Feature

VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS

Dr Julian Jackson *examines the position and treatment of Jews in Occupied France*

When in 1945 France came to try those who had 'collaborated' during the war, the fate of the Jews was not central. It was even possible for Xavier Vallat, Vichy's Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, to defend himself against the accusation of collaboration by arguing that he had not acted at the bidding of the Germans, since his own anti-Semitism was authentically French and 'inspired by the teaching of the Church'. That it was conceivable to offer anti-Semitism as a defence is striking evidence of the degree to which in 1945 anti-Semitism was viewed as less important than the crime of collaboration.

Even those who were not so ready to overlook the fate of the Jews were prepared to accept that the primary responsibility for wartime anti-Semitism lay with the Germans. This reassuring idea was also accepted by many Jews who wanted only to put the nightmare behind them and fit back into French society. When in 1954 Alain Resnais made a film about the concentration camps, he was obliged by the censors to cut a photograph of a French policeman helping to load people on to deportation trains: the official mythology could not accept the idea that the French had been involved in such actions.

In the 1970s, this mythology started to come under attack. More and more was written about Vichy's anti-Semitism, and there were calls for those who had committed crimes against the Jews to be brought to account. Emotion was particularly intense in 1992 which was the fiftieth anniversary of the infamous raid when almost 13,000 Jews were rounded up by French police in Paris on 16/17 July 1942 and subsequently deported to Auschwitz. In 1993, under public pressure, the government conceded that 16 July would permanently be designated a national day of commemoration of the persecution of the Jews in France. 1997 saw the opening of the trial of the 83 year old Maurice Papon who had, during the Occupation, been an official in the Prefecture of Bordeaux involved in organising the deportation of Jews to Germany. In April 1998 Papon was found guilty of crimes against humanity: this was the first time a Vichy official had been convicted for complicity in the Holocaust.

Through Papon, the Vichy regime, and France itself, was on trial. In a complete inversion of the situation prevailing in 1945, Vichy anti-Semitism was by 1998 dominating contemporary conceptions of the Occupation. Has this process gone too far and created new distortions? Recently the French historian Henri Rousso has suggested that there is a danger of writing what he calls a 'judeo-centric' account of Vichy. While not denying the enormity of Vichy's responsibility in the Holocaust or the reality of Vichy's anti-Semitism, Rousso argues that concentrating on the persecution of the Jews to the exclusion of almost every other aspect of Vichy, exaggerates the centrality of racism to the Vichy regime (in fact the Jews were never directly mentioned once in any speech of Pétain), neglects the regime's other victims (Communists, Freemasons, Resisters) and blurs the differences between Vichy anti-Semitism and Nazi anti-Semitism[1]. Somewhat differently from Rousso, other historians have suggested that a distinction should be drawn between the actions of the Vichy regime and the response of French society. Is it now possible to provide a more balanced account of the experience of the Jews in Occupied France?

Vichy and the Jews: Persecution and Collaboration

About Vichy's anti-Semitism there can be no dispute. Discriminatory measures against foreigners and Jews were among the first acts of the new regime in 1940. From 4 October Prefects were authorised to round up foreign Jews and intern them in camps. About thirty of these camps existed in the Unoccupied Zone; they were set up and run by the French without any German interference. At the end of 1940, the internment population stood at about 55-60,000, consisting largely of foreign Jewish refugees. The conditions of internment were atrocious: about 3000 Jews died in French camps from undernourishment and cold even before the Final Solution had begun.

In addition to these measures affecting foreign Jews, the Jewish Statute of 3 October 1940 excluded *French* Jews from public service employment and from 'professions that influence people' (teaching, the cinema, press). This law affected Jews whose families had been French for generations. Despite what some Vichy apologists later claimed, it was not imposed by the Germans who at this stage had no interest in what the French did to the Jews in the Unoccupied Zone. The Jewish Statute was only the beginning of an ever thickening web of regulation directed against the Jews. Over the next year, Vichy issued 26 laws and 24 decrees on the Jews. In June 1941, a second Jewish Statute extended the earlier definition of Jewishness and introduced more occupations banned to Jews. It was followed by a chain of decrees imposing quotas (usually of 2 per cent) on Jewish lawyers, doctors, student, architects, pharmacists and so on.

Left to itself, then, Vichy's attitude towards the Jews was to turn French Jews into second-class citizens and treat foreign Jews as an encumbrance to whose fate it was indifferent. But

French General and Vichy leader Phillipe Pétain shaking hands with Adolf Hitler at Montoire, October 1940.
Hulton Getty

Vichy was not left to itself for long. By the end of 1940 the Germans in Paris were actively pursuing their own anti-Semitic agenda. Whenever the Germans started to intervene in French affairs in the Occupied Zone, Vichy's dilemma was whether to let them do so, at the price of infringing France's sovereignty and jeopardising French administrative unity, or to assume responsibility for German actions even if this meant doing the Germans' dirty work for them. Almost always the latter course was chosen. When on 18 October 1940 the Germans passed an ordinance requiring Jewish enterprises in the Occupied Zone to be placed under trusteeship as a preliminary to 'Aryanization', Vichy, fearing that the Germans were intending to take over important sectors of the French economy, pre-emptively set up an agency of 'temporary administrators' to ensure that the trustees were French. As one German official noted in November 1940, the aim was to 'make the French authorities participate in the elimination of the Jews. In this way we shall make the French share the responsibility for Aryanization and we shall have at our disposal the French administrative apparatus'[2]. This Machiavellian strategy was extremely successful, and although the initiative for Aryanization had not originally come from Vichy, many French interests became caught up in it. By the summer of 1941, half the Jewish population of Paris had been deprived of any means of existence. In July, to preserve administrative unity, Vichy extended Aryanization to the Unoccupied zone as well.

The most fateful consequences of this policy of administrative collaboration arose when the Germans started to implement the 'Final Solution'. In June 1942 the Germans demanded the arrest of 40,000 Jews between the ages of 16 and 45. Dealing with this problem was the responsibility of the Vichy chief of police, René Bousquet, who was directly answerable to Laval. Bousquet's overall objective was to recover French authority over policing in the Occupied Zone. At a meeting with high-ranking Germans on 2 July 1942, Bousquet raised no objection to the principle of the deportations, but found it 'embarrassing' that they should be carried out by the French police; on the other hand, the last thing he wanted was for the Germans to interfere in policing. As for the Germans, French police co-operation was a prerequisite of the success of the operation. A compromise was reached: the French police would carry out the arrests but the operation would be restricted entirely to foreign Jews from both zones.

The arrests which occurred in Paris on 16 and 17 July were the single largest operation, but there was another series of round-ups in the unoccupied zone on 26-28 August. The government slightly modified its position in September in the face of Church protests. On 2 September, Laval asked not to be provided with new targets of Jews in the light of these difficulties. Handing over Jews was not, he said (whether regretfully or not is unclear), like buying items in a discount store. Although the deportations proceeded through September, they then ceased for the rest of the year, except for four convoys in November. In total, 41,951 Jews were deported from France in 1942.

When the cycle of deportations resumed at the start of 1943, French police were again involved. But the Vichy government became progressively less co-operative. It refused to impose the yellow star on Jews in the non-Occupied Zone as the Germans had done in the Occupied Zone since June 1942; and in August it 1943 it refused German pressure to denaturalise larger numbers of Jews. By the spring of 1943, the arrests were being carried out by the Germans alone. This meant that the distinction between French and foreign Jews no longer counted. The arrests were more random and more brutal, but the results less efficient. The biggest single operation occurred in the autumn in Nice where some 30,000 Jews had taken refuge while it was in the Italian zone of occupation. As soon as the Italians

signed an armistice in September 1943, the Germans moved in and tracked down all the Jews they could find. They lacked documentation, but this only made the operation more brutal and arbitrary. One survivor remembered:

> Official black Citroens cruised the streets of Nice, and passengers attentively scrutinised passers-by. At any moment, a pedestrian would be asked to get into a car. No useless questions or identity checks. The car went to a synagogue. There the victim was undressed. If he was circumcised, he automatically took his place in the next convoy to Drancy.[3]

Altogether 1800 Jews were arrested, much less than the 25,000 the Germans had hoped to find. In 1943, the total of deported Jews was 17,069.

In the eight months of 1944 before the Liberation, 14,833 Jews were deported. This was a slightly higher monthly figure than the previous year. The French police still participated in some of the operations involving non-French Jews (in Bordeaux and Poitiers), but most of the work was now done by the Germans with the help of French ultra-collaborators. The arrests were carried out in a frenzied and indiscriminate way. No Jews were safe whether French or foreign, young or old, sick or healthy. Hospitals and orphanages were combed for Jews. The last convoy left France on 17 August 1944, eight days before the Liberation of Paris.

If to these totals are added Jews deported from the Nord/Pas de Calais, which was attached to Belgium, and Jews deported individually as resisters, a total of 75,721 Jews were deported from France. Of these about 3.5 percent (2500) returned alive. In addition to this one can add about 4,000 Jews who died in French camps or were executed in France. This gives about 80,000 Jewish victims of the Holocaust in France. Approximately 24,000 (32 per cent) of these were French Jews and 56,500 (68 per cent) foreign. This represented approximately 12 per cent of all French Jews and 41 per cent of all foreign Jews.

Although this was not a policy inspired by the Vichy government, and although Vichy's complicity in it was dictated by the logic of its collaboration policy more than by its own anti-Semitic instincts, the truth was that Vichy shed no tears at all over the fate of foreign Jews in France who were seen as a nuisance; 'dregs' [*déchets*] was Laval's term for them[4]. He told an American diplomat that he was 'happy' the Germans were giving him a chance to get rid of the foreign Jews. It was in fact Bousquet himself who, hearing that the Germans were intending to arrest foreign Jews in the Occupied Zone, had originally suggested that they also take foreign Jews who were interned in the South. When the arrests started there, he instructed the Prefects to 'break all resistance' and 'free your area of all foreign Jews'. He asked for the names of officials whose zeal was suspect[5].

For Bousquet and Laval, the Jews were viewed as expendable in the wider scheme of collaboration and of maintaining French administrative sovereignty. Deportation was not a Vichy initiative, but it was a policy with which Vichy was ready to co-operate if raison d'état demanded, especially since it did not go fundamentally against the regime's own inclinations. As so often in the history of collaboration, ideological complicity smoothed the way.

Would things have been different if the fate of the deported Jews had been known? Laval informed the cabinet that the Jews were apparently being sent to a Jewish State in Eastern Europe, but neither he nor Bousquet made any inquiry as to whether this was true. When the Protestant leader Pastor Boegner saw Laval on 9 September, he was given the official line. As Boegner said: 'I talked of massacres, he replied by talking of gardening'[6].

After the war, Laval's post-war defenders argued that French police co-operation was the price paid by Laval to preserve the lives of French Jews. Quite apart from the morally dubious notion that some Jews were more precious than others, this argument founders on the fact that without French co-operation the Germans lacked the manpower or information to round up significant numbers of either foreign or French Jews. About three quarters of the Jews were arrested by the French police. When the German police chief Heinz Rothke pleaded with Berlin in June 1943 for another 250 extra French-speaking Gestapo men to assist in the round-ups, he was told that shortages would require him to manage with what he had[7]. There were only about 2500-3000 German police in France in mid-1942.

The French Paradox

If one compares the role of the Vichy regime in the Final Solution to that of other governments — or semi-independent governments — in Nazi dominated Europe, there are few others who offered the Germans as much help despite possessing a considerable freedom of manoeuvre (a Free Zone, autonomy for the French administration even in the Occupied Zone). It was the Vichy regime which, to German surprise, had volunteered to deport foreign Jews from the Free Zone over which the Germans had no jurisdiction. Perhaps Vichy was not as co-operative as Slovakia, which delivered native and foreign Jews from its own heartland, but it was more so than Hungary which, despite having had its own anti-Semitic legislation since 1920, handed over no Jews until the country was occupied by the Germans in March 1944.

But there is a paradox in this story: France was also one of the countries with the largest surviving Jewish population. Apart from Denmark where only 7 per cent of Jews perished because the tiny Jewish population was spirited across the water to Sweden, and Italy, where the non co-operation of the authorities (until the German occupation in September 1943) meant that only 16 per cent were deported, nowhere else was the rate of survival higher than in France where about 'only' 24 per cent of Jews were deported, as opposed to 78 per cent in Holland, 45 per cent in Belgium and 50 per cent in Hungary.

There is no single reason why a higher number of Jews from France survived the war than in much of the rest of Western Europe[8]. Throughout Nazi Europe the fate of the Jews depended on a variety of factors: the presence of an independent government able to interpose itself between the Jews and the Germans; the willingness of such a government to do so; the numbers of German occupation troops; the timing of the Germans' anti-Jewish policies; the reactions of public opinion and the organisations which expressed it (especially the Churches); the extent to which sympathy towards the Jews was translated into effective rescue networks; the geography and topography of the country; the size and distribution of the Jewish population.

None of these factors was necessarily decisive in itself; what mattered was how they combined with each other. Holland and Belgium are both small and highly urbanised countries, but only a quarter of Jews from Holland survived while in Belgium it was almost two thirds. Holland witnessed the first big demonstration against anti-Semitism, but Dutch rescue

networks were less effective than those in Belgium. By the time it was clear what the Nazis had in store for the Jews, most of the Dutch Jews had been concentrated into three ghetto districts of Amsterdam. Geography – proximity to Sweden – may have helped the Jews of Denmark, but it was not enough to save those of Norway, most of whom perished. Apart from geography, the successful rescue of the Danish Jews was due to a combination of factors: the obstructiveness of the government, the solidarity of civil society and the effectiveness of the rescue network and the fact that the Germans, reluctant to antagonise the Danish government, did not act against the Jews of Denmark until the summer of 1943.

How many of these factors operated in France, and how did they combine? The historian Annie Kriegel, herself a Jewish survivor of the period who was in the Jewish communist resistance, later suggested that if the Vichy state had not existed more Jews would have perished. This was not meant to deny the reality of Vichy anti-Semitism but simply to make the point that unlike occupied countries where the Germans were able to give orders directly to the local police, Vichy did provide some kind of screen between the population and the Germans. Vichy did sometimes say 'no' – as in the refusal to impose the star in June or to denaturalise more Jews in August 1943 – and Vichy did sometimes try and slow things down – as in September 1942. Is it possible to say that without Vichy more Jews would have died?

Even if it is possible to say that without Vichy more Jews might have perished, there are two objections to be made to Kriegel's argument. First, if it is true that the little Vichy did to protect the Jews contributed to saving some of them, then it could certainly have done more. The case against Vichy is not only what it did, but what it did not do despite the fact that in theory it enjoyed the rights of an independent government. Secondly, although there was a distinction between Vichy persecution and German extermination, Vichy continued to apply and refine its own policies even while the German were applying theirs. For example, in December 1942 Vichy required all Jews, French and foreign, to have their identity and ration cards stamped 'juif'. This made the Jews all the more vulnerable to the German policy of arrest and deportation. From 1942 Vichy behaved towards the Jews like a family building a bonfire in its backyard despite the presence of a forest fire just over the fence.

For Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, the most important determinant of the Jews' fate was Germany. They claim that the survival rate of the Jews depended on 'the degree to which the Nazis were willing and able to apply themselves to their task'[9]. This willingness and ability were however partly dependent on other factors like the reactions of civil society and the obstructiveness, or lack of it, of the governments with which Germany had to deal. Although it is true that the Germans applied their policy in fits and starts, once Vichy's position became marginally less co-operative after September 1942, the rate of deportations never again reached the figure of 3,000 per week which it had attained between July and September 1942. There was no doubting the murderous determination of the Germans in Nice in 1943, but the operation, carried out without the assistance of the French police, was much less successful than the round-ups in Paris in 1942.



Jewish Internment and Deportation Camps (August 1942)

A. Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte* (Paris: la Decouverte, 1991)

From State to Society

There was also another reason for this: in 1942 the Jews had been taken totally unawares by the arrests; in 1943 they had had time to prepare themselves. The

fate of the Jews, in other words, can not be understood without also examining the responses of the Jews. Initially Jewish leaders had no idea how to react to the unprecedented situation in which they found themselves. French Jews hung pathetically on to the idea that the French State would not abandon them to their fate. They were desperate to believe that what was happening to them was the fault of the Germans, and the Vichy was doing its best to protect them. For this reason such French Jews as Raymond-Raoul Lambert, a distinguished Jewish leader who had before the war enjoyed the friendship of many French politicians, continued to believe the best he could of Vichy. 'One has to play on the sincerity of Vallat', he wrote. In June 1941, he anguished whether he should get his children to New York: 'I will remain a Frenchman until my death, but if the French nation legally rejects me from its midst, do I have the right to decide that my children must be pariahs?'[10]. In 1943 Lambert was arrested with both his children, and sent to Auschwitz. The reactions of French Jews were also complicated by the fact that some of them agreed that there were too many foreign Jews in France. The President of the Central Consistory (the top administrative body of French Jewry), Jacques Helbronner, who had been a friend of Pétain since 1917, even proposed a revised Jewish Statute to eliminate from public life 'elements which cannot be assimilated to the national spirit'[11].

But for all Jews, French or foreign, July 1942 was a turning point. As Annie Kriegel remembered it:

> I saw a policemen in uniform who was carrying a suitcase in each hand and crying. I distinctly remember those tears running down a rugged, rather reddish face because you would agree that it is rare to see a policeman cry in public. He walked down the street, followed by a small group of children and old people carrying little bundles ... It was the *rafle* [round-up] ... I continued on my way when at the crossroads ... I heard screams rising to the heavens: not cries and squawks such as you hear in noisy and excited crowds, but the sort of screams you hear in hospital delivery rooms.

At a loss what to do she sat down on a park bench and waited: 'It was on that bench that I left my childhood'[12]. At the same time the Jews of France collectively lost their innocence. Thousands went into hiding and fled to the South; others turned to resistance.

Only a tiny minority of Jews engaged in armed Resistance. The most important Jewish resistance took the form of saving Jews from deportation. This was largely the work of Jewish charitable organisations which moved gradually from legality into clandestinity. Among these was the Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE) a relief organisation for Jewish children originally founded in 1912 after the Russian pogroms. In 1940 and 1941 it was involved, quite legally, in ameliorating the conditions of children in the internment camps, and trying to get them out; by the end of 1942 it was also fully engaged in clandestine activity to save Jewish children: smuggling them across the borders, forging papers, arranging hiding places. One important escape network which existed under the legal cover of the OSE was run from Lyons by a Jewish engineer, Georges Garel: he managed to disperse and hide about 1600 children. Another network, run from Nice by a Syrian Jew, Moussa Abadi, with the help of only two assistants, saved about 500 children and dispersed them in orphanages, convents and schools. Overall the OSE probably saved between 7500 and 9000 children[13].

None of these efforts would have succeeded without the complicity of non-Jews. Many of the children were taken in by non-Jewish families or hidden in religious institutions. In other words, the fate of the Jews in France cannot be understood, finally, without looking also at the response of the population at large.

Solidarity with the Jews is not something which could have been predicted from the attitude of the French population during the first two years of the Occupation. The prevailing sentiment ranged between indifference and hostility. The first Jewish Statute aroused little interest. Only 14 out of 42 prefects in the Unoccupied Zone reported any reaction at all – nine favourable, four unfavourable, one mixed[14]. Indifference did not necessarily mean non-involvement. The application of the Statutes drew numerous sectors of the population into active participation in anti-Semitism. It was the French professional organisations of doctors, dentists, lawyers and architects who administered the quotas in their professions; it was the universities who excluded Jewish teachers.

A rare exception to the generalised indifference towards the Jews came from the Protestant leader Pastor Boegner who wrote a much publicised letter of solidarity to the Chief Rabbi on 26 March 1941 protesting against the Statute. But even he accepted that there was a problem regarding recent Jewish immigrants. Catholic leaders said nothing.

If the attitude of the population as whole could be characterised as one of generalised xenophobia mixed with indifference, the early attitude of the Resistance was hardly different. Little attention was paid until the second half of 1941. In some cases there was even sympathy with the notion that a Jewish 'problem' existed. It was the events of the summer of 1942 which transformed popular perceptions of the Jews. Already in June the authorities noted the adverse reaction of the Parisian population to the imposition of the yellow star. The roundups of the summer of 1942 caused outrage throughout France. The public was shocked by the horrifying scenes of screaming children being rounded up with their parents or forcibly separated from them.

On Sunday 23 August 1942, the respected Archbishop of Toulouse, Saliège, broke the silence of the Catholic Church. In the Cathedral, he read out a pastoral letter unequivocally condemning the arrests. He reminded his listeners that the Jews were 'our brothers'; treating them like this was a violation of Christian morality. This message was read out in every church in the diocese, despite being forbidden by the Prefect. Saliège's example was followed by four other leading Catholic prelates: Théas of Montauban, Gerlier of Lyons, Delay of Marseilles and Mousaron of Albi. The Resistance press which had been so discreet on the Jewish issue now joined the chorus of condemnation.

By the end of the year the emotion had died down. After Gerlier and Pétain met in October, the Church and the regime seemed to have made it up. The introduction of the compulsory labour service for French workers meant that the term '*déporté*' was now commonly used to describe labour recruits being drafted to Germany. Indeed to some people the Jews now appeared as privileged because at least they were not liable for labour service. But something had irrevocably changed in the summer of 1942. The protests may not have lasted, but they gave way to quiet solidarity, and the development of an infrastructure to aid the Jews.

The first rescue efforts were spontaneous and improvised. During the *rafle* in the Lyons region in August 1942, Jewish children had been parked in a disaffected barracks at Venisseux outside Lyons. Exploiting the confusion whether or not children were to be deported, the OSE representatives managed to get about 100 of them out. Amitié Chrétienne, an organisation run by two Catholic priests, Pierre Chaillet and Alexandre Glasberg, helped to place the children in safety, dispersing them in religious houses and among Catholic families.

This was only the start of more formal links between Jewish rescue organisations and sympathetic Catholics. Amitié Chrétienne, which had been founded to help foreign refugees, now became a cover for help to Jews. The Jewish rescue network set up by Georges Garel, who had been involved in the Venisseux rescue, was encouraged by Archbishop Saliège who gave him entry to religious institutions in the Toulouse diocese where Jewish children could be hidden. Moussa Abadi's network in Nice was assisted by the Bishop Paul Rémond who offered Abadi a cover by appointing him 'inspector of independent education' and gave him a room in the bishopric from which to operate. The nuns of the order of Notre-Dame-de-Sion in Paris placed around 450 children in non-Jewish families in the region. In Lyons the nuns of the same order specialised in forging identity papers.

Even more important was the help provided by the Protestants. Much of this was co-ordinated by CIMADE (the Comité Intermouvment aupres des evacués) a Protestant organisation founded in 1939 to help refugees. Continuing its work among inhabitants of the camps after 1940, it made contacts with sympathetic pastors who were able to provide refuges for children in their communities. Many of these were in the Cévennes, a mountainous area of the Languedoc with a large Protestant population. The Protestants of this area viewed their solidarity with the persecuted Jews in the light of their own history of resistance to persecution from the French Catholic State over the centuries. The most celebrated example was the isolated village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon where, under the leadership of their pastor André Trocmé, and his wife Magda, the 2,000 villagers hid some 2,500 Jews during the course of the Occupation, some for a few days on their way to other destinations, others for months or even years[15].

Many Jews, however, were saved not by organised rescue networks, but by the spontaneous actions of individuals from all walks of life. Saul Friedlander, today a historian at Tel Aviv, was nine years old in 1940, when his family from Prague settled in a small town in the Allier. He was befriended by a local librarian who placed him, with the consent of his parents, in a Catholic boarding school at Montlucon. His parents who tried to escape across the Swiss border were refused entry and handed over to the French police. In November 1942 they were deported to Auschwitz[16]. Simon Fuks, a Paris tailor, was helped to escape from Drancy by a benevolent guard, Camille Matthieu, who then hid the whole family for the rest of the occupation at his mother's house in a village in the Aude[17]. There are hundreds, thousands, other such stories to be told.

Why were these rescue efforts so successful? Undoubtedly geography was a significant factor. France is a large country with mountains, and she enjoyed common borders with two non-belligerent countries (Spain, Switzerland). But the effectiveness of the rescue organisations, whether run by Jews or non-Jews, depended on the solidarity, passive or active, formal or informal, of the French population. For 150 years, the Jews of France had looked to the State to protect them if necessary from the anti-Semitic outbursts of civil society; in the Occupation it was civil society that helped protect the Jews from the State.

References

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[14] Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp.15-16.

[15] P. Hallie, *Lest Innocent Blood be Shed* (New York, 1979).

[16] S. Friedlander, *Quand vient le souvenir* (Paris, 1978).

[17] A. Rayski, *Le Coix des juifs sous Vichy* (Paris, 1992), pp.144-5.

Further Reading

M. Marrus and R. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York, 1981) was a pioneering book which remains the best study of Vichy policy towards the Jews. S. Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz* (Paris, 1983-5) is a detailed study of Vichy's role in the Final Solution. S. Zucotti, *The Holocaust, the French and the Jews* (New York, 1993) and A. Kaspi, *Les Juifs pendant l'Occupation* (Paris, 1991) are good overviews. A. Cohen, *Persecutions et sauvetages. Juifs et Français sous l'occupation et sous Vichy* (Paris, 1993) and R. Poznanski, *Etre Juif en France pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1994) both have a lot to say about Jewish strategies of survival. D. Ryan, *The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille* (Chicago, 1996) is a good local study.

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