

FACTION
IN
TUDOR ENGLAND

'This wicked Tower must be fed with blood'—W. S. Gilbert's dialogue sums up the popular myth of Tudor England. This pamphlet looks at the reality, a society and politics necessarily divided into rival factions by the pulls of patronage, local loyalty and the implications of personal monarchy, and it considers what a recognition of faction brings to the understanding of sixteenth-century England. Dr Ives teaches at the University of Birmingham and works on English legal history as well as Tudor politics. His publications include *The English Revolution, 1600-1660* and *The Letters and Papers of William Brereton*.

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E. W. Ives

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FACTION IN TUDOR ENGLAND

Henry VIII inaugurated his long reign with two executions: the victims, Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley, the crime, high treason. Almost a century later his daughter, Elizabeth I, signalled the finale of Tudor rule in the beheading of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, again for high treason. What links these episodes? The same crime, certainly, but even if we believe the evidence, Empson and Dudley had only taken precautions against possible violence on the death of Henry VII while Essex's rebellion was an inept fiasco. For a significant connection we need to look to that constant phenomenon of Tudor England, faction.

It is, of course, true that Empson and Dudley were ultimately scapegoats for the late king's unpopular fiscal policies, but when they were arrested, few people in England knew that Henry VII was dead, and others, just as much involved, were never even threatened. They fell, as the chronicler Edward Hall suggested, 'by the malice of them that with their authority in the late king's days were offended'.¹ In the case of Essex, the element of faction was openly discussed. The earl continually complained of it, his rival, Robert Cecil, tried to rebut the allegation and popular ballads came down on the side of Essex.

Part I—The Nature of Faction

WHAT IS FACTION?

Historians of all periods find 'faction' a very convenient word because it is rarely defined precisely. All too easily, when events are not clear, on goes the label, and that is that—faction! For Tudor history, a strict definition of 'a faction' is 'a group of people which seeks objectives that are seen primarily in personal terms'—either positive (gaining or keeping privileges, grants, jobs, office for members or their associates), or negative (denying such things to rivals). With the article

¹ Edward Hall, *Chronicle* (1809), p.505.

omitted, 'faction' can either be used in a limited sense to mean the particular operations and interactions of such 'factions' or more generally to indicate a system where relationships and events are determined by groups thinking mainly of personal advantage. Thus Essex headed 'a faction', was involved in 'faction', and the whole story exemplifies the operation of 'faction' as a system. This is, obviously, not to say that faction defined in this way is peculiar to the sixteenth century or to England. To study Tudor faction is to examine one of the generic forms of human social and political organisation at a particular time and place.

What must not be forgotten in this definition is the qualification: 'primarily in personal terms'. It is easy to see that in many circumstances, especially where local or central political office is involved, who is or is not successful will reflect more than personal considerations. A faction may come to occupy a recognisable ideological position and the struggle to place this individual rather than that can be a way to advance a desired policy. To take the Essex faction back a generation to Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (Essex's step-father). There is no question that Dudley was associated with a belligerent approach to foreign affairs or that his highly successful promotion of clerical nominees in the early Elizabethan church was also the promotion of what became moderate puritanism. This blurring of the distinction between people and programmes is always a problem in studying faction, and circumstances will vary from case to case. But, however much ideas or policies are involved, it remains true that the emphasis is on the advancement of such concerns by the advancing of people. Indeed, given the personal nature of Tudor monarchy, it was inevitable that policy debates would be resolved in terms of people, the king putting his confidence in those whose advice he had accepted or whose advice agreed with his own opinions. Naked advocacy of policies and programmes was a highly suspicious activity. All policies had to be the king's policies and hence the political battle was to persuade the monarch to listen. It is not too much to suggest that faction was the natural form of loyal political activity in the sixteenth century and that the 'political programme' was a characteristic of rebels. This is not to say that all or most faction had political implications, but it is artificial to attempt to separate politics from faction when such implications are present.

PATRONAGE

To understand why faction was endemic in sixteenth-century England we need to look at another phenomenon, patronage. The use of personal influence was ubiquitous, normal and unavoidable. In the world today which selects by formal examination, academic qualification, public competition and sealed tender, there is an illicit sound about 'patronage'. But despite would-be objective selection procedures, it remains hard to choose between the qualified and promising without personal recommendation in some form. It is no surprise, then, that in a society where such procedures were virtually non-existent, patronage was essential to selection. How was a monarch to recruit the army of servants he needed for every corner of the realm—stewards, farmers, bailiffs, attorneys, receivers, justices, sheriffs, keepers and constables, parkers and many more—unless individuals were recommended to him? And what applied to the ruler was part of a universal principle; as an Elizabethan remarked, 'advancement in all worlds [is] obtained by mediation and remembrance of noble friends'.²

Why were men willing to act as patrons? There were two reasons. In the first place, by promoting clients a patron enhanced his own standing and reputation. Having the young Shakespeare in his entourage brought the Earl of Southampton what he had himself called 'praise and reputation', and placing men in jobs or securing them privileges did much the same since it built up a following and demonstrated the influence which the patron commanded.³ In the second place, a patron looked for tangible reward. From a poet it might be a dedication, but elsewhere gifts and cash; it was 'not the use to do good turns *gratis*'.⁴ A patron, therefore, had an economic interest in placing protégés and if he failed repeatedly, not only would his standing decline, but so too his income, as Essex found to his cost. Patronage was deeply serious, to both sides, and it produced the simplest form of Tudor faction, the patron and the clients who depended on him and on whom he depended.

² W. T. MacCaffrey, 'Place and Patronage in Elizabethan Politics', in *Elizabethan Government and Society*, ed. S. T. Bindoff *etc* (1961), p. 108.

³ S. Schoenbaum, *William Shakespeare: a Documentary Life* (Oxford 1975), p. 128.

⁴ J. E. Neale, *Essays in Elizabethan History* (1958), p. 66.

FACTION IN THE LOCALITY

It is possible that faction would have remained at this simple stage if the element of competition in English life had been less. But competition flourished and almost certainly increased in intensity as the Tudor century progressed. Without calling in 'the rise of the gentry', it seems undeniable that there were more people seeking advancement. Not only did the population as a whole rise by about two thirds in the century from 1500, but the political nation, those who were involved in the struggle for patronage, appears to have grown even more rapidly; by the outbreak of the Civil War the number of gentry and their betters may have trebled while the population of the country as a whole had, perhaps, doubled. To make matters worse, it is likely that the total stock of patronage declined as the century went on. The wars at the end of Elizabeth's reign did increase military and naval employment and by 1600 there were more openings in government; in Surrey, for example, 36 J.P.s in 1577 had become 80 by 1608. But increase was more than offset by offices lost after the sale of church and crown land and by the decline of the real value of many older fees.

The spirit of competition was fed by the intense self-consciousness of Tudor men and women, the stress on dignity, status and prestige. The attitude of Thomas, the eldest of the three Stanhope brothers, was typical:

for my part I can die but once, and I had rather pay that sum whatsoever the day they discredit either my own power, reputation or any of my so loving brethren who so carefully deal for me.⁵

It was also strengthened by the peculiar fluidity of Tudor society which allowed the son of a tradesman in a small Midlands town to end up owning the largest house there, a coat of arms and the appellation, 'William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon, gentleman', or in an earlier and more extreme case, the son of a Putney clothworker to become Thomas Cromwell, Earl of Essex and Lord Privy Seal.

Another factor accentuating competition was the intense localism of English life; few men were much concerned with what happened beyond the horizon of their county if it had no implications for local affairs. In such relative isolation there

⁵ W. T. MacCaffrey, 'Talbot and Stanhope: an Episode in Elizabethan Politics', in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, xxxiii (1960), 77.

were many possibilities of friction—land, inheritance, the search for marriages, sharing out offices and leases, public appointments, the local pecking order—and individual rivalry could readily spawn alliances, cabals and feuds. In Cheshire in the first three or four decades of the century, a clique monopolised county affairs and kept down all challengers. In Elizabethan Norfolk, a continued polarisation disturbed the whole life of the shire. Even where an acknowledged leader or an accepted order of precedence and interests ensured a minimum of disturbance, feelings could easily be roused by outside intrusion; in 1577, complaints from the gentry-oligarchy of Sussex led the privy council to strip the interfering Bishop of Chichester of all temporal authority and much of his ecclesiastical initiative as well.

PERSONAL MONARCHY

In a more diffuse society such as France or, indeed, England at an earlier time, such struggles might have been contained at a local level, but as the bringing in of the privy council against the Bishop of Chichester shows, this was not the case under the Tudors. Developments from the middle of the fifteenth century had made the monarch the ultimate dispenser of all major employment and advancement. The independent society of the north 'which knew no king but Percy' had gone into rapid decline, the Reformation put an end to the great monastic patrons, concentrating what remained of church patronage in royal hands, while the abolition of the great franchises meant that offices and farms, once of only regional interest, were now absorbed into the general national stock and competed for at the centre. To get what he wanted the applicant had now, more and more, to compete for the personal approval of the sovereign.

It is important to realise that the involvement of the ruler was no technicality. In the personal monarchy of the Tudors it was the direct decision of the king which counted, a decision exemplified in his signature and his alone. To obtain a grant in Henry VIII's reign, it was first necessary to secure a provisional promise from the king, or someone such as Wolsey or Princess Mary whom the king would recognise, then to haggle over the terms with the royal advisers (and against others armed with similar provisional promises) until an

agreed formula was arrived at. This was then written out as a petition, 'a bill', and presented to the king to sign, and only if this second and formal royal approval was given could the bureaucratic process of issuing letters patent begin. Historians have frequently pointed out that Philip II of Spain was personally responsible for the decisions necessary for the government of his vast empire. On a much smaller scale and with more informality, the same was true of kings of England.

With royal approval indispensable, a suitor had to find someone to bring his case to the king's attention, and here the last links in the chain fall into place. The ultimate in patronage is being in a position to influence or advise the ultimate source of advancement or honour, the sovereign—to recommend this person, to put the case for another, to frustrate a third. Hence the king's entourage was an arena where patrons competed to place candidates and inevitably factions resulted. A patron might seek to ensure his candidate's success by getting the support of another person of influence and even the man confident of royal favour might bring in allies to squeeze out a competitor. About 1530 the courtier Walter Walsh wrote this illuminating letter to a colleague, William Brereton:

Brother William, so it is that the parson of Hanworth is not like to continue [live] long. I spake yesterday to Master Norris [another courtier]; he promised me to move the king to be good to a brother of mine therein, which is a priest and studieth at Cambridge. I pray you solicit it and to hearken lest any priest or any other should make suit therein. . . . If chance happen well for the benefice that a bill may be made, my brother's name is Edward Walsh, priest.⁶

In this case the group is pursuing the interests of one of its members, but in others a suitor might have no connection with a patron and would therefore need an introduction, perhaps from a lesser figure at court or some mutual contact. This was yet another layer of patronage and we should see faction at court as a human pyramid with its apex the man or men with the direct access to the monarch. Naturally there was something in it for everyone. In Elizabeth's first year, for example, a suitor applied to Lord North with a promise of 1000 marks (£666.66), specifying 500 marks for William Cecil and the rest for North to use to promote his case. North offered the Secretary of State a further 200 marks and proposed 200 for the

⁶ *Letters and Accounts of William Brereton*, ed. E. W. Ives (Lancashire and Cheshire Record Society 116, 1976), p.93.

queen's cousin, Francis Knollys, leaving himself the remainder.

We must not, however, forget that much of this competition for royal grants and the like began in the provinces, a long way from court. A courtier in addition to handling more immediate suitors would often have links with factions in the localities. In Elizabethan Norfolk, each of the warring factions had its supporters at court, and it was not mere internal decoration when Lord Burghley had a gallery at his principal house painted out as a map-room, showing all the counties with a note of the leading families in each. The one potentially dangerous element in the Essex rebellion was the support which the earl had built up in Wales.

The Cecil connection (and wishfully that of Essex) was nationwide, but a patron at court would often be active himself in the region from which he came. The Breretons of Malpas, for instance, led the faction which dominated Cheshire until 1536, with Walsh's 'Brother William' as their representative at court and, on his father's death in 1530, the recognised leader in the county as well. Nor must we see these provincial factions as without influence on affairs at the centre. In 1584 a dispute between Sir Edward Stradling and Sir James Croft over a wealthy Glamorgan heiress escalated into a struggle which brought in Raleigh, Lord Howard of Effingham, Sir Francis Walsingham, the Earl of Pembroke, the Countess of Warwick (the Earl of Leicester's sister-in-law) and the Sidney family whose second son, Robert, walked off with the prize. It is useful to think of faction at court as a pyramid, but for the relation between faction at the centre and faction in the provinces an organic simile is better. The analogy is with a plant whose root system spreads over a wide area but concentrates on a single stem. Indeed, this picture is an apt one; faction, like the plant, depended on a two-way traffic—cash and support from the localities, like water and minerals from the roots, and honours and offices from the centre, as the products of photosynthesis from the sun of royal favour.

FACTION AND POLITICAL POWER

So far we have been concentrating upon faction as the product of patronage and personal monarchy, with the objectives grants, rewards and the like, but the story is much the

same where the objective was high political authority. Since, as we have seen, policy is made around the king and the power struggle is a struggle to exert and maintain influence with the king, it will be a matter of allies and supporters, of faction, just as much as the struggle for patronage. Indeed patronage is part of the political battle. A minister such as Wolsey, Cromwell or Burghley needed to control the flow of patronage as much as possible to support his position as minister. None would have lasted long once grants and honours began to flow through other men's hands. It was an evil omen for Wolsey when, as his gentleman-usher, George Cavendish, wrote of Anne Boleyn:

it was judged by and by through all the court, of every man, that she being in such favour with the king might work masteries with the king and obtain any suit of him for her friend.⁷

Patronage and politics alike, the need is to stand well with the king, and the means faction. The battle-ground of both is the court and political rivalry is very often conducted in courtly terms. Just as Walsh, Brereton and Norris joined to discover and defeat rival suitors, so the minister struggled to put his own men round the king and keep out those of his rivals. The Earl of Leicester was roundly rebuked by Elizabeth when he tried to interfere in admissions to her apartments:

God's death, my Lord, I have wished you well; but my favour is not so locked up for you that others shall not partake thereof; for I have many servants, to whom I have, and will at my pleasure, bequeath my favour, and likewise resume the same.⁸

Whether the emphasis is on profit or on politics the result is the same, faction.

THE ROYAL COURT

To understand how influence could be exerted on a Tudor monarch it is necessary to understand something of the organisation of the royal court. From medieval times this had been divided into the household below stairs, ruled over by the Lord Steward and concerned with supply, and the household above stairs commanded by the Lord Chamberlain and con-


⁷ George Cavendish, *The Life and Death of Cardinal Wolsey*, ed. R. T. Sylvester (Early English Text Society 243, 1959), p.35.

⁸ *Elizabethan People*, ed. J. Hurstfield and A. G. R. Smith (1972), p.142. The report is probably not *ipsissima verba* but gives the substance of Elizabeth's remarks.

cerned with attendance on the sovereign. By the end of the fifteenth century there was no longer a single chamber where the king lived, but three, eventually labelled the great, the presence, and the privy chamber, and the king was spending more and more of his time in the privacy of the third, access to which was heavily restricted. 'Privy chamber' is, indeed, a misleading term since we should think of a sizeable private suite. The development of this suite set in train another, the recruitment of a staff to serve there. Henry VII seems not to have minded menials about him, but his son wanted friends, and by the early 1520s we can see a new group, the 'gentlemen' and 'grooms' of the privy chamber, who acted as the king's companions and personal attendants. This would not have mattered but for the fact we have already established, that influence with the king was crucial to politics and to profit. The privy chamber, access to it and influence in it, became a key to power and place. The king's ministers were at a grave disadvantage. The court moved from palace to palace and ministers had frequently to be absent. When the king was on progress or one of his interminable hunting expeditions, he even left much of the household behind—but never his privy chamber.

We have already seen the patronage aspect of the privy chamber in operation. Walter Walsh and William Brereton were both grooms there, and the 'Master Norris' who had agreed to speak to the king was none other than Sir Henry Norris the Chief Gentleman and Groom of the Stool (the royal privy). As for politics, the privy chamber staff, and especially the Chief Gentleman, were the king's agents and confidants, giving him the means to be independent of any minister. It was William Brereton who led the party which collected the signatures of the peers, bishops and abbots to the great petition sent to Rome in 1530 in support of Henry VIII's nullity suit. It was Norris whom Henry sent to Wolsey, after the minister's fall, to assure him of the king's continued goodwill. It was the Groom of the Stool who, under Henry VII and especially under Henry VIII, had charge of the king's 'coffers' where, more and more, surplus revenues were deposited under the monarch's immediate control—which made the post, in G. R. Elton's words, 'the vital financial office'.⁹ It was the Chief

⁹ G. R. Elton, *Reform and Reformation: England 1509-1558* (1977), p.212.



Holbein: HENRY VIII DINING IN THE PRIVY CHAMBER

B.L.



Holbein: THOMAS WYATT
Windsor Castle

(n.d.)



Holbein: HENRY HOWARD, Earl of Surrey
Windsor Castle

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Gentleman who, at the end of Henry VIII's reign, was responsible for the highly important 'dry stamp' which made it possible to add the king's signature to a document without bothering the king personally.

Under Edward VI, the importance of the privy chamber was tempered by the king's youth, but the potential was still there. This explains the serious reaction to his receiving surreptitious presents from his ambitious uncle, Thomas Seymour, or, equally, why Sir Henry Sidney had an almost aggrieved obsession with Edward VI's memory; Sidney's father had secured important posts, from the start, in Edward's household and Henry himself had been installed, in Edward's household and Henry himself had been installed as one of the gentlemen of the new privy chamber, only to have it all slip away as the young king died in his arms.

With Mary and Elizabeth the situation was bound to be different. The closest attendants on the monarch were now women, and so not competing themselves for place and power. Further, although we so far know less about the later privy chamber, it does appear that the attendants of the Tudor queens fluctuated less than those of their father had done, and so less readily reflected the play of court faction. Mary's privy chamber was almost a Catholic ghetto. Under Elizabeth it seems that factional struggle was concentrated on the social life of the privy chamber, the courtiers and ladies admitted to it, rather than those who held formal appointments there, in some cases for decades. It is significant that Elizabeth's castigation of Leicester, mentioned earlier, was in support of an usher who was executing her instructions to vet closely all admissions to the privy chamber. Nevertheless, those in office were still powerful. Raleigh said of the Queen's ladies that 'like witches, they could do hurt, but they could do no good'.¹⁰ When the Earl of Shrewsbury was squabbling with Sir Thomas Stanhope, Lord Buckhurst, the queen's cousin, wrote to warn the earl of the influence of Stanhope's two brothers:

We that live here in court and see how matters are handled and do pass, shall surely much better judge of these things than you that are so far from the sight and dealings of this place, assuring your lordship (if I can judge anything at all) that the continual presence of these two brethren in court, with the near place they hold to Her Majesty, and that which is above all the rest, the especial favour which Her Majesty doth bear unto them, will

¹⁰ Francis Bacon, *Collected Works*, ed. J. Spedding *etc* (1857-74), xiii. 335.

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always prevail with so great advantage against you as it will not be possible for you or your friends to carry this cause in that course of good success which peradventure you hope for.¹¹

Part II—Faction at Work

FACTION 1485-1547 (a) THE PROBLEMS

This is not the place to attempt a detailed history of faction in Tudor England, even if this were possible. Only a handful of examples have been studied in any detail and in many others, especially from the earlier years, source material is too scanty to ever allow more than a most tentative conclusion. This is true of Empson and Dudley and it is also true of the much more important matter of Wolsey's rise to power. We know that on Henry VIII's accession, most of his father's leading advisers were retained on the council, notably Richard Fox, Bishop of Winchester and Lord Privy Seal, but that the new king's council now included men who wished to abandon the first Tudor's peaceful foreign policy and accommodate Henry VIII's juvenile yearnings for military glory. We also know that a new group comes on the stage, the coterie of courtiers among whom the king had his social life, men like Charles Brandon, William Compton, Henry Stafford and Edward Howard, while we must not overlook the principal peers on the council, Stafford's brother, the Duke of Buckingham, and Howard's brother, the Earl of Surrey. Polydore Vergil, an eye-witness, tells us that Thomas Wolsey was pushed by the ageing Bishop Fox as a counter to Surrey and that Wolsey struck up a close alliance with Brandon. The suggestion would make good sense of the evidence. We can imagine an initial line-up of Buckingham and Surrey, supported at court by the king's closest companions, against Henry VII's bureaucrats and possibly against his policies; (Empson and Dudley might be its victims). Wolsey, however, carries the day as the old ministers urge his capacities, as he secures an ally at court in the person of Brandon and as he makes his reputation with the king in the war of 1512-14. Brandon would be an obvious person to detach from the courtiers because, coming from East Anglia, he has either to accept subordinate status to the Howards or strike out on his own, a decision which could be confirmed when his closest

¹¹ W. T. MacCaffrey, *Bulletin* . . . xxxiii.79.

link with them, his friend Edward Howard, is drowned at sea in 1513. But we cannot be certain of all this. Polydore Vergil hated Wolsey and was ready to decry him at every turn, there was no lasting enmity between Brandon and the Howards or continued links between Wolsey and Brandon and the older councillors were sometimes resentful and critical of a man whom, according to this hypothesis, they had promoted.

We find little to help us in Wolsey's biography; Cavendish did not enter the cardinal's service until 1522, but his experience of his master did enable him to recognise the feline sensitivity to intrigue and the nuances of patronage and favour which, whatever the details, must be the ultimate explanation of Wolsey's rise:

He daily attended upon the king in court, being in his especial grace and favour, who had then great suit made unto him as councillors most commonly have that be in favour . . . in whom the king conceived such a loving fancy, especially for that he was most earnest and readiest among all the council to advance the king's only will and pleasure, without any respect to the case.

The king, therefore, perceived him to be a meet instrument for the accomplishment of his devised will and pleasure, called him more near unto him, and esteemed him so highly that his estimation and favour put all other ancient councillors out of their accustomed favour that they were in before, in so much as the king committed all his will and pleasure unto his disposition and order, who wrought so all his matters that all his endeavour was only to satisfy the king's mind, knowing right well that it was the very vein and right course to bring him to high promotion.¹²

Close attendance on the king, attraction of suitors which brought fame and wealth, willingness to compete and see others fall behind and, above all, total dedication to the royal will, this was the recipe for success. Nor, until the end, did Wolsey's culinary skill desert him. As business took him more from the king, he paid increasing attention to those who were at Henry's side; no one was to supplant him in his absence. This explains his vendetta against the king's secretary, the inoffensive Richard Pace, and why in 1519 Wolsey engineered the dismissal from the privy chamber of the more dangerous courtiers; when the problem of the privy chamber recurred, as it soon did, Wolsey included in the Eltham Ordinances of 1526

¹² Cavendish, *op. cit.* pp.11-12.



Holbein: THOMAS BOLEYN, Earl of Wiltshire (n.d.) Windsor Castle



Holbein: ANNE BOLEYN (?1533-36) Nidd Hall



Holbein: JANE SEYMOUR (1536-37) Windsor Castle



Holbein: NICHOLAS CAREW (1526-28) Basle



Flicke: THOMAS CRANMER (1546) N.P.G.



Holbein: THOMAS HOWARD, Duke of Norfolk (1539-40) Windsor Castle



after Holbein: THOMAS CROMWELL (1533-34) N.P.G.



Holbein: WILLIAM FITZWILLIAM, Earl of Southampton (1537-40) Windsor Castle

a reduction of the department to a size and staff which he hoped to manage.

Another episode where we can suspect faction is the fall of Edward Stafford, Duke of Buckingham, in 1521. This must surely have been, in part at least, Wolsey's doing. Buckingham had stood at the centre of a powerful group of councillors and courtiers with close ties with Queen Catherine and the heir presumptive, the Princess Mary. He had had a running feud with Wolsey, daring to question the utility of that favourite brain-child, the Field of Cloth of Gold, and the duke had also been caught in the cardinal's campaign against retaining (as had others of the faction). The circumstances are suggestive, but again we cannot be certain. The same is true of Wolsey's fall. It was not failure to free Henry from Catherine which brought the cardinal down. He fell because this failure gave a final weapon to the factions which, for years, had been trying to undermine the king's confidence in his minister. Even then it took six months of further pressure before Wolsey was forced into the Siberia of his York diocese. But the particulars remain to be investigated.

FACTION 1485-1547 (b) THE CRISIS OF 1536

To see faction at work in any detail, we have to go to the example of Tudor faction *par excellence*, the fall of Anne Boleyn and the submission of Princess Mary in the spring and summer of 1536. Historians have tended to explain both events in terms of Henry VIII's determination to have his own way with a wife he had tired of and a daughter who was defying him. But, as was suggested at the time, in striking at Mary, the target was really those supporting her. As for Anne, it is easy to exaggerate the discord in her marriage. She was certainly innocent of adultery. The 'evidence' was manufactured from the flirtations of 'courtly love', that artificial game which had been played with countless great ladies all over Europe, back to the days of Capetian France. Suddenly, convention was taken as fact. Thus the queen's teasing implication that her affection could be won, was misrepresented as a declaration 'that the king never had her heart' and construed as proof that she conspired the king's death.¹⁴ Henry VIII's second marriage was stormy, but there is no evidence that he

¹⁴ British Library, Hargrave Ms.388, f.187v.

ever ceased being fascinated, as well as alternately infuriated by Anne. She was in high favour as late as Easter 1536, a fortnight before her arrest. The quarrels only mattered because, for so long as Henry's resentment lasted, he was vulnerable to the sympathising of the queen's enemies; an exactly similar situation arose with Catherine Parr.

Who were Anne's enemies? First of all there was the Buckingham faction, now headed by Henry Courtenay, Marquis of Exeter, one of two noblemen with established posts in the privy chamber. Also active was Nicholas Carew, Master of the Horse, who had belonged to the privy chamber since his youth, with several other of the king's intimate courtiers. The king's interest in Jane Seymour brought in her two brothers, Edward and Thomas. Also involved were some of the queen's own household. Opposed to this alliance were Anne's father, the Earl of Wiltshire, and her brother Viscount Rochford, who held the other privy-chamber post reserved for a peer. Also from the privy chamber and elsewhere at court were Henry Norris, William Brereton, Thomas Wyatt, Francis Bryan and others close to the king, while outside, Archbishop Cranmer strongly supported the queen. Others, notably the Duke of Norfolk, equivocated, while the decisive point was a change of sides by Thomas Cromwell.

Merely to list these names is to show that neither the alliance for nor the alliance against Anne was more than a temporary coalition. On Anne's side, Norris and Brereton, as we have seen, were two of a distinct clique in the privy chamber; their service there had begun long before Anne arrived, they were Henry's servants first and last, with only links of convenience with the Boleyns. Wyatt was close to Norris and Bryan and also to Norfolk's son, the Earl of Surrey, yet not to Brereton and he was, perhaps, hostile to Rochford. Rochford was in conflict with Bryan and so one could go on. Anne's supporters were a loose coalition of those who put their money on the queen. Factions had used women to lure the king before, but Anne had always triumphed and there was every reason to expect her to do so again, until Cromwell's desertion put new efficiency into the attack.

Similar variety characterised the opposition. Courtenay and his allies were, by long association, committed to Catherine and her daughter. They wanted to drive out 'the concubine' who had supplanted the true queen, to reinstate Mary as the

recognised heir and, no doubt, counted on the benefits which would flow to her loyal supporters. Carew's earlier loyalties had been to the Howards, his sympathies French and Bryan was his brother-in-law, but a feeling for Catherine and Mary may have been reinforced by loss of prominence this produced at court. Courtenay and Carew were also drawn together by increasing fear for the church; indeed, the issues of Catherine, Mary and traditional Christianity were probably seen by them as one and the same. As for the Seymours, Edward had been associated with the Duke of Richmond, Henry's bastard and Norfolk's son-in-law, and Thomas with Francis Bryan, but what mattered in 1536 was a sister on the throne. Richmond also explains Norfolk's ambivalence. If Anne were to go and the king have no more children (on his past success, not improbable), the duke would be the mentor of the only male among Henry's three bastards and the probable next king of England. Cromwell's abandonment of Anne was calculation of a similar kind. He had risen to power as her supporter, but early in 1536 he found improved relations with Charles V frustrated by the identity of the queen. He also faced Wolsey's old problem, the influence the privy chamber could exercise, independent of the minister. Removing Anne could be used to remove two of the most important men there, Norris and Rochford. Norfolk's pretensions could also be set down. He had been encouraging Richmond to flex his muscles, especially in his marcher lordships. Cromwell had just secured a statute abolishing marcher liberties, but this had to be implemented and it would be unlike Norfolk to watch independence pass tamely away. Brereton, however, was Richmond's deputy, and if he were destroyed with Norris, his offices could be given to more 'reliable' men.

Already this discussion has shown the wide diversity of Tudor faction. 1. The Buckingham connection was extensive but also among Anne's enemies was a faction headed by the two half-brothers William Fitzwilliam, the Vice-Admiral, and Antony Browne of the privy chamber. 2. Factions varied in length of life as well as size; the Buckingham group had roots in the reign of Henry VII while the Norfolk-Boleyn axis which brought Anne to the throne was in disarray within three years. 3. Some groups, for instance Norris and Brereton, might stick to the patronage game and nothing else, but given a great issue, another faction might acquire an ideology as the

Buckingham group did with Catherine, Mary and the church. Ideology on one side then forced ideological positions on others, not in the Boleyn-Mary crisis which was too brief, but certainly later. As Cromwell pursued an active policy of religious reform, his opponents came under pressure to embrace conservatism, irrespective of private belief; when, after his death, the conservatives represented the assertive ideology, the reverse is true. This is not to say that private beliefs were immaterial; once a faction had an ideology it attracted men of that sentiment. Religion was both cause and consequence of factional allegiance. 4. We should not, however, see factions as rigid. Links were often weak and alignments surprisingly fluid. Men worked together for as long as it suited them; there is nothing strange in Cromwell changing sides. An individual could have links with more than one faction at a time. True, there were some sharp lines of demarcation, on issues and on personality, but we have seen already that a man like Thomas Wyatt could hold not entirely compatible links with Norris, the Howards, the Boleyns and Bryan, and he was also close to Cromwell. 5. It is also clear that the grand coalitions locked in combat over Anne were the least common kind of faction. Thrown together as some major question polarised the court, such alliances lasted only as long as the circumstances which produced them.

The victorious coalition against Anne Boleyn held together for days rather than weeks. Cromwell placed his men in the privy chamber and the Seymours received their rewards. But those who had pursued Anne as a prelude to Mary's restoration had a rude awakening. The Princess found that Anne's removal did not mean her own immediate return and Cromwell appears to have stalled her requests while continuing to encourage her hopes. Mary's supporters at court became ever more vocal, openly arguing that since Mary had been conceived in good faith, even if Henry's marriage had subsequently been found invalid, in law she was legitimate and so heir presumptive. This was enough. Cromwell knew that repudiation of his second wife did not mean retreat by Henry from positions taken up in the course of the Boleyn courtship. Exeter and Fitzwilliam were banished the council, the wife of Mary's chamberlain went to the Tower and Carew, Browne and the rest found themselves under interrogation. Mary herself could not be excused. Pressed by Cromwell and

bludgeoned by a commission comprising a leading Erastian bishop, the Duke of Norfolk and another Richmond sympathiser, she disarmed her supporters and signed herself a bastard. Cromwell had cast off the conservatives and on 29 June he took his public reward, the keepership of the privy seal followed on 9 July by a peerage. On 22 July there came a bonus; Richmond died, and Cromwell no longer had to keep an option open in Norfolk's direction.

FACTION 1547-1603

The events of 1536 open what seems to have been an acute period of faction. It may be that our evidence is more plentiful, but for the next twenty years faction was never far below the surface. There was a dimension of court faction in the Pilgrimage of Grace; the Buckingham-Carew faction was finally destroyed in 1538; Norfolk and Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, brought Cromwell down in 1540 and there was a less bloody outcome to attacks on Gardiner, Cranmer and Queen Catherine Parr. Edward VI's reign, which saw major power-struggles in 1549 and 1551 and ended in the abortive coup of 1553, had been ushered in by months of the bitterest controversy. Norfolk went to the Tower, his son, Surrey, to the block and Gardiner was disgraced. The privy chamber and the remaining conservatives rallied to the victorious Seymours and their ally, John Dudley, later Duke of Northumberland, and with this faction monopolising the court, arrangements were made for the regency and Henry VIII's will was manipulated to yield a patronage bonanza. Then, once Edward Seymour (now Duke of Somerset) had the nominal title of Protector, interests divided. Dudley, fearing Somerset's ambition, promoted Thomas Seymour. Somerset set about removing the Lord Chancellor, an obstacle to further power, and in March 1547 the Protector obtained at last an independent regency, guaranteed until October 1555. Under Mary casualties of faction were fewer but its dangers as great or greater; feuding at the English court was a topic of European comment and, at times, paralysed government. That it got no worse was partly due to the skill of William Paget who kept the administration going. There were other factors too; a confusion of factions prevented a straight two-party split; religion more and more blunted the logic of

patronage and power; the lessons of 1553 were fresh in the mind, and so too the hope offered by a barren Mary and Elizabeth as heir-presumptive. Yet though Mary did retain 'the name of queen', she did not have 'command of her kingdom'.

A change begins with the accession of Elizabeth. There is an end to the more traumatic faction episodes. The Duke of Norfolk (Surrey's son), speaking at Tower Hill before his execution in 1572, said:

For men to suffer death in this place is no new thing, though since the beginning of our most gracious Queen's reign I am the first, and God grant I may be the last.¹⁷

His prayer was not wholly granted, but the only other courtier-politician to be executed by Elizabeth was Essex, and like Norfolk, his final acts, though foolish, were undeniably treasonable. What had happened? Faction continued to flourish and, as we have seen, competition became steadily more shrill. The disconsolate Edmund Spenser wrote:

Full little knowest thou, that hast not tried,
What Hell it is in suing long to bide;
To lose good days that might be better spent;
To waste long nights in pensive discontent;
To speed today, to be put back tomorrow;
To feed on hope, to pine with fear and sorrow;
To have thy Prince's grace, yet want her peers';
To have thy asking, yet wait many years;
To fret thy soul with crosses and with cares;
To eat thy heart through comfortless despairs;
To fawn, to crouch, to wait, to ride, to run,
To spend, to give, to want, to be undone.¹⁸

Pressure of competition may also have encouraged corruption, the imprecise but perceptible shift from gratuities for services rendered, to deliberate bribery. Contemporaries noted 'the great and unusual fees exacted lately'.¹⁹ But if temperature in the kitchen was hotter, explosions were much less frequent.

Part of the explanation must be the greater separation of Elizabeth's domestic affairs and her social and political life which we have already noticed. Mary's private circle had been a faction of Catholic loyalists. Everyone else was suspect, and for them, as the gentlemen pensioners grumbled after Wyatt's

¹⁷ W. Cobbett *etc*, *State Trials* (1816-98), i.1035.

¹⁸ Edmund Spenser, *Mother Hubbard's Tale*, lines 895-906.

¹⁹ Neale, *op. cit.* p.78.

rebellion, there was nothing but bare thanks. Elizabeth, by contrast, was never hemmed in by her servants. Also important was a general consciousness of foreign danger, so that where xenophobia had presented Mary with most of her problems, it now concentrated loyalty on Elizabeth. It was a long time, too, before religious conservatives imitated the Marian Protestants and stood firm against the established church, and before the queen abandoned her determination not to allow 'windows in men's souls'.

There is no doubt, however, that the principal reason for the calmer waters of Elizabeth's reign was the queen's open-eyed acceptance and exploitation of faction, her determination to have, as she told Leicester, 'many servants to whom I bequeath my favour'. For suitors this meant several possible avenues of recommendation and some attention to merit, not weight of influence alone. For Elizabeth herself it meant freedom. Sir Robert Naunton, who records her rebuke to Leicester, drew the moral:

She ruled much by faction and parties which herself both made, upheld, and weakened, as her own great judgement advised.²⁰

When in 1593 an opportunity occurred to promote the Attorney-General and appoint a replacement, the queen did nothing for fourteen months during which the Earl of Essex agitated in vain for his client, Francis Bacon, instead of the obvious (but Cecil-backed) candidate, the Solicitor-General. If factions united to push a single nominee, as was later done with Bacon for the now vacant post of Solicitor, the queen again responded with delay.

This system could not have operated if Elizabeth's government had not been deeply, innately conservative. There was little opportunity to persuade the queen to positive action, to remove existing officials or to call for new men. Equally, the system required restraint from faction leaders, the recognition that they would lose as well as win, a readiness to accept the queen's will and to live together. For much of the reign they did. Burghley and Leicester—Elizabeth's closest confidant and her most intimate courtier—were recognised rivals, but there was never a complete break-down of relations; Burghley—Leicester might be the main pivot, but there were plenty of cross-connections and much independence.

²⁰ Hurstfield and Smith, *op. cit.* p. 141.



S. van der Muelen: ROBERT DUDLEY Earl of Leicester (1560-65) *Wallace Coll.*



A. van Brounckhorst: WILLIAM CECIL (1560-70) *N.P.G.*



M. Gheeraerts: ROBERT DEVEREUX Earl of Essex (1596) *Woburn Abbey*



J. de Critz: ROBERT CECIL (1599) *Ingatstone Hall*

Faction Leaders of Elizabeth's Reign

Of course it took some years for the rules to be accepted or, indeed, for the queen to transform instinctive caution and dislike of commitment into a conscious policy. Cecil, as he then was, Leicester and other leaders spent the 1560s manoeuvring very much in the old style. At the end of the reign as well, the conventions began to break down. Burghley now identified service to the queen with advancement of his second son, Robert Cecil. Edmund Spenser wrote:

O grief of griefs, O gall of all good hearts
To see that virtue should despised be
Of him, that first was raised for virtuous parts,
And now, broad spreading like an aged tree,
Lets none shoot up, that nigh him planted be.²¹

Leicester's successor, Essex, accepted no rules at all. His threat to Robert Cecil over the Attorney-Generalship is indicative:

The attorneyship for Francis [Bacon] is that I must have; and in that I will spend all my power, might, authority and amity, and with tooth and nail defend and procure the same for him against whom whatsoever; and that whosoever getteth this office out of my hands for any other, before he have it, it shall cost him the coming by.²²

Men were driven into the arms of the Cecils whose interest had now to be the earl's disgrace; Raleigh wrote to Robert Cecil some weeks before Essex's final outbreak:

[Essex's] son shall be the youngest earl of England but one, and if his father be now kept down, [Cecil's son] shall be able to keep as many men at his heels as he, and more too. . . . But if the father continue, he will be able to break the branches, and pull up the tree, root and all.²³

Elizabeth herself, faced with Essex's determination to monopolise her favour, was driven the same way in self-defence. In the final months the queen was a good deal more dependent on a single faction than at any other time.

FACTION AND THE MONARCH, 1485-1547

Early difficulties and the final tragedy must not obscure the fact that, overall, Elizabeth I had been the mistress of faction, and this prompts a question. What was the relationship between the earlier Tudor monarchs and faction, or since

²¹ Edmund Spenser, *The Ruins of Time*, lines 449-53.

²² *Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth*, ed. T. Birch (1754), i.152-3.

²³ E. Edwards, *Life of Walter Raleigh* (1868), ii.223.

Edward VI died young and Mary was palpably the victim of faction divisions, what was the position under Henry VII and Henry VIII? For the first there is insufficient evidence to answer with conviction. We can detect faction-fights in the provinces and links between local alignments and the king's entourage; we know, for example, of manipulation by Richard Empson in Nottinghamshire and in Yorkshire and by Archbishop Savage, President of the Council, in Derbyshire; furthermore, as we have seen, the fall of Empson and Dudley implies the existence of factions around the king. But there is no overall picture. The little we do see suggests that Henry VII, like his granddaughter, was master in his own house. He gave considerable licence to men like Empson or Savage but was ready to discipline anyone, however much in his confidence, whose behaviour overstepped a line set very much at the king's discretion. Thus, although he was controller to the Prince of Wales, Henry Vernon still found himself in dire straits over his family's misbehaviour and was, in Edmund Dudley's opinion, 'too sore dealt with'.²⁴

To these masters of faction, the first Tudor and the last, historians like A. F. Pollard and, most recently, L. B. Smith would add the second. They see Henry VIII as a dominating, calculating man who played his courtiers and ministers as the lion-tamer plays upon his lions. Contemporaries were certainly impressed with Henry's authority and even today something of the force of the man breathes in Holbein's great drawing, made to dominate the privy chamber at Whitehall. But appearances are not everything. The king's dominance often slept; there were many days when he showed no interest beyond 'pastime with good company' and many others when he was content to follow his ministers.²⁵ It was the king's nature, rather, to intervene casually or to break out in a sudden

²⁴ C. J. Harrison, 'The Petition of Edmund Dudley', in *English Historical Review*, 87 (1972), 88.

²⁵ The sentiments of the king's own song deserve attention:

Pastime with good company I love and shall until I die. Grudge who lust, but none deny; So God be pleased, thus live will I; For my pastance, Hunt, sing and dance; My heart is set All goodly sport For my comfort: Who shall me let?	Youth must have some dalliance, Of good or ill some pastance, Company methinks then best All thoughts and fancies to digest, For idleness Is chief mistress Of vices all: Then who can say But mirth and play Is best of all?
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burst of energy as his interests and emotions were engaged and increasingly, as the French ambassador Marillac noted, his distrust and fear. And here lay the opportunity. The men who knew Henry best, his courtiers and ministers, were convinced that the king could be influenced to intervene, whether in a single act of grace or a major exercise of power, and on this belief Cromwell, Norris and the rest staked their lives.

Again the events of 1536 are revealing. The plot against Anne Boleyn was most carefully calculated. Jane Seymour deliberately tantalised the king, at the same time poisoning his mind against Anne. The rest of the queen's enemies joined in the chorus when and how they could, the Imperial ambassador included. When the king agreed to a commission of enquiry into Anne's conduct, they had their chance. Jane kept the king occupied while Cromwell duly produced evidence enabling him to assure Henry that the suspicions voiced to him were indeed justified. Cromwell also took care to keep counter-influences away from Henry so that Jane and her allies could have a free field. Cromwell prevented Cranmer from access to the king and reduced the archbishop to sending a letter to a king whose impatience with reading was notorious. The other danger-man was Francis Bryan who was away from court at the time. Cromwell had him called back and interrogated before he was allowed to see the king; from Bryan's behaviour it is clear that he had been given the choice between accepting the Seymour marriage and following his friends to the Tower.

Four years later it was Thomas Cromwell who was the victim of a very similar conspiracy, with the bait now Catherine Howard. Just as Anne had been hustled to the Tower without the chance to see Henry, so too was Cromwell, and we are no more certain that the king read his minister's appeals than that he read Cranmer's plea on behalf of Anne or the letter the archbishop now wrote defending Cromwell. Process had gone too far. Henry spelled out the realities to Cranmer three or four years later when he also was faced with arrest:

Oh Lord God! What fond simplicity you have so to permit yourself to be imprisoned, that every enemy of yours may take advantage against you. Do you think that if they have you once in prison, three or four false knaves will be soon procured to witness against you and to condemn you?²⁶

²⁶ Ralph Morrice, 'Anecdotes of Archbishop Cranmer', in *Narratives of the Days of the Reformation*, ed. J. G. Nichols (Camden Society 77, 1859), p.255.

What made the difference in Cranmer's case was that his enemies had not sufficiently established their hold on the king by lies or distractions; Henry changed his mind. When Gardiner was the target, his attackers made the mistake of not blocking his access to the king; discovering what was afoot, the bishop went straight to Henry and won his forgiveness. The Duke of Suffolk grumbled:

If I had suspected this, I would have had him in the Tower overnight and have stopped his journey to the court.²⁷

The lesson was not forgotten next time, and in the crisis of 1546-7 Gardiner was carefully kept away.

It would clearly be an exaggeration to represent Henry VIII as exclusively the creature of faction. But those who would interpret episodes such as the attack on Cranmer as Henry stirring up division in order to reign supreme, have a hard task. They cannot set on one side an event like the fall of Cromwell, and allow that the king was suggestible in that instance. If then, why not at other times? If Henry controlled faction he was a monstrous puppet-master, making his servants dance at his pleasure. But what was his pleasure in elevating Cromwell to an earldom in April and having him arrested in June? And why when her marriage had been declared null and void was Anne Boleyn executed for being an unfaithful wife? What had the king to gain from the death, rather than the disgrace of either Cromwell or Anne, or from the deliberate hounding of Wolsey after his fall? But if Henry had been carried along by faction, there was urgent reason to keep the momentum up lest the victim's friends should stage his come-back. Must we assume self-deception when the king complained afterwards that Cromwell had been done to death 'on light pretexts' and that he now knew that he had been deceived?²⁸ The behaviour of the courtiers certainly does not suggest Henry the manipulator, rather Henry the man to be manipulated. In a poem of advice to Francis Bryan, Thomas Wyatt pointed out that selfless devotion to royal service meant financial ruin; a courtier had to compete because only this would 'bring in as fast as thou dost spend'.²⁹ William Brereton's letters show exactly the same sort of intrigue over grants and offices as at the fall of Anne Boleyn or Cromwell.

²⁷ John Foxe, *Acts and Monuments* (Church Historians of England, v. 1858), pp.690-1.

²⁸ J. J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII* (1968), p.383.

²⁹ Thomas Wyatt, *Satire 3*, in *Collected Poems*, ed. J. Daalder (1975), pp. 109-12.

Thomas Wyatt's verse gives a vivid insight into the fevered atmosphere at court. His dependence on Cromwell comes out in his lament for the minister, 'The pillar perished is whereto I leant' and on more than one occasion he was himself a victim of court intrigue.³⁰ The court attracted Wyatt:

I grant sometime that of glory the fire
Doth touch my heart: 15

but he despised the morality of the successful courtier:

I cannot crouch nor kneel, to do so great a wrong
To worship them like God on earth alone
That are as wolves these seely lambs among. 25

* * *

I cannot wrest the law to fill the coffer,
With innocent blood to feed myself fat,
And do most hurt where most help I offer.
I am not he that can allow the state
Of him Caesar, and damn Cato to die.³¹ 35

The target is never the king—'my king, my country, alone for whom I live'—but the turbulence surrounding the king.³² 'Around the Throne, thunder rolls'—Wyatt wrote in his verses on the 1536 executions which he had witnessed:

These bloody days have broken my heart:
My lust, my youth did them depart,
And blind desire of estate.
Who hastes to climb seeks to revert:
Of truth, *circa Regna tonat.* 15

The Bell-Tower showed me such sight
That in my head sticks day and night:
There did I learn out of a grate,
For all favour, glory or might,
That yet *circa Regna tonat.* 20

By proof, I say, there did I learn
Wit helpeth not defence to earn,
Of innocency to plead or prate:
Bear low, therefore, give God the stern.
For sure, *circa Regna tonat.*³³ 25

Wyatt did not use, as he well might have done, that other Tudor tag, *mors ira principis*, 'the wrath of the prince is death'.³⁴

³⁰ Wyatt, *ibid.* p.203.

³¹ Wyatt, *Satire 1*, *ibid.* pp. 100-104. line 27 *seely*: innocent.

³² Wyatt, *In Spain*, *ibid.* p.95.

³³ Wyatt, *Who list his wealth and ease retain*, *ibid.* pp. 185-6. line 13 *of estate*: for status; line 14 *seeks* . . . invites a fall; line 18 *grate*: grating; line 24 *give God the stern*: accept God's will, as a ship runs down wind.

³⁴ The source is *Proverbs* 16 verse 14.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in the management of faction we do not have a case of 'like father, like daughter'. Henry VIII appears more a victim of the system than its master.

CONCLUSION

Detailed interest in Tudor faction is barely a generation old, and still there is much to discover and already much to re-write. What is clear is that faction is a complex political and social organism. It occurs in many forms and in all levels of the community and its roots are to be found in the igneous rocks of pre-industrial England, in patronage, localism and personal monarchy. The working of faction is as distinct an area of study as the history of party, for so long a staple interest of historians. Faction is not tidy; it is usually opaque. But even now it is possible to begin to examine faction as a concept and in actuality, whether comparatively in a given situation or in terms of development over a period of years.

It is clear, furthermore, that study of faction leads not only to an understanding of what is a distinct social and political reality, hitherto largely ignored, but to a consequent revision of the accepted perspective of sixteenth-century history. In the past emphasis has been on the policy and character of rulers, the aims of government, constitutional development, foreign affairs and religion, all set in a context of social and economic movement. We must now recognise that domestic faction provides the political and social circuitry which links these components together.

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
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BACK COVER

Key: *The painting is a composite picture, celebrating the status at court of Edward Somerset, Earl of Worcester (Master of the Horse, 1601), and especially the marriage of his heir, Lord Herbert, to Anne Russell (one of Elizabeth's maids of honour), 16 June, 1600. Identifications (by Dr. Roy Strong) are: 1 Elizabeth I; 2 Lord Sheffield; 3 Earl of Nottingham; 4 Earl of Cumberland; 5 Lord Hunsdon; 6 Earl of Shrewsbury; 7 Earl of Worcester; 8 Thomas Somerset, Worcester's second son (?); 9 Lord Herbert; 11 Anne Russell; P Gentleman Pensioners; G Grooms of the coaches. Other identifications are: 10 Countess of Worcester; 12 Katherine Somerset, Lady Petre; M Maids of honour or (less probably) bridesmaids.*

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