raised by the timeline by asking:

- What did Britain commit to initially? (Britain initially only committed to marine presence.)
- When did the Cabinet U-turn with regard to Britain contributing ground troops to the UN war effort?
- What was the significance of the Battle of the Imjin River? (It was the most famous/significant military engagement by British forces, but this was not a success.)


For the data capture using primary sources, you can either use the transcripts provided in Resource sheet 8.1A or, if you prefer this activity to have more of the feel of a trip to the National Archives, you can use the photographs/facsimiles, as shown on Slides 8–12, which are at a readable size in Resource sheet 8.1B.

Students work in groups and use this pack of five government sources to complete the data-capture task using Resource sheet 8.1C. They need to infer from the documents why the Labour government agreed to enter the Korean War in 1950 and why the Conservatives maintained this commitment from 1951.

Key factors that will come to light will include:

- forging closer ties with the US
- perceived British national interest

The students should note the considerable continuity across the two governments despite their supposedly markedly different positions.

Slide 7 also asks learners to note the shifts in British policy – which are most notably away from focusing on her own empire, to instead focusing on the relationship with the USA. This is evidenced in Document 2, for example, which gives the British reasoning for not sending ground troops to Korea, that this might not be of benefit to British interests in Hong Kong. However, by Document 3, the British position has shifted concerning ground troops because this policy benefits closer ties with the US.

PLENARY: MARK CURTIS INTERPRETATION (SLIDE 13)

Slide 13 introduces a source from Curtis identifying continuities in British foreign policy post-World War II, irrespective of which party is in government. Ask learners to read and then compare his interpretation with the impression that they gain from the primary sources/government documents.

They should conclude that:

- This source is complementary to (agrees with) the primary documents, in that it notes that national interest, global standing and a desire to retain close ties with the US do drive British foreign policy.
• However, it is at odds with the primary documents in noting that British policies are also driven by meeting the needs of corporations/gains for the economic elites.

PLENARY (SLIDE 15)

Students can be asked how Curtis would explain their previous findings regarding continuities of foreign policy across Labour/Conservative governments. They should be able to infer that, irrespective of who is in power, British foreign policy serves elite economic interests/corporations, which is the major theme of the enquiry.

LESSON 8.2 BREAKDOWN: WHAT WAS RESPONSE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE MILITARY TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR?

STARTER (SLIDES 1–4)

Using the link on Slide 4, show the short clip from the 1980s British comedy Yes Minister.

The question asks: What does it suggest about the power of the civil servant?

Use the class discussion to set up the theme of the lesson as an interrogation of the so-called ‘permanent state’ (i.e. the non-elected powers that sit alongside and behind elected government) and its influence on policy decisions.


This activity builds strongly on the last lesson in both theme and pedagogy. Students work in groups and use another pack of government sources – this time to complete a Venn diagram on the response of the Civil Service (in this case the Foreign Office) and the military to the outbreak of the Korean War and potential British intervention.

Once again, you have a choice of transcripts or photographs/facsimiles (Resource sheet 8.2A or 8.2B). The sources are also shown on Slides 7–11.

The Venn diagram is available as Resource sheet 8.2C, which might work best enlarged to A3 to ensure that the central area has room to write in.

Slide 12: Choose students to share their completed (or in progress) diagrams. The central area of their charts should be full while the distinctive areas on each side should be relatively empty. Certainly, students should infer from the sources that there is much commonality in the responses of the Foreign Office (FO) and military leaders. The military share the FO’s concern about Britain’s imperial possessions and close ties with the US. Similarly, Franks, at the FO, champions the need for ground troops to ensure close ties with the US, including averting a potentially negative economic impact.


Students now revisit the same sources (plus one extra from Lesson 8.1) and use the data-capture table (Resource sheet 8.2C) to consider the relative influence of each of these elite players. They should find that government ministers most certainly do not dominate the decision-making.

Finally, students can return to annotate their Venn diagram to highlight the influence of the different players. Add reference to specific documents that provide evidence of this.
ACTIVITY 3: JOYCE ON THE PERMANENT STATE (SLIDES 14–15)

Introduce the Joyce source to examine WHY there is commonality across the different elite power bases.

Students should appreciate how the shared background/values of the elite players can help to explain their shared mindset and how they are therefore all influential as they are promoting shared agendas. It is possible to introduce the construct of a British military-industrial complex here.

Slide 15 then takes you back to Yes Minister to compare/contrast Joyce on the ‘permanent state’ vs. the take of Yes Minister. Themes might be similar but the tone/emphasis is very different to Joyce.

Yes Minister clearly lampoons the apparently immense influence of the Civil Service, but is this a critique of elite power?

PLENARY (SLIDE 16)

Students communicate their understanding of Joyce’s position by constructing a visual representation (it could be a cartoon or any type of image, depending on what the students are comfortable doing) that conveys the nature of the relationship between government, the Civil Service and the military.

NB They might disagree with Joyce’s position; if so, they could represent how they see the relationship but be ready to explain why they see it differently from Joyce.

Slide 16 provides a link to the political cartoon gallery if they are looking for inspiration. You will also have your own favourites that you can show now to help get them started.

RESEARCH TASK

As explained above, our intention had been to next examine how the media supported the elites, particularly in the way in which they represented dissenters. In the end we could not afford the reproduction fees that we were being charged to include these sources in the printed publication or the online material, so we dropped the lesson.

However, some of you may be lucky enough to hold a personal or an institutional subscription for one of the media archives. Some schools and college libraries have the subscription without the history department being aware of it.

If you do have access then we suggest that you look at a range of publications (left-leaning such as the Daily Mirror and right-leaning such as the Daily Mail) and examine their representation of dissenters such as:

- Monica Felton
- Hewlett Johnson, ‘The Red Dean’
- Alan Winnington

Here are some articles to start your research:

Monica Felton was a Labour Party member and chair of the Stevenage new town development corporation. She took part in a visit to North Korea organised by the Women’s international Democratic Federation. On her return, she alleged that the UN forces had committed atrocities both by bombing and by presiding over massacres of civilians. For representative comment, see for example:

- Daily Mirror 26/08/52 ‘Shopping with Monica’ by Cassandra
- Daily Mirror 19/06/1951 ‘Mrs Felton’s passport did not include Korea’
- The Times 11/05/53 ‘Mrs. Felton’s “help to the Queen’s enemies”’
Alan Winnington was a British communist based in Beijing who covered the Korean War for The Daily Worker. For representative comment, see for example:

- Daily Mail 08/03/55 ‘A word on treason’

Hewlett Johnson was a Church of England priest who visited China with his wife Nowell and brought back allegations of American ‘germ warfare’. For representative comment, see for example:

- Daily Mail 10/07/52 ‘The scandal of the Dean’

**LESSON 8.3 BREAKDOWN: HOW DO SPECIALIST HISTORIANS APPROACH THE RESPONSES OF THE BRITISH ELITES TO THE KOREAN WAR?**

**STARTER (SLIDES 1–3)**

The Korean War is now attracting the attention of specialist historians. One example is Grace Huxford (who has also been an influential part of this Teacher Fellowship programme and contributed an article to this publication).

Draw attention to her methodology as well, through using the blurb for her book:

*Using Mass Observation surveys, letters, diaries and a wide range of under-explored contemporary material, this book charts the war’s changing position in British popular imagination and asks how it became known as the ‘Forgotten War’. It explores the war in a variety of viewpoints – conscript, POW, protester and veteran – and is essential reading for anyone interested in Britain’s Cold War past.*

**ACTIVITY 1: HOW DO SPECIALIST HISTORIANS APPROACH BRITISH RESPONSES TO THE KOREAN WAR? (SLIDES 4–10)**

Students work in groups and, using a series of extracts from leading Korean War historians Dockrill (1986), Hopkins (2001) and Huxford (2018), they complete the first two columns of the data-capture sheet, which considers the focus of those historians’ research and their methodology.

The table is available on Resource sheet 8.4A (page 1).

They should be able to identify that:

- **Dockrill’s** focus is high politics, British decision-making regarding Korea, the motivations for participation and British imperial/geopolitical concerns as a whole, especially the importance to British foreign policy of a close relationship with the USA. Dockrill’s sources are British governmental sources, and learners may voluntarily pick up on the overlap between the documents that Dockrill utilises and the very sources that they have engaged with in previous lessons.

- **Hopkins’** focus covers similar ground, but he is most specifically concerned with the influence of the British Ambassador to the US, Franks, on Britain’s Korean War policy. Hopkins’ sources are clearly also of the same nature as Dockrill’s and so have equivalent familiarity to the students.

- On the other hand, **Huxford** is interested in looking at Britons who dissented against the governmental line over Korea, the responses to these individuals of both the elites and the broader public, and also cultural memories of the conflict. Huxford’s methodology also differs from the other specialist historians in being more broad-ranging, clearly including secondary sources and also a war office film, contemporary to the period that she is focusing on.
**ACTIVITY 2: HOW DOES SPECIALISTS’ WORK CONTRAST WITH SCHOLARS ALREADY ENCOUNTERED? (SLIDES 11–12)**

Students are given interpretations (including some that they have already seen in previous lessons) from Curtis, Joyce, Gramsci and Herman and Chomsky (on Resource sheet 8.3A (page 5)) and they are to contrast the emphasis of these ‘non-specialist’ scholars with those of the ‘mainstream’ Korean War scholars. The final column of the table captures the interpretations of these scholars.

Learners should appreciate that questioning of elite interests/power inherent in the non-specialist sources is not a concern for the specialist historians of the Korean War.

Similarly, while Huxford discusses elite responses to dissenters and even acknowledges Pollitt’s claim, which is in tune with Curtis et al.’s logical questioning of why such vitriol is directed at Felton, for example, the unpacking of why Pollitt may well have a point is missing.

Through this critique, we are again seeking to offer learners access to higher-order thinking/more holistic understanding by questioning Huxford’s position.

**ACTIVITY 3: WHY MIGHT SOME SCHOLARS CRITIQUE ELITE POWER AND OTHERS NOT? (SLIDE 13)**

To engage with the aforementioned issues more fully, students complete a card sort (Slide 14 and Resource sheet 8.3B) in answer to this question, which will get them to consider differing views regarding the purpose of historians and all manner of contextual issues.

The cards suggest that the production of historical works is influenced by funding, which can encourage elite interests to be championed. This can lead to questioning of whether historians see their role as bolstering accepted societal structures or not. Discussion can also focus on different fields of history and how where scholars fit into these may impact on their work, a debate that potentially can be opened out to consider subjects across the curriculum. The cards also suggest the significance of age, academic experience and renown impacting in myriad ways on the works that historians/scholars produce. These are all healthy topics of debate for a holistic historical discourse within the post-16 classroom and potentially at Key Stage 4 as well. Of course, the cards also demand consideration of the influence of scholars’ political/ideological leanings upon their work, although this is something usually more widely addressed.

**PLENARY (SLIDE 15)**

Finish by completing a paragraph-long answer to the question:

What do elite responses to the Korean War teach us about Britain in the early Cold War years and what do scholarly responses to these developments teach us about the construction of history?
Lesson 8.1 Overview

Content covered in this lesson:
1. The outbreak of the Korean War
2. Timeline of British involvement
3. Responses of the Labour and Conservative governments 1950–53 to the Korean War
4. An historian’s interpretation regarding British foreign policy in this period

Timeline of British involvement in the Korean War

- June 1950: The United Nations (UN) Security Council declared North Korea the aggressor in the Korean conflict; later that month, Canadian American and British forces entered Korea. The British government deployed the HMAS HMAS to provide support.
- July: South and Fijian aircraft took off from HMS Sydney to attack the North Korean airfield at Inchon.
- 26 August: The first British ground force, 27 Brigade, sailed to the Korean Peninsula, under the command of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Royal Marine Commandos. Meanwhile, Royal Navy ships engaged in a routine exercise with amphibious units recaptured by Royal Marines.
- 18 September: In the south, 27th Commonwealth Brigade advanced through North Korea.
- November: A second and much stronger British force arrived.
- April 1951: Battle of the River – three days of fighting saw the Glencorse Commandos defeated by a Chinese attack. Blood, the remaining three battalion of 27 Brigade, along with the supporting arms, withdrew. On 23 April, 9 Brigade was relieved by American units.
- In later stages of the conflict, British brigades remained to a more defensive position covering Seoul.
- The British command essentially ended the Korean War, and the Commonwealth naval forces were withdrawn from the Korean War on 30 April.

Responses of the Labour and Conservative governments 1950–53 to the Korean War

- Document 1: Labour government minutes 1950 supporting intervention
- Document 2: Labour government minutes 1950 supporting intervention
- Document 3: Labour government minutes 1950 opposing intervention
- Document 4: Conservative government minutes 1951 opposing intervention
- Document 5: Conservative government minutes 1951 opposing intervention

Activity 1

1. Data capture: Work with transcripts (Resources sheet 8.1a) or facsimiles (8.1b) to fill the data capture table (8.1c).
2. Then use your completed table to work out:
   - What do the documents suggest regarding Labour and Conservative support for UN/US/UK action in Korea?
   - What do the documents suggest regarding the government’s intervention in supporting the sending of British combat troops in Korea?
   - How different do the Labour and Conservative positions appear to be?
Section 3 | Enquiry 8 How did Britain respond to the Korean War? An evidential and historiographical approach

LESSON 8.1 (continued)

An historian’s interpretation of British foreign policy post-WWII

“The view has long been held that Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role”, in the famous words of US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, several decades ago. Yet Britain’s real role is easily discovered if we are concerned to look... Britain’s role remains an essentially imperial one: to act as junior partner to US global power; to help to organise the global economy to benefit Western corporations; and to maximise Britain’s (that is, British elites’) independent political standing in the world and thus retain a world power.”


Examining and Teaching the Korean War | Lesson 8.1

LESSON 8.2

Lesson 8.2

What was response of the Civil Service and the military to the outbreak of the Korean War?

LESSON 8.2 Overview

Content covered in this lesson:
- Civil service and military responses to the Korean War
- Comparison of the responses of these institutions to those of the governments
- An historian’s interpretation regarding the British ‘permanent state’

The influence of the Civil Service, as represented in a British comedy series from the 1980s

Starter
What does this film clip suggest about the power of civil servants?
“Mrs Humphrey Appleby: the consummate civil servant! This Friday, New York, ‘Allo! ‘Allo, Series 3 Episode 5: ‘The Whiskey Priest’

Activity 1 discussion
How much commonality is there between the positions of the Foreign Office and the military regarding British involvement in the Korean War?

Activity 2
1. Data capture: Look at the sources again (including one extra repeated from last lesson). Fill out your own copy of this table (Resource sheet 8.20).
2. Consider the relative influence of the military, the Civil Service (Foreign Office) and the government over Korean War policies. Who seems to have the most influence?

Examining and Teaching the Korean War | Lesson 8.2
LESSON 8.2 (continued)

An historian’s interpretation of British civil servants and politicians


‘... the purpose and identity of the civil servant as a “statesman” – a man of the state who in actual practice was little different in outlook and character from leading politicians; and little different in the degree to which he held power. I also consider the occupational culture and ethical stylisation of the politician. Shared outlook, social background and education united the two. Therefore, in using the term “governing classes” it is these people that we should have in mind, for contrary to some understandings, and to the doctrine of the separation of politics and administration, it was in both figures that the real business of government took place. The high bureaucracy, just as much as the politician, was involved in making state policy.’

Why is there commonality across elite power bases?

Activity 3

1. Read the source on the previous slide. How would Joyce explain the continuities between the state actors’ positions, as well as their levels of influence on policy?

2. Now watch this clip from “Yes Minister”. To what extent is Joyce’s interpretation of the Civil Servant akin to that presented in “Yes Minister”?

3. How can you explain any differences?

LESSON 8.3

Enquiry 8 overview:
How did Britain respond to the Korean War? An evidential and historiographical approach

Lesson 8.1
What was the response of the Labour and Conservative governments 1950–53 to the Korean War?

Lesson 8.2
What was response of the Civil Service and the military to the outbreak of the Korean War?

Lesson 8.2
How do specialist historians approach the responses of the British elites to the Korean War?

Lesson 8.3 Overview

Content covered in this lesson:

- What research focus is taken by specialist historians of the Korean War?
- How does their work contrast with scholars already encountered?
- Why do some scholars critique elite power and others not?
- What do elite responses to the Korean War teach us about Britain in the early Cold War years and what do scholarly responses to these developments teach us about the construction of history?

How do specialist historians approach British responses to the Korean War?

Activity 1
Data capture. Use specialist Sources 1–3 to complete the first two columns of this table (Resource sheet 8.3A).

Specialist historian: Michael L. Dockrell

Source 1:
Extract from


Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs

https://www.jstor.org/stable/301708?

Specialist historian: Michael Hopkins

Source 2:
Extract from


DOI: 10.1080/03088990125338452
Lesson 8.3 (continued)

Specialist historian: Grace Huxford


How does the work of specialist historians contrast with scholars already encountered?

1. Now complete the final column of the data capture using Sources 4–7 (shown on the next slide)

2. What are the key differences in emphasis between the specialist historians and the other scholars regarding the elites?

Why do some scholars critique elite power and others not?

Activity 3

1. Using the cards on Resource sheet 8.3B (and Slide 14), fill out this table on reasons for the differing approaches of scholars to elite power.

2. What conclusions can you draw from this activity?

Plenary

How do you think the issues that you’ve engaged with in this lesson relate to school textbooks?

Write a paragraph in answer to the following question: What do elite responses to the Korean War teach us about Britain in the early Cold War years and what do scholarly responses to these developments teach us about the construction of history?

Expand this to an essay for homework if you wish.
The focus of this publication has been on teaching the history and legacy of the Korean War from a British perspective. It is our fervent hope that the materials in this publication provide UK teachers with a bank of resources that will update their subject knowledge and also provide them with classroom-ready resources that help them to teach this fascinating and incredibly significant period of world history in the twentieth century.

Of course, as Dr Han’s article at the start of this publication points out (1A, ‘Quo vadis?’), history is huge and multi-faceted. In a publication such as this, we cannot even cover the full story of the Korean War as it affected Britain, let alone its wider significance in other countries and globally.

With this in mind, the aim of this final section is to make teachers and students aware of some of the impressive other resources that are available for the study of the Korean War.

For many years, the Korean War Legacy Foundation (https://koreanwarlegacy.org) has been interviewing veterans of the Korean War from all the states that took part. After collecting over 1,100 interviews, the KWLF teacher fellows tagged the interviews with metadata and identified short, compelling video clips from each interview that would be useful in the classroom. The result is an unparalleled and incredibly precious resource to historians and teachers.
THE MEMORY BANK

The Memory Bank is the entry point to the Foundation’s coverage of the Korean War, its events and its legacy. It has several interconnected sections, which can also be accessed from the main menu at the head of the page.

THE INTERVIEW ARCHIVE

The Interview Archive is perhaps the jewel in the crown of the Foundation’s resources. There are over 1,100 interviews, 3,000 short video clips and over 2,000 photographs. It is a treasure trove for historians and has been shown to be immensely popular and engaging for young students as well. The Archive is made manageable by careful curation and can be simply browsed or searched using a range of key criteria.
Here are just a few examples of the materials that can be found in the Interview Archive:

**Gerald ‘Gerry’ Farmer**

A guy came along with his tie and he said, ‘Have you heard about a place called Korea? There’s a war starting out there, and it’s going to be a big war, you know.’ And I said ‘No.’ And that’s the first time I heard about Korea. We were young then and newspapers, we didn’t read newspapers and we didn’t have television. You just went about your normal business.

https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/gerald-gerry-farmer/

**Keith Gunn**

You always look back at war and say was it worth it. If you look at Korea now, even with the present situation with North Korea, which is on a very touchy basis, even then you’ve got to say with the progress being made in Korea and South Korea… You’ve got to say ‘yes, it was worth it’.

It was a forgotten war, I don’t think it was forgotten as it was quite ignored and never considered. Even today when anniversaries occur and they talk about the Falklands War and Iraq War, Korean War never gets mentioned… It’s totally wrong because it was the first major United Nations effort and one would think that would [have] captured people’s imagination, but for some reason no.

https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/keith-gunn/

**Charles Ross**

That was our final battle with the Third Battalion of the 8th K. We were overrun there. But this went on. This happened on the night of November the 1st – that’s when they first hit us. The following morning the firing ceased – early in the morning. And by the time daylight come I looked around and I couldn’t see anymore. I was lying in a ditch and my two men who had been with me were gone. But during the excitement – we fought all night. We fired at anything we could see that didn’t have a steel helmet on. See, we still had our summer uniforms on. We’d not been issued winter uniforms yet. And the Chinese that we were fighting – we didn’t know that they were Chinese. We thought they were North Koreans. And they had on these POW caps. So that was my means of identifying who’s – who were fighting. But I’m thinking still, that they were North Korean soldiers. So I’d shoot anyone with a POW cap on. And the following morning when I looked around, I didn’t see anybody moving or anything. And I raised up to take a look, thinking I may be the only survivor.

https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/charles-ross/

**Richard Faron**

Some of my difficult times had to do with kids that you inevitably saw in the streets. I mean they were waifs. They were starving you know. They didn’t have much and it always tore at me. And hired some of these children to be what we called house boys. And we had mama-sans. And they were always very polite, I mean extremely polite. I wish my kids had been that polite. And I felt sorry for them. You just had to feel sorry for them. And we did a lot for them. We had one of the young kids, I remember, he was I guess seven when we picked him up off the streets in Seoul. And we picked him up because he was stealing fruit from our operation. So what we tried to explain him was, ‘You don’t have to steal it. All you have to do is ask for it.’ But he didn’t know that. And we took him in.

https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/richard-faron/
HISTORY

Through a series of chapters, this section provides a chronology of the Korean War while also acknowledging multiple perspectives on this complex period and wrestling with the enduring legacy of the war. The chapters tell the story of the war both chronologically and thematically and are unique in their use of veteran oral history clips as primary source materials.

There are 17 chapters, which range from the early Cold War context of the late 1940s, through key events of the war itself, to the process of memorialising the war and understanding its legacy. There are thematic sections as well, such as the role of women in the war and the role of African Americans.

Each section provides an overview piece and also links to selected interviews from the Veterans Archive.
Multiple Perspectives on the Korean War

But as with all historical interpretation, there are other perspectives to consider. The Soviet Union, for its part, denied Truman’s accusation that it was directly responsible. The Soviets believed that the war was “an internal matter that the Koreans would settle among themselves.” They argued that North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung hatched the invasion plan on his own, then pressed the Soviet Union for aid. The Soviet Union reluctantly agreed to help as Stalin became more and more worried about widening American control in Asia. Stalin therefore approved Kim Il Sung’s plan for invasion, but only after being pressed by Chairman Mao Zedong, leader of the new communist People’s Republic of China.

A historian’s job is to account for as many different perspectives as possible. But sometimes language gets in the way. In order to fully understand the Korean War, historians have had to study documents, conversations, speeches and other communications in multiple languages, including Korean, Chinese, English, Japanese and Russian.

In 1995, the famous Chinese historian Shen Zhihua set out to solve a major problem posed by the war. Many people in the west had argued for decades, as Truman did, that North Korea invaded South Korea at the direction of the Soviet Union. Skeptical of that argument, Zhihua spent 1.4 million yuan ($220,000) of his own money to buy declassified documents from Russian historical archives. Then, he had the papers translated into Chinese so he could read them alongside Chinese government documents.

Zhihua found that Stalin had encouraged Mao Zedong to support North Korea’s invasion plan, vaguely promising Soviet air cover to protect North Korean troops. However, Stalin never believed that the United States and its allies would sanction an invasion against the Soviet Air Force.

TEACHING TOOLS

The Foundation has been working for many years with teachers to promote knowledge and understanding of the Korean War and also to provide practical help for teachers in the form of ready-to-use inquiry-based resources, just like the ones written for British teachers in this publication. There are 15 separate resources, all downloadable and classroom-ready.
DOCUMENTARY FILM

In 2018, the Korean War Legacy Foundation produced a documentary on the legacy of the Korean War. The 40-minute documentary follows Arden Rowley, a Korean War veteran, and his great-grandson, Cayden Sherwood, as they travel back to South Korea to remember his wartime experiences, while discovering the unique history and miraculous progress that the Korean people have achieved over the past 65 years. The film connects the past to the present and is a perfect classroom resource on the Korean War.
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The Korean War has been called ‘The Forgotten War’. Yet it was profoundly significant to the development of the Cold War. It had a cataclysmic impact on both North and South Korea which continues to affect both nations’ development to this day. And it continues to influence relationships between the USA and China – today’s global superpowers.

It deserves more of our attention. It deserves more of our teaching time.

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The Historical Association Teacher Fellowship Programme

This publication is a joint publication from the Historical Association and the Korean War Legacy Foundation sponsored by the Korea Foundation. It grows out of a 6 month long Historical Association Teacher Fellowship Programme (funded by the Korean War Legacy Foundation). The programme recruited eight talented British teachers and exposed them to the latest academic research, through a residential conference followed by an intensive online programme (moderated by Ben Walsh). They engaged with cutting edge academic scholarship. Out of this they each created the classroom teaching resources contained in this publication.

**The Teacher Fellows**
- Guy Birks
- Jacob Keet
- Erica Kingswood
- John Marrill
- Jennifer McCullough
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